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The Michigan Economic Development Corporation requested third-party input to assess the 
effectiveness and return on investment (ROI) of the Michigan Business Development Program 
(MBDP). Since 2012, MBDP has provided grants and loans to businesses for “highly 
competitive projects in Michigan that create jobs and/or provide investment.” 
 
The Center for Regional Economic Competitiveness (CREC) and the W.E. Upjohn Institute for 
Employment Research examined three aspects of the MBDP to assess effectiveness: the 
MBDP’s economic return on investment, the importance of the MBDP incentive to securing 
projects and generating results for Michigan, and a comparison to other states’ incentive 
program management practices. The analysis is based on MBDP-funded project reports and 
original research using MBDP project histories. The ROI estimates were developed using the 
Upjohn Institute’s cutting-edge state-level model for incentive evaluation research. 
Return on Investment 
The study estimates that the MBDP has an ROI of 3.86. That is, for every $1 the state invests in 
the MBDP, the program results in a net gain of $3.86 in per capita income for Michigan 
residents. This ROI is higher than that for many other state incentive programs because:  
 
• Michigan has targeted relatively high multiplier industries with an extensive network of 
local manufacturing suppliers that benefit when their incentivized customer grows; 
• Michigan’s MBDP incentives are provided up-front, which increases cost-effectiveness 
because many businesses pay the most attention to near-term investment returns; 
• Michigan’s MBDP incentives are relatively modest in size, which increases effectiveness 
per dollar as incentives tend to experience declining returns as size increases.  
This study’s ROI approach is different from MEDC’s current method of calculating ROI, so the 
study results vary from MEDC-reported results. The main difference is that this study considers 
a broad range of economic and fiscal benefits and costs to the state while MEDC’s current 
approach emphasizes anticipated cash flow to the state from growth in taxes. Incorporating 
economic effects is important for understanding whether incentivized projects have a positive 
economic impact in a manner consistent with MEDC’s mission and vision. 
Importance of the Incentive 
A key finding is that even when the incentive’s impact on company decisions is estimated to be 
modest, the MBDP still generates the positive program ROI of nearly 4:1 as described above. 
The estimated long-term benefits of even one new full-time job are such that the program 







reaches a breakeven ROI point with a “but for” percentage of less than 1 percent. This is 
because the long-term earnings benefits far outweigh the MBDP’s modest costs.  
 
This study provides a more systematic approach than prior studies in assessing whether 
proffered incentives help secure projects and the effect those investments may have on ROI. 
MEDC’s current ROI methodology implicitly assumes that 100 percent of the estimated benefits 
can be attributed to the incentive, as is the practice in most states. The study team suggests an 
alternative approach for two reasons. First, in practice, it is impossible to know with certainty 
whether a company would have made an investment without the incentive. Second, many 
factors, such as workforce and infrastructure quality, influence business investment decisions. 
Incentives are considered in combination with these other factors. Therefore, incentives rarely 
are 100 percent responsible for an investment. Similarly, they rarely have zero impact. 
 
In response, the study team developed two different approaches to adjusting the calculation of 
net benefits when estimating ROI for the MBDP. Both approaches indicate that the incentive 
played a role in the investment decision and that varying proportions of project outcomes can be 
attributed to the effect of the incentive.  
State Comparisons 
MEDC’s procedures for pre-award analysis and post-award program management are 
consistent with standard practices in comparable state incentive programs. No state has a 
perfect program, and all states face the same challenges around calculating returns, managing 
compliance, and evaluating performance. Nevertheless, comparing analytical and management 
procedures to similar programs in other states can yield helpful insights for improving 
effectiveness. The program examination suggests: 
 
• ROI is not calculated consistently across states. ROI is typically one of several factors 
used to decide whether to grant incentives and to calibrate the amount of the incentive.  
• “But for” is frequently considered although seldom well-defined. Most programs do not 
have a statutory “but for” requirement. Even so, most states ask applicants to provide 
project-specific information that would indicate either the level of competition for the 
project or a rationale for requesting the incentive.  
• As in Michigan, other states prepare performance agreements with companies receiving 
incentives that detail job creation and other requirements, and incentives are typically 
paid after performance is achieved, often with intermediate milestones and payments.  
• Annual company reporting requirements, including payroll documentation, ability to 
conduct audits, site visits, and ability to verify company inputs with state unemployment 
insurance and/or revenue offices are common compliance procedures. 







• States are improving their reporting on outcome metrics, including compliance with 
performance agreements and actual jobs created compared to projected jobs. However, 
the process of tracking and reporting on outcomes is complicated by timing issues, 
project amendments, and dismissed or terminated projects. States lack an industry 
standard to guide incentive reporting. 
Options for Consideration 
One reason for assessing the MBDP’s effectiveness is to identify ways to enhance the 
program’s economic impact for Michiganders. Options for consideration include:  
Reorient the ROI analysis to emphasize economic impact over a 10-year time 
horizon 
The MBDP’s internal measure of ROI is currently limited to fiscal gains to state government 
even though the program is expected to generate economic benefits related to job creation. 
MEDC may consider adapting its impact model to include economic as well as fiscal impacts. 
The timeframe for ROI analysis should be extended beyond the current 2- to 3-year time 
horizon in order to more completely capture benefits and costs. This study’s findings suggest 
that a 10-year timeframe for analysis would capture most benefits and costs. 
Address costs more explicitly in ROI estimations 
Economic impact estimates are viewed with skepticism if they overstate the benefits and ignore 
costs such as greater public service expenses associated with growth, higher prices for local 
businesses, and opportunity costs. The MEDC specifically asked that this effectiveness study 
take into consideration several of these cost factors. The ROI estimation procedures should be 
adapted to reflect these costs as well as economic benefits.  
Account for the incentive’s level of influence on investment decisions 
ROI measures can overstate benefits by assuming that the incentive is responsible for all 
positive outcomes. This study provides two methods of calculating a percentage that estimates 
the incentive’s importance for individual projects and across the program. Alternatively, MEDC 
can simply discount the estimated net benefits at set levels, such as 10%, 50%, 70% and 100% 
of the estimated ROI for potential projects. This basic method would also allow MEDC to identify 
the break-even point for projects and, with experience, establish either target levels or minimum 
levels for project approvals.  
The ROI model can help direct incentives toward projects with the greatest 
economic impact . . .  
The model used to estimate ROI is designed to highlight how the ROI varies by project 
characteristics.  Prioritizing higher-return projects would mean targeting areas with high 
unemployment rates, emphasizing industries with high multipliers, and recognizing the 
dampening economic impact of rising local prices due to job and population growth.  







. . . But ROI should be used in concert with other project review criteria to drive 
decisions that reflect economic objectives 
States seek many benefits that cannot be captured in a single ROI calculation. In some cases, 
MEDC should be willing to accept lower ROIs when projects help achieve important objectives 
not included in the ROI, such as bringing abandoned properties back into productive use, hiring 
populations with barriers to employment, or positioning Michigan-based operations for future 
growth. ROI should not be the only factor driving the decision to provide incentives.  
Revisit MBDP’s purpose and eligibility rules to assess match with current state 
needs  
The economic, political and incentive environments have changed since MBDP was created. 
MEDC may wish to consider how to improve MBDP’s effectiveness in today’s economic 
development setting. As companies struggle to find workers, is it sensible to focus exclusively 
on job creation? Should a worker training option be evaluated? Should the MBDP consider 
revising its own eligibility criteria to expand its reach to smaller, Michigan-based enterprises?  
Continue to pursue options to use unemployment insurance data to verify 
company-provided data on job creation 
States are increasingly striving to verify jobs and payroll data provided by incentive recipients 
with information that companies submit to state unemployment insurance (UI) agencies. While 
these records provide a useful check on data that incentivized firms submit, they are not 
foolproof. In Michigan, the unemployment insurance agency generally does not collect site-
specific data for employers paying into the system, meaning the data currently is inadequate for 
MBDP compliance verification. One option would be to require or request MBDP applicants to 
create “chargeable locations” in their firm’s UI records to simplify compliance and allow for 
milestone verification.  
Strengthen cooperation with local partners  
The MBDP could be improved by strengthening cooperation with local economic development 
partners. Options include providing local partners greater transparency on local projects, 
sharing updates on milestones from companies in their communities, and implementing a joint 












Since 2012, the Michigan Economic Development Corporation (MEDC)1 has offered the 
Michigan Business Development Program (MBDP), which provides discretionary grants and 
loans to businesses via an application and due diligence process for “highly competitive projects 
in Michigan that create jobs and/or provide investment.” MEDC has requested external 
assistance to determine the effectiveness and return on investment (ROI) of this incentive 
program. The goal of this effort is to help MEDC better allocate its limited resources and to 
invest in economic development programs that yield net benefits for the state.  
 
The MEDC requested the following three analytical elements to understand the MBDP’s impact 
and effectiveness:  
 
• Return on investment by project and program, including a comparison of findings to the 
ROI projected by the REMI model currently used by MEDC; 
• Assessment of how important the incentive was to securing the project for Michigan and 
creating jobs; and 
• Comparisons of ROI, up-front project analysis, and program management of MBDP to 
similar incentives offered in other states.  
The study concludes with a set of options to improve MBDP ROI practices and up-front 
analyses prior to making award decisions, plus suggestions for improvements to program 
design and administration that could enhance the effectiveness of MBDP.  
II. Methodology 
The Center for Regional Economic Competitiveness (CREC) and the W.E. Upjohn Institute are 
nonprofit organizations that work on topics related to economic development incentive 
evaluation research, including data sharing, economic modeling, legislative action designed to 
improve incentive goal setting, and ROI analysis. The methodology for this assessment 
incorporates these services. The resulting analysis is built around project-specific data and 
original research using MBDP project histories.  
                                               
1 The Michigan Strategic Fund (MSF) receives an annual appropriation from the legislature for a number 
of economic development programs, including the Michigan Business Development Program (MBDP). 
The MSF Board of Directors has granted authority to the Michigan Economic Development Corporation 
(MEDC) to provide administrative services to the MSF for the MBDP. All recommendations for awards 
under the program and approval or modifications of the program guidelines are presented to the MSF 
Board for consideration. 








MEDC’s ROI formula defines net benefits as the expected increased state revenue over the 
term of the MBDP incentive, taking into account incentive costs. Upjohn’s ROI estimation model 
differs from the model MEDC currently uses by capturing a broader set of economic costs and 
benefits in addition to fiscal impact. The Upjohn-developed ROI model represents an 
improvement over most other tools used to calculate ROI for incentive programs; it includes the 
ability to take into account opportunity costs and the importance of the incentive in securing 
projects for the state – two critical factors requested by MEDC for this assessment.   
Accordingly, this study defines net benefits as the present value of the gains in real income per 
capita for Michigan residents. Specifically, the Upjohn model includes the analysis of benefits, 
such as increases in state and local tax revenue, gains in worker earnings due to both increases 
in the employment-to-population ratio and increases in real wages, and gains in property values. 
Increases in public spending to accommodate population change, effects on local firms that face 
higher costs due to increased wages and property costs, and effects of financing the incentive 
are among the costs. Opportunity costs are built into the model by incorporating the need for 
states to account for the resources required to provide the incentive.  
 
This new methodology captures the idea that economic development incentives such as MBDP 
are primarily aimed at giving a state’s residents better economic opportunities due to increased 
access to good jobs. The model’s inclusion of gains in real earnings per capita due to higher 
employment to population ratios and higher real wages captures the value of such opportunities. 
But this study’s methodology also captures various offsets; for example, new jobs, while they 
may increase a state’s tax revenue, also increase the state’s population, which requires 
additional state and local public spending to maintain the same quality of public services. 
 
This study’s present value of net benefits is calculated over an 80-year and 10-year period. This 
timeframe differs significantly from MEDC’s current approach of looking at the 2- to 3-year term 
of the MBDP incentive. A longer time period is appropriate for understanding both the longer-
term economic costs and benefits from incentivized projects. In most model simulations, the 
present value of the 10-year and 80-year estimates are similar, as most of the net benefits of 
new jobs for a state’s residents accrue in the first 10 years after the jobs are created. 
 
For this study, we adapted the baseline Upjohn model to make it specific to Michigan and the 
MBDP. The model was modified to use the actual jobs created as reported in the MEDC 
program database for each MBDP project. Actual incentive disbursements and repayments from 
the database were also incorporated. For all projects, the model assumes that the last-reported 
cumulative number of jobs created will persist and that no future incentive disbursements or 
repayments will be made. Finally, the model incorporates Michigan-specific information on 
value-added per industry, county-level unemployment rates, taxes and spending patterns and 
effects, industry multipliers, and housing price elasticities. 
 







Full details are provided in Appendix A.   
Importance of the Incentive  
A common question in evaluating incentives is whether a project would have happened without 
the incentive. Put another way, would the project not have happened “but for” the incentive? 
“But for” is a challenging analysis for both individual incentive deals and program evaluation 
because we cannot know with certainty the relative values of the multiple drivers (including 
incentives) behind each individual business’s location decision. Incentives themselves are often 
layered, and it can become impossible to assign any one incentive full responsibility for making 
a deal happen.  
 
Our approach, therefore, is not to require that a specific incentive account for 100 percent of a 
project decision or outcome in order to be considered valid. Instead, we have estimated a set of 
percentages to indicate the expected impact of the incentive on a project using two different 
approaches, as described below. We have also determined the “but-for” level that would need to 
be assumed for projects to break even according to the ROI model used for this analysis.  
 
• The first approach (referenced as the “cost sensitivity” approach) builds on the research 
literature addressing how location decisions in general are sensitive to tax costs and 
how incentives help firms reduce those costs.  
• The second approach (referenced as the “firm choice” approach) draws on the research 
literature describing factors that affect “but for” and applies these factors to individual 
MBDP projects to create a scaled score hypothesizing the likely level of influence of the 
MBDP incentive on the business decision.  
Cost sensitivity approach 
The first approach is based on literature findings that state location decisions in general are 
sensitive to tax costs and how incentives help firms reduce those costs. Upjohn’s cost sensitivity 
approach used for most of the ROI estimates, and applied to all 239 projects, is based on 
estimates of how businesses respond to taxes. 
 
The research literature suggests that a 10 percent reduction in state and local business taxes 
holding the quality of public services constant will, in the long run, increase a state’s level of 
business activity by about 5 percent. The cost sensitivity approach assumes that “a cost is a 
cost,” and that changes in business costs due to other factors, such as incentives, will have 
similar effects per dollar as business tax changes.  
 
To operationalize this, we re-express the business tax effects by effects on overall business 
costs associated with a business’s activity. There are a variety of ways to measure the 
magnitude of a business’s activity. One standard measure of a business’s scale is “value-







added”: the value of its output minus the value of the material inputs it purchases. As a 
percentage of business value-added, state and local business taxes have historically averaged 
around 5 percent (Bartik 2017; Phillips, Sallee, and Peak 2016). Therefore, if a 10 percent 
reduction in business taxes increased desired business activity by 5 percent, the implication is 
that a 0.5 percent reduction in costs as a percentage of value-added will increase desired 
business activity by 5 percent, or a 1 percent reduction in costs as a percent of value-added will 
increase desired business activity by 10 percent  
 
For the but-for percentage to be consistent with these effects, a 1 percent reduction in business 
costs as a percent of business value-added due to incentives would have to increase the 
probability of the business making that location or expansion decision by 10 percentage points.  
In calculating incentive costs as a percentage of value-added, we must consider how business 
decision-makers make investment decisions, and how they weigh immediate investment costs 
versus changes in profits next year, five years from now, and ten years from now. In practice, 
this is operationalized in the model by estimating the stream of value added associated with a 
project over an infinite time horizon. This stream of value added is discounted at a real discount 
rate of 12 percent (Poterba and Summers, 1995). MBDP incentives are also discounted using a 
12 percent discount rate. The ratio of the two is then taken. This percentage is then used to 
project the but-for percentage for that individual project.  
Firm choice approach 
For the second approach, we no longer assume that “a cost is a cost,” but that a discretionary 
grant offered during a competitive site selection process would have a different impact than a 
general reduction in costs.  The MBDP is a discretionary grant program to which firms must 
apply and receive approval - as opposed to a statutory tax program available to all eligible 
companies. We therefore assume the MBDP could have a different level of influence on 
individual firm decisions than would be assumed from the tax cost sensitivity literature.   
 
The cost sensitivity approach built into the aforementioned ROI model also implicitly assumes 
that location decisions do not vary with the characteristics of the local area or take into 
consideration national incentive competition.2 We know that location decisions do vary by local 
area characteristics and are affected by national incentive competition. Many location-specific 
factors influence business investment decisions, including access to customers and suppliers, 
talent availability, infrastructure, quality of place, and availability of sites or buildings, as well as 
incentives. The competitive environment drives much of incentive use and is therefore 
necessary to consider when striving to assess the importance of incentives to investment 
decisions.  
 
Taking these factors into consideration, CREC developed the firm choice approach. Instead of 
assuming “average” responsiveness to incentives based on sensitivity to costs, we examined 
                                               
2 Bartik 2018a, p. 148. 







individual company statements regarding the nature of each MBDP project, Michigan’s 
competitive advantages and disadvantages, and competing locations under consideration. We 
also incorporated interviews of local partners to gain their understanding of the role the MBDP 
incentive played in each project decision.  
 
This project-specific documentation allowed the study team to compare information provided by 
the company to a set of characteristics from the research literature that have been determined 
to increase firm sensitivity to location-based incentives when making investment decisions. The 
result was a weighted list of relevant project characteristics that affect “but for.” These 
characteristics were scored for each individual project and then translated into a percentage 
indicating the hypothesized level of influence the MBDP incentive had on the investment 
decision.  
 
Additional details on both approaches are provided in Appendix B.  
State Comparisons 
Comparing analytical and management procedures to similar programs in other states can yield 
helpful insights for improving effectiveness. This analysis compares information on four 
programs similar in structure to MBDP to illuminate how different states evaluate projects to 
determine an incentive award (“pre-award analysis”) and how states monitor and evaluate the 
expected impact of projects that have received incentive support (“post-award program 
management”). No state has a perfect program, and all states face the same issues around 
calculating projected ROI, managing compliance, and evaluating performance.  The state 
comparison analysis is intended to highlight only how different states assess and use ROI 
estimates and “but for” analyses in their incentive programs.   
 
CREC developed and maintains the C2ER State Business Incentives Database, a national 
database of more than 2,000 active and inactive state business incentive programs. It is a portal 
designed to be a one-stop resource for economic developers to compare incentive programs 
across states. Data provided in the database is fully searchable by more than 50 different 
indicators. To find comparable programs to MBDP, CREC used the database to search for 
‘discretionary’ incentive programs that award $10 million or less in grants and loans to a single 
applicant for relocating or expanding net new jobs. 
 
From the resulting list, four state programs were selected in consultation with MEDC, based 
primarily on similarity to the MBDP purpose and structure. The programs included in this review 
are Minnesota’s Job Creation Fund (JCF), North Carolina’s Job Development Investment Grant 
(JDIG), Ohio’s JobsOhio Economic Development Grant, and the Texas Enterprise Fund (TEF). 
Based on available information, CREC prepared profiles for each incentive program describing 
their purposes, eligibility requirements, program provisions and guidelines, and the application 







processes. The format of the profiles matches the MBDP summary available on the MEDC 
website. The four state program profiles are available in Appendix C. 
 
For each state program, the CREC team accessed publicly available materials found online. 
Some state contacts provided confidential information. CREC requested interviews with 
program experts in each state to obtain additional insight into the respective program 
management procedures and performance measurement approaches. The interview protocol is 
included in Appendix C. 
III. Overall ROI and Factors Impacting the ROI  
 
This section describes the MBDP’s ROI, which was calculated using the economic model 
developed by the Upjohn Institute for incentive evaluation research and analysis. The estimated 
overall return on investment of the MBDP is 3.86 – the net benefits of the MBDP to the state of 
Michigan outweigh the net costs of the program by nearly 4 to 1. The overall ROI determination 
is based on a range of economic and fiscal benefits and costs to Michigan residents. How the 
overall ROI is determined for the MBDP program, as well as an analysis of how the ROI varies 
across projects that are in process, complete, or have ended, is discussed in this section.  
Overall ROI 
A summary of different types of project benefits and costs and the overall ROI is shown in Table 
1. This summary includes the 41 projects considered by MEDC to be completed or terminated, 
and the 198 projects for which some incentive payments have been made and some jobs have 
been created for a total 239 projects. Table 1 also reports a separate analysis for the 32 
projects (out of the 41 completed/terminated projects) that were formally completed or 
terminated.  The results are shown by different types of benefits and costs, including increases 
in per capita earnings; fiscal benefits from increases in state and local tax revenues that exceed 
public service needs from a higher population; capital gains from higher property values due to 
job growth; benefits from exporting some incentive costs to out-of-state business owners; costs 
for local businesses from higher local prices and wages; and incentive costs. 
 






















Earnings benefits $122.2 $578.0 $700.2 $79.1 
Fiscal benefits $13.2 $73.9 $87.1 $8.4 
Property value benefits $19.7 $93.5 $113.3 $14.4 
Benefits from exporting business 
taxes $5.3 $18.8 $24.1 $4.3 
Costs for local businesses $(8.2) $(39.3) $(47.5) $(6.0) 
Gross benefits (= sum of above) $152.3 $725.0 $877.2 $100.2 
Incentive costs $33.7 $146.7 $180.4 $24.9 
Net benefits $118.5 $578.3 $696.8 $75.3 
“ROI” = Net benefits/incentive costs 3.51 3.94 3.86 3.02 
NOTE: All dollar figures are presented as 2018 present values, using 3 percent real discount rate, and are in millions 
of real dollars.  
MEDC considers all 41 Completed/terminated projects as likely to be complete, but only 32 are formally finished.  
 
The overall ROI for the MBDP program is 3.86. The ROI is slightly lower for the 
completed/terminated projects at 3.51 and even lower for the formally completed and terminated 
projects at 3.02. Although there are some differences, overall the program has a very high rate 
of return – net benefits are more than 300 percent of MEDC’s costs of incentives. To put it 
another way, the overall net benefits of the MBDP program are nearly 4 times that of every $1 
invested in the program by MEDC.   
 
The bulk of program benefits are earnings benefits. As seen in Table 1, property value gains 
and fiscal benefits are important, but even when combined, their total is less than one-third of 
the earnings benefits. The main benefit from the MBDP program for Michigan residents is the 
effect the created jobs have in boosting earnings per capita, mainly by boosting Michigan 
employment-to-population ratios. These earnings benefits from all 239 projects have a present 
value of around $700 million, which nearly equals the net benefits from the entire program. In 
other words, the MBDP program roughly breaks even from its fiscal benefits and property value 
benefits; it is its labor market benefits in higher earnings per capita that cause it to have a 
positive ROI.  
 
These benefits and costs are present values of benefits and costs over an 80-year period. 
These present-value calculations use discounting; for example, one dollar 20 years from now is 
worth only 57 cents today. There may be some concern about whether an 80-year ROI provides 
reliable estimates. Some would argue that a shorter time horizon would better reflect returns to 
the state, based on business decisions and market conditions.  
 
To address this concern, Table 2 considers how benefits and costs vary when a 10-year 
perspective is taken, rather than an 80-year perspective. A 10-year perspective does eliminate 
some long-term benefits; however, the bulk of the benefits and costs in this baseline model 







occur within the first 10 years. Moving from an 80-year to a 10-year perspective only lowers the 
overall ROI for all 239 projects about 7 percent; from 3.86 to 3.60. Note that, for the rest of this 
ROI analysis, the discussion is based on the 80-year estimates. 
 
Table 2  80-Year vs. 10-Year Perspective on MBDP 
 10-year ROI 80-year ROI 
Completed/terminated projects (41 
projects) 3.28 3.51 
Pending/in-process projects (198 projects) 3.67 3.94 
Total (239 projects) 3.60 3.86 
NOTE: ROI is net benefits/costs over number of years listed in each column, discounted at 3 percent real 
discount rate. 
 
It should be emphasized that this result is for the baseline model, which assumes that the 
MBDP program is implicitly financed by business taxes being higher than they otherwise would 
be. If we instead assumed that the MBDP program was financed by lower K-12 spending, then 
the ROI would likely be lower due to the likely impact that reduced educational spending would 
have on the wages of the next generation of Michigan residents. Appendix A provides additional 
detail on how the model addresses the opportunity costs of government financing for incentives. 
 
Table A1 in Appendix D reports the individual ROI for each of the 239 total projects, along with 
other project characteristics.  
Factors Determining ROI 
Several factors drive the ROI to be higher or lower. This analysis considers industry type, 
project type, deal size, deal structure, and location as factors affecting ROI. 
Industry type 
Table 3 reports average project ROI and other project characteristics by four industry 
categories: autos (3361-3363); other manufacturing industries in NAICS code 33; other 
manufacturing that includes NAICS 31 and 32; and non-manufacturing industries. One 
noticeable pattern is that the completed and terminated projects, which were generally initiated 
further in the past, were more dominated by auto industry-related projects. Roughly two-thirds of 
incentive dollars were devoted to autos for the completed/terminated projects, $21.2 million out 
of a total of $33.7 million. In contrast, among the pending projects, only about one-third of 
incentive dollars were devoted to auto projects, $48.7 million out of $146.7 million. 
 
In general, it appears that auto industry-related projects have a somewhat lower ROI, averaging 
2.92. The non-auto-related industrial categories all have ROIs exceeding 4.  
 






















15 11 5 10 41 
Number of Pending projects 45 60 32 61 198 
Total projects 60 71 37 71 239 
      
PV of incentive costs, 
Completed/Terminated 
projects  
21.2 3.0 3.6 5.9 33.7 
PV of incentive costs, Pending 
projects 
48.7 30.1 24.4 43.5 146.7 
PV of incentive costs, all 
projects  
69.9 33.1 27.9 49.4 180.4 
      
ROI Completed/Terminated 2.80 4.65 4.98 4.63 3.51 
ROI Pending 2.97 4.55 4.80 4.13 3.94 
ROI total 2.92 4.56 4.83 4.19 3.86 
Note: Present value of incentive costs are in millions of 2018 dollars 
 
Table 3 indicates that the higher ROI for the pending projects, compared to the 
completed/terminated projects, is due in part to the switch of incentive dollars from auto-related 
to non-auto-related projects. The actual ROI for the pending projects by industry group, versus 
the completed/terminated projects, is lower in some industry groups. For example, for non-
manufacturing projects, the ROI for completed/terminated projects is 4.63, versus 4.13 for 
pending projects.  
 
This finding is somewhat puzzling. The auto industry has a relatively high input-output multiplier, 
at 4.15, compared to the overall average multiplier of 3.69 for all 239 projects.3 The model’s 
structure also leads to the finding that, other things being equal, a higher multiplier will increase 
the project ROI. For example, as shown in Table 4, if we rerun the model for all 239 projects 
and increase each project’s multiplier by 1.0 (e.g., the auto multiplier of 4.15 becomes 5.15), 
then the overall program ROI increases considerably by over one-third, from 3.86 to 5.43.4  
                                               
3 This average multiplier is a weighted average, using incentive costs for each project as weights.  
4 To understand this, the key phrase is “other things equal.” Auto projects also tend to have a much 
higher than average value-added per worker. The autos’ projects have a value-added per worker that is 
generally above $235,000 (the exact amount varies by year). The average value-added per worker for the 
239 MBDP projects is $169,000. Thus, autos have a value-added per worker of over one-third greater 








Table 4  How Increasing the Multiplier by 1.0 Affects Program ROI 
 
Completed/terminated 
projects (41) Pending Projects (198) All Projects (239 projects) 
Baseline 3.51 3.94 3.86 
Multiplier increased by 1.0 4.86 5.56 5.43 
Note: The multiplier takes each project and makes one change: the multiplier goes up by 1.0.  
 
Figure 1 shows why auto projects have a somewhat lower ROI. The vertical axis shows the ROI 
for each of the 239 projects. The horizontal axis is 100,000 times the ratio of the project’s input-
output multiplier to the project’s value added per full-time-equivalent (FTE) worker.  As the figure 
shows, there is a strong positive relationship between this ratio and project ROI. Autos tend to 
have a below-average value for this ratio and therefore tend to have a below-average ROI.  
 
Figure 1  Project ROI vs. Ratio of Multiplier to Value Added per Worker for 239 Projects 
 
NOTE:  Horizontal axis is 100k times multiplier/value-added per FTE worker. Each dot corresponds to one of the 239 
projects. Dots in red are in auto industry. 
 
The intuition here is straightforward. For a given incentive cost per worker, the “but for” 
percentage will be lower if projects have a higher value-added per worker, yielding lower 
                                               
than the average MBDP project. The multiplier also goes up, but by less than 13 percent (4.15 / 3.69 = 
1.125). The model also says that, holding incentive costs per worker constant, if the value-added per 
worker increases by x percent, the but-for probability should decline, perhaps by close to that percentage 
value.  







benefits. If the multiplier is higher, however, benefits will be higher. Ideally, in choosing projects, 
one wants to choose those in industries with high job multipliers relative to their value-added per 
worker, meaning that the job creation effects will be relatively high per dollar of incentive costs.  
Project type 
Table 5 expands the analysis of how project ROI varies between completed/terminated projects 
and pending projects to also consider how the ROI varies between completed projects and 
terminated projects. This table also analyzes the differences in ROI between projects that 
involve a new site or a relocation, versus those that involve an expansion or an acquisition of an 
existing company.  
 
Table 5  How ROI Varies by Project Status, and by Expansion vs. New Site Projects 
 









Completed 18 $15.6 3.59 7 $12.1 3.75 
Terminated 12 $4.8 2.82 2 $1.2 2.90 
Total 
completed/terminated 30 $20.4 3.41 9 $13.3 3.67 
Pending 152 $108.2 3.91 46 $38.5 4.04 
Overall 182 $128.6 3.83 55 $51.8 3.95 
Note: Two projects with zero net costs are not in this project count. Zero benefits and zero costs. Incentive costs are 
in millions of 2018 dollars. ROI is present value of net benefits divided by present value of incentive costs. 
 
Completed projects have satisfactorily fulfilled their agreement with MEDC, whereas terminated 
projects have not. Terminated projects are expected to have a lower ROI. This is the case; 
however, the ROI only declines a little more than 20 percent. The ROI decline is not greater 
because most terminated projects involve at least some job creation, and in many cases some 
incentive payments were never paid or were refunded. Thus, there are at least some benefits, 
although less than for completed projects, and costs are also lower.  
 
There is little difference overall between projects that are new sites and those that are 
expansions. The overall ROIs are quite similar, at 3.95 for new sites/relocations and 3.83 for 
expansions or acquisitions. It is important to note that this ROI is based on the returns of the 
operations phase of each project and doesn’t include benefits from construction and capital 
expenditures. 
Deal size 
When considering how ROI varies with deal size (defined by the number of jobs involved with 
the project), large projects tend to have a somewhat lower ROI.  Figure 2 shows the project ROI 
for each of the 239 projects versus the final number of jobs reported as being created by that 
project. As the figure shows, a regression of project ROI on the projected number of jobs yields 







a coefficient that suggests that each extra 100 jobs will reduce the project ROI by −0.321 
(standard error of 0.096). This relationship is highly statistically significant (t statistic absolute 
value greater than 3) and of meaningful size.  
 
Figure 2  Project ROI vs. Project Jobs, 239 Projects 
 
NOTE:  Horizontal axis shows final number of jobs created by project.  Vertical axis shows ROI. 
 
The model’s structure in no way dictates the results. Presumably, there are various reasons why 
the larger deals have lower ROIs, such as deals not working out as often or larger deals tending 
to involve auto industries.  
 
Deal size can also be defined as project cost per job. Figure 3 compares project ROI with the 
MBDP incentive cost per final job created. (Included are top codes at $50,000 per job for a few 
projects that were relatively expensive yet created few jobs.) This figure also shows that more 
expensive projects tend to have lower ROIs. A regression suggests that each extra $1,000 of 
MBDP costs per job reduces the project ROI by −0.0367 (standard error = 0.0112). This 
relationship is highly statistically significant (t statistic absolute value greater than 3) but is not a 
huge substantive effect.  
 







Figure 3  Project ROI vs. Project Cost per Job 
 
NOTE:  Horizontal axis is present value of costs divided by final project jobs, top-coded at $50K to deal with some 
very expensive projects that created few jobs. 
 
The model is also used to explore how increasing incentive costs affect project ROI. Table 6 
takes the model and considers a hypothetical ROI: What would happen to the ROI if the 
incentive costs for the project were exactly doubled and all other project characteristics stay 
constant? As discussed in the model description, the model assumes some diminishing returns 
to higher incentive costs. Doubling incentive costs will not quite double the “but for” for the 
project, thus will not quite double benefits. Therefore, the ROI, which depends upon the ratio of 
benefits to costs, is expected to decline. This is the case, as shown in Table 6, but the ROI is 
lowered only slightly. Doubling the incentive lowers the ROI by about 5 percent.  
 
Table 6  Effects of Doubling Incentive Costs on ROI 
 
Completed/Terminated 
projects (41 projects) 




Baseline costs 3.51 3.94 3.86 
Doubling incentive costs 3.36 3.72 3.65 
NOTE: All figures in this table are ROIs, defined as equal to present value of project net benefits divided by present 
value of incentive costs. The doubling incentive costs alters original project by imagining counter-factual where 
project incentive costs are doubled. 
Deal structure 
In the model, more front-loaded incentives tend to have higher ROIs. Up-front incentives tend to 
affect investment and job creation decisions more for business decision makers with high 







discount rates for future cash flows, while not increasing the present value of costs as much for 
policy makers, assuming policy makers are appropriate in using lower social discount rates.  
 
However, in practice, for the MBDP program, this appears to make little difference. Table 7 
shows that if all payments for the MBDP program were made up front, the ROI would be almost 
the same as it is now. The probable reason for this result is that MBDP payments are already 
substantially front-loaded. As shown later, when considering similar programs in other states, 
incentive payments that are excessively long term can lead to a lower ROI for state incentives.  
 
Table 7  Effects of Totally Front-Loading Incentives on ROI 
 
Completed/Terminated 
projects (41 projects) 




Baseline time pattern of 
costs (already substantially 
front-loaded) 
3.51 3.94 3.86 
Totally front-loaded 3.46 3.93 3.84 
NOTE: All figures in table are ROI, equal to present value of net benefits divided by present value of incentive costs for 





For many reasons, the location of a project may influence its ROI. This analysis considers how 
project ROI is affected by the following features of its location: local unemployment rate, local 
housing price elasticity, and location on a state border.  
 
As mentioned in the model description in Appendix A, the unemployment rate of a location has 
significant effects on ROI because it affects who gets the new jobs. Research has shown that if 
the local unemployment rate is higher, job growth tends to have greater effects on the local 
employment-to-population ratio and lesser effects on attracting in-migrants. Therefore, in higher 
unemployment areas, a given amount of job creation will have greater effects in boosting local 
earnings per capita – a key benefit from a successful incentive investment.  
 
Simulations of how the model ROI varies with the local unemployment rate were run, holding all 
else constant. Additional simulations of the model were run for all 239 projects with the county 
unemployment rate higher by just one percentage point (e.g., if the observed county 
unemployment rate was 5 percent, this counterfactual simulation increased the county 
unemployment rate to 6 percent).  
 
Even this very slight increase in the unemployment rate significantly boosts the ROI. As shown 
in Table 8, a one percentage higher county unemployment rate boosts the overall ROI by about 
10 percent, increasing it from 3.86 to 4.22. This implies that there are substantial increases in 







ROI attainable by choosing projects in counties with unemployment rates higher by 3 or 4 
percentage points than other counties, or by being more aggressive in starting projects when 
the overall state unemployment rate is higher, implying a greater state need for new jobs.  
 
Table 8  Effects of Increasing County Unemployment Rate by 1% on ROI 
 
Completed/terminated 
projects (41 projects) 




Baseline actual unemployment rate 
in county 
3.51 3.94 3.86 
County starting unemployment rate 
increased by 1 percentage point 
3.88 4.30 4.22 
NOTE: All figures in table are ROI, equal to present value of net benefits divided by present value of incentive costs, 
for some group of projects. The counterfactual presented here takes each project and alters one location 
characteristic: the unemployment rate in the county is increased initially by 1.0 percentage points. (That is, if the 




The analysis also considers the effect of being in a local economy in which a given shock to 
jobs increases housing prices by a greater amount, implying that there are restrictions on 
developing land for new housing. As mentioned in the model description, restrictions on housing 
supply will reduce project ROI because job growth in incented firms and multiplier firms will 
boost local costs more, which will in turn hold back growth in other private employers.  
 
The current model only contains information on housing supply elasticities for the Detroit and 
Grand Rapids metro areas. The Detroit metro area has a higher effect of job growth on housing 
prices (a less elastic supply of new housing) than is true of the Grand Rapids area. In the 
absence of better information, the model assumes that the Grand Rapids housing price 
response (supply elasticity) applies to all of Michigan except for the Detroit metro area. Note 
that the ease of developing new housing is not the same everywhere in the state outside of the 
Detroit metro area, or for that matter, that the ease of developing new housing is the same 
within the city of Detroit as it is in the Detroit suburbs.  
 
As shown in Table 9, a project located in an area with a higher housing price elasticity in 
response to job growth (implying a lower elasticity of supply of new housing) will have a much 
lower ROI. The assumed Detroit/Grand Rapids differential lowers the ROI by almost one-
quarter.  
 







Table 9  Effects of Project being in Detroit Metro Area vs. Non-Detroit Metro on ROI, Due to 
Model’s Assumptions about Housing Supply Being Less Elastic in Detroit Metro 
 Completed/Terminated 
projects (41 projects) 




Baseline (107 Detroit metro projects, 
132 non-Detroit projects) 
3.51 3.94 3.86 
If all projects were inside Detroit metro 3.03 3.43 3.36 
If all projects were outside Detroit metro 3.99 4.45 4.36 
NOTE: All figures in table are ROI, equal to present value of net benefits divided by present value of incentive costs, 
for some group of projects. Two counterfactuals are considered here: all projects inside Detroit metro area; all 
projects outside metro area. In context of model, the only difference this makes is that housing prices go up more for 
same job growth in Detroit metro area, so this is really test of whether housing price effects matter to model.  
 
This analysis implies that there might be payoffs for the state government being more sensitive 
to the ease of developing new housing. Local elasticity can have a substantial aggregate impact 
on whether job growth has broad benefits. If local rules severely restrict housing supply, the 
consequence can be to lower job growth and increase the proportion of benefits from economic 
development programs that go to property owners rather than unemployed workers.  
 
Table 10 explores how the ROI varies in counties bordering another state. As discussed in 
Appendix A, border counties have lower multipliers for the state of Michigan because some of 
the multiplier effects spill over into the adjacent state, but have a higher “but for” percentage, as 
the competitor state is nearby.  
 
Table 10  Effects on ROI of Project Being in “Border County” with Another State  
 
Completed/Terminated 
projects (41 projects) 




Baseline (17 border projects, 222 non-
border projects) 
3.51 3.94 3.86 
If all projects were in border counties 3.73 4.20 4.11 
If all projects were in non-border counties 3.44 3.91 3.82 
NOTE: All figures in table are ROI, equal to present value of net benefits divided by present value of costs for some 
group of projects. Two counterfactuals are assumed: all projects in border county; all projects not in border county.  
 
Table 10 compares the baseline results, with 17 projects in border counties and 222 in non-
border counties, with two counterfactuals: all projects in border counties and all projects in non-
border counties. Being in a border county increases the ROI, but the effect is slight, only about 5 
to 10 percent.  
Summary of Factors Determining ROI 
This analysis of factors determining the MBDP program’s ROI is summarized by doing a 
regression of each project’s ROI on various possible determining factors. To do this, the actual 







ROIs for each of the projects are combined with some hypothetical alternative: adding 1.0 to the 
multiplier, adding 1 percent to the county unemployment rate, switching the project’s border 
county status to the opposite of what it actually is, and switching the project’s status of being in 
a metro area or not with a high response of housing prices to growth.5  
 
Instead of directly explaining the determinants of the ROI, the model attempts to explain the 
gross benefit to cost ratio, which is exactly equal to the ROI plus 1. The model also specifies the 
dependent variable as the natural logarithm of the benefit-cost ratio, or ln(ROI +1). This is done 
because many of the possible determinants of the ROI would be expected to have percentage 
effects on gross benefits before considering incentive costs. A change in the logarithm of a 
variable is approximately a percentage change in proportional terms and specifying the model 
as the logarithm of growth benefits over costs captures the percentage effect on the benefit-cost 
ratio.  
 
Among the most statistically significant and large effects are the effects of the multiplier and 
value-added-per-FTE-worker variables (see Table 11). A 10 percent increase in the multiplier 
(say from 4 to 4.4) is associated with the benefit-cost ratio for the project going up by 7 percent, 
with the t statistic on this coefficient of 0.701 of over 10. A 10 percent increase in the project’s 
value added per FTE worker is associated with the project’s benefit-cost ratio decreasing by 
almost 8 percent, with the absolute value of the t statistic on this estimated coefficient of −0.781 
being over 20.  
 
                                               
5 Only 237 projects are included in this regression because two of the 239 projects have no incentive 
costs. Hence, the model assumes that the zero incentive costs induced no jobs, thus the ROI cannot be 
defined: There are no net benefits in the numerator and no incentive costs in the denominator.  







Table 11  Regression Analysis of Factors Determining Benefit-Cost Ratio of MBDP Projects 
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of (Benefit/Cost) Ratio = ln(ROI + 1) 
Explanatory variables Coefficient (standard error) 
ln(multiplier) 0.701*** 
[0.0618] 
ln(value-added per FTE worker) −0.781*** 
[0.0367] 
County unemployment rate −1.336** 
[0.588] 
Dummy for border county 0.0190 
[0.0199] 
Dummy for Detroit metro project −0.207*** 
[0.0144] 
Dummy for project completed 0.194*** 
[0.0345] 






Adjusted R-squared 0.506 
Reg Type Unweighted 
SE Type Robust 
Mean DV 1.683 
NOTE:  Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Observations are original 237 projects (two projects have no ROI because zero net costs), plus four hypothetical 
variations: add 1 to multiplier, add 1 percent to county UR, switch border county status, switch Detroit metro status. 
Implicit omitted dummy from project status is project was terminated. 
 
There also are large effects of being in an area where housing supply is more restricted and 
growth has larger effects in boosting housing prices. The dummy variable for being in the Detroit 
metro area indicates that projects in such an area have a benefit-cost ratio that is lower by 20 
percent, with a t statistic that has an absolute value of around 15.  
 
In addition, compared to terminated projects, completed projects have a benefit-cost ratio that is 
higher by over 19 percent, with a t statistic of over 5. Compared to these same terminated 
projects, the projects in process have a benefit-cost ratio that is higher by a little over 14 
percent, with a t statistic of over 5.  
 
One unexpected result is that the county unemployment rate is associated with projects having 
a lower ROI. This result is statistically significant, with a t statistic absolute value of over 2; 
however, the magnitude is very small. The coefficient implies that a 1 percent higher 
unemployment rate will reduce the benefit-cost ratio by about 1.3 percent. This result should not 







override the prior result that, holding everything else constant, a higher unemployment rate 
increases ROI. The regression here does not completely hold other factors constant. The 
negative correlation between county unemployment rate and the benefit-cost ratio must reflect 
other features of these projects that lead to a lower ROI, not the unemployment rate. Finally, 
being in a border county does not have statistically or substantively significant effects on project 
ROI.  
 
Overall, most of these results are consistent with the prior analysis. These results emphasize 
choosing projects with a high ratio of the multiplier to the industry value added per worker.   
Why is the MBDP Program’s ROI Much Higher than the Typical U.S. 
Incentive Program?  
Why are the returns to Michigan’s incentives program so much higher than for typical U.S. state 
and local business incentive programs? Bartik (2018a) estimates that the typical state and local 
incentive program in the United States has an ROI of 0.22 (see Table 4 of Bartik, 2018a). In 
contrast, this study finds an ROI of 3.86 for the MBDP program. What factors cause this 
divergence? 
 
To determine what factors cause this divergence, the overall U.S. model is tweaked to better 
match some characteristics of the Michigan model used in this study (Table 12). These model 
adjustments are cumulative: Each row in the table modifies one additional aspect of the model, 
keeping all the adjustments done in the previous row.  
 
Table 12  Comparison of Michigan ROI vs. ROI of Average Incentive Program in the United States 
 ROI 
U.S. average incentive program 0.22 
Assuming no future incentives awarded to retain jobs 1.31 
Business tax financing rather than mixed financing 2.01 
Upfront incentives 3.04 
Increase multiplier from 2.5 to Michigan's 3.69 4.76 
Reduce scale of incentives to Michigan's smaller scale 4.93 
Michigan ROI in this study 3.86 
NOTE: All except the last row are modeled based on characteristics of average state in U.S., and use model 
described in Bartik (2018). The last row is taken from the current study's results for 239 MBDP projects 
 
 
The U.S. model assumed that the average state and local incentive package would be 
accompanied by future incentives to retain those jobs. If the current study’s assumption is 
followed – that a state does not have to repeatedly pay incentives for the same jobs – the ROI 
increases from 0.22 to 1.31.  
 







The U.S. model also assumed that incentives would be financed half through spending cuts and 
half through tax increases. Of the tax increases, only 44 percent would be financed through 
business tax increases. This study’s assumption is that increased business taxes are used as 
the sole source of financing, thus the ROI further increases from 1.31 to 2.01 because this 
change reduces the negative effects of financing incentives via cuts to education spending. (We 
will further explore the implications of alternative ways to finance incentives later).  
 
The U.S. model additionally assumed that incentives were only modestly front loaded, with large 
incentives being provided through at least year 10 of the project. If the U.S. model were 
tweaked to make incentives totally up front, which is more like the MBDP program, the ROI 
increases from 2.01 to 3.04.  
 
Further, the U.S. model assumed an input-output multiplier of 2.5, which is typical for an 
economic development project in the United States. (For example, this multiplier is similar to 
estimated multipliers for the Foxconn and Amazon HQ2 projects.) The 239 projects under 
MBDP, however, have an average multiplier of 3.69. If the U.S. model is tweaked to increase 
the multiplier from 2.5 to 3.69, the ROI increases from 3.04 to 4.76.  
 
Finally, the typical size of total state and local incentives in the United States, which is used in 
the U.S. model in Bartik (2018a), is about three times the size of the MBDP incentive, as a 
percent of a firm’s value added. If the average incentive size assumed in the U.S. model were 
scaled back, the ROI in the U.S. model increases from 4.76 to 4.93.  
 
There are other features of the Michigan model (e.g., different fiscal system, different value 
added per worker, different housing price elasticities with respect to growth, projects that don’t 
work out) that presumably lower the estimated 4.93 ROI that might be expected from a 
mechanical application of the U.S. model. These do not account for special features of 
Michigan’s economy and fiscal system, nor the special features of the MBDP program. The big 
lesson here is that the details of incentive programs matter. For instance, making incentive 
investments up front enhances ROI beyond that achieved when spreading the same amount of 
incentive investment over a longer term. Furthermore, targeting higher multiplier projects 
improves ROI, as does financing incentives through higher business taxes rather than through 
cuts to other programs that have their own economic benefits.  
How This Study’s ROI Differs from the ROI Currently Produced by MEDC: 
Methodology and Results 
As mentioned above, this study’s ROI is based on a methodology that counts a much broader 
range of benefits than is currently counted by MEDC in calculating its own ROI. These 
differences arise in several areas: 
 







• The time period considered for capturing costs and benefits: This study includes benefits 
and costs over an 80-year and 10-year period after a project’s start, discounted using a 
social discount rate. MEDC’s current methodology counts benefits over the term of the 
MBDP incentive agreement, typically either 2 or 3 years.  
• The “but for” assumption: MEDC’s current methodology assumes 100 percent; that is, it 
is assumed each project would not have occurred “but for” the incentive. Upjohn’s cost 
sensitivity “but for” method is based on the average estimated sensitivity of business 
location decisions to costs in the state and local business tax literature. The resulting 
percentage is lower than CREC’s firm choice “but for” method. The Upjohn cost 
sensitivity approach averaged 9.7 percent over the 239 MBDP projects. The CREC 
customized firm choice approach averaged 61 percent for the 41 completed and 
terminated projects. 
• The MEDC ROI methodology only tracks state tax revenue increases as a program 
benefit. This study’s methodology also includes many other benefits and costs, including 
gains in local tax revenue; increased state and local public service costs due to a larger 
population; higher real earnings due to higher employment rates and real wage rates; 
capital gains for Michigan residents due to higher property values; and profit losses for 
locally owned businesses due to higher local costs. 
• This study does not account for local incentive costs, either for their costs or how they 
might affect the “but for” of a project. (The model could be modified to handle such local 
incentive costs, with good data on the magnitude and timing of such incentives.) 
MEDC’s ROI methodology subtracts out local incentive costs from the numerator in 
counting net benefits.  
• MEDC’s ROI is totally “ex ante”; that is, it is based on agreed-upon job milestones and 
incentive payments that may or may not ultimately occur. This study’s ROI is “ex post 
facto” or based on reported job creation and incentive payments that have occurred up 
until now. The study does do some implicit projections in assuming that the final jobs 
created will persist unchanged in the future, and that no future incentive payments or 
repayments will occur.  
The differences between this study’s ROI and MEDC’s ROI for each project is shown in Figure 
4. The figure shows this study’s ROI using the cost sensitivity “but for” methodology versus the 
MEDC’s current ROI, reported in the MEDC files. Over all 237 projects with a calculated ROI, 
the average Upjohn ROI is 3.86, compared to 8.05 using the MEDC methodology.  
 







Figure 4  Upjohn ROI vs. MEDC ROI, 237 projects 
 
 
There is a slight negative relationship between the Upjohn ROI and the MEDC ROI. This 
disappears controlling for project value-added/worker (Table 13). Projects with higher value-
added/worker have a lower ROI in the Upjohn model due to lower “but for” percentages for a 
given incentive cost. The lack of relationship between the two sets of ROIs is due to all the 
many differences between the two ROI calculations. 
 
Table 13  Regression of Upjohn Benefit-Cost Ratio on MEDC Benefit-Cost Ratio and Project Value 
Added Per Worker, 237 Projects 
Dependent variable: ln(Upjohn BC ratio) = ln(Upjohn ROI +1) 
Regression Statistics  
R Squared 0.43  
Observations 237  
   
 Coefficients Standard Error 
Constant term 6.965 0.412 
ln(MEDC ROI +1) −0.0193 0.0257 
ln(VA per FTE) −0.449 0.036 
 
The comparison is quite different when the firm choice “but for” method (generated by CREC) is 
used (in lieu of the Upjohn-derived cost sensitivity approach) in the study’s benefit-cost 
simulation model. This CREC-derived firm choice “but for” estimate is based on various project-
specific factors. The firm choice “but for” assumption is only calculated for the 41 completed and 







terminated projects. The average “but for” in the firm choice model is 61 percent, compared to 
MEDC’s implicit assumption of a 100 percent “but for.” Despite the lower firm choice “but for,” 
the more extensive benefits included in this study’s model yield a much higher ROI. The 
average ROI across the completed and terminated projects is 10.2 in the MEDC model, versus 
86.2 when combining the firm choice “but for” with this study’s model.  
 
Figure 5 shows the MEDC ROI versus CREC’s firm choice “but for” ROIs. As the figure shows, 
there is not much of a relationship between the two sets of ROIs. For further discussion, see the 
Technical Note in Appendix A. 
 
Figure 5  CREC ROI vs. MEDC ROI 
 
IV. Assessment of MBDP’s Importance to Securing Projects and 
Generating Results 
 
This section describes the findings from the study team’s two approaches to estimating the 
importance of the MBDP to business investment decisions (the “but for” percentage) and the 
impact of those estimates on ROI. The “but for” percentage required to reach a breakeven ROI 
within the model is also calculated.  







Findings From the Cost Sensitivity Approach 
For MBDP, the average incentive has a present value of about $7,500 per job; that is the 
incentive is equivalent to giving each firm cash of $7,500 per job today. The average value-
added per job of the incented firms is $168,000 annually per job. The present value of this 
incentive, evaluated at a 12 percent discount rate, is $1,568,000 per job. Therefore, the average 
MBDP incentive is about 0.5 percent of the present value of value-added for the firm. To put it 
another way, the MBDP incentives are equivalent to lowering the state and local business taxes 
owed by the firm by 10 percent. Based on the research literature on how state and local 
business taxes affect business location decisions, a simplistic aggregate projection is that the 
“but for” for the MBDP program should average around 5 percent.  In practice, the estimated 
average “but for” ends up being higher, as we will see, at almost 10 percent. This slightly higher 
average is due to the variation across individual projects in incentive amounts and value added 
per job.   
 
As explained in more detail in Appendix B, the rationale for this “but for” projection is based on 
the research literature on how business location decisions respond to state and local business 
taxes. This research literature suggests that, holding public services constant, lowering all state 
and local business taxes by 10% will increase the likelihood of businesses choosing that state 
by around 5%. The Upjohn approach therefore is assuming that incentives will have similar 
effects as a reduction in business taxes whose present value is of a similar dollar amount.  
 
It could be argued that, by being more targeted, the MBDP program and other incentive 
programs will be able to have greater effects than tax reductions. That is, an incentive program 
may be able to exclude some applicants whose location decisions seem less likely to be 
affected by incentives, and this will tend to increase the “but for” percentage over what would be 
predicted based on the tax literature. The excluded applicants would be those who do not really 
have a viable alternative to a Michigan business location. A counter-argument is that the 
applicant businesses have far more information on the value of their location alternatives than is 
feasible for any state incentive program. This makes it difficult for state officials to target 
incentives only on firms that are most likely to be affected by incentives.  
 
A review paper looked at the more limited number of studies that simply estimated the “but for” 
percentage for incentives (Bartik 2018b). Across 34 estimates from 30 studies, the mean “but 
for” percentage was around 23%. Some studies had much higher “but for” percentages, but 
others had much lower “but for” percentages. Therefore, it seems prudent to consider the 
possibility that the but-for percentage might be lower than 25%, perhaps much lower. Perhaps 
the MBDP does better than that, but it seems from the research literature that many incentive 
programs do not do so.  
 
Surveys of corporate CEOs on how they make investment decisions (Poterba and Summers, 
1995) suggest that firms discount future income streams by 12 percent annually when 







compared with immediate revenues. This discount rate is higher than the 3 percent or so that is 
more typical for public sector investments, but it is consistent with our casual observation that 
many firms are very focused on their short-term stock price and how it is affected by near-term 
cash flows. Consequently, the Upjohn cost sensitivity “but for” approach assumes that firms use 
a discount rate on the order of 12 percent in making business location investment decisions, so 
it is incorporated into out-year calculations of incentive costs and benefits and compared to 
similarly discounted firm costs and value-added estimates resulting from the incentives.   
 
Such a relatively high discount rate means that incentive programs offering up-front benefits 
tend to be more cost-effective. This is an advantage of the MBDP program’s upfront approach 
compared to some other states’ incentive designs, as seen in a previous section.  
 
When we use the Upjohn cost sensitivity approach across all 239 projects, the mean “but for” 
percentage ends up being estimated as 9.7% for the MBDP. This “mean” is incentive cost-
weighted – that is, larger projects have a greater impact on the calculation than smaller ones.  
We take the “but for” percentage individually estimated for each project and calculate the mean 
over all 239 projects when each project is weighted by its present value of incentive costs. For 
the completed/terminated projects, the incentive-cost-weighted mean for the “but for” 
percentage is 6.8 percent.  
Findings From the Firm Choice Approach 
The CREC team examined applications and supporting documents to calculate “but for” 
percentages for the 25 completed projects and 16 of the terminated projects that met a first 
milestone, in accordance with Upjohn’s initial but-for and ROI analysis.  
Completed projects overview 
The 25 completed projects served as the primary focus for much of our analysis. These 
completed projects met the job creation terms of their agreements, and they had no further 
milestone deliverables or payments due. During the project research period, some of these 
projects were still in their monitoring phase, which is the defined period after the final milestone 
has been met for ensuring jobs remain in the state. For the purposes of analysis, however, they 
were considered complete.  
 
Relevant findings for this set of projects on factors likely to influence the importance of the 
incentive are:  
 
• Manufacturing operations comprised 21 of the completed projects; only 4 were services-
based. Of the 21 manufacturers, 12 were in the auto industry sectors (defined as NAICS 
3361-3363) 







• Twenty-three (23) companies conducted the 25 completed projects. Most already had 
operations of some type in Michigan. Our team considered two to be new to the state 
(Fairlife and Sakthi). Using MEDC internal categorizations, 5 were considered new 
facilities, two relocations, and the rest expansions.  
• Most completed projects involved companies with existing locations outside of Michigan. 
Two projects involved companies with operations only in Michigan. In many cases, the 
Michigan operations were competing for new investment with existing company 
operations in other states.  
• Eighteen (18) of the completed projects occurred in non-border counties; 7 projects were 
in counties along the Canada, Indiana, or Ohio borders.  
• Thirteen (13) of the 25 projects involved a foreign-owned firm or a foreign-owned parent 
company. 
• Fourteen (14) of the projects involved companies that had previously received Michigan 
Strategic Fund investments. 
• Three (3) companies could be considered small businesses, with fewer than 500 
employees.  
• Eleven (11) projects were in an “eligible distressed area,” defined by the Michigan State 
Housing Development Authority May 2018 designation list.  
• The completed projects reported the creation of over 4,000 new jobs in their compliance 
documentation. In some cases, companies may have created additional new jobs but did 
not include them in their milestone reports.  
• Five (5) projects involved an amendment, a dismissed milestone, or both. 
• The offered incentive averaged 10% of the projected business investment across 
completed projects, with a range of 2% to 36%. 
• The incentive offer averaged nearly $7,500 per job across completed projects, with a 
range of $3,000 to $27,000. 
Completed project characteristics and sensitivity to incentives 
The CREC firm choice “but-for” approach combined the research literature on factors that affect 
the likelihood that incentives influence company investment decisions (see Appendix B) with 
project-specific information available from MBDP applications and MEDC briefing memos. We 
then selected seven factors for which we had consistent data from project applicants that 
aligned with factors identified in the research literature:  








• Whether the company considered multiple locations 
• The existence of a financing gap or competitive disadvantage 
• The ratio of the incentive to the projected investment 
• Whether the company already had operations in multiple locations 
• Whether the company already operated in Michigan or was new to the state 
• Foreign or US parent company ownership, and  
• Cost-sensitivity of the industry in which the company operates 
The weighting and scoring approach for these seven factors is provided in Table 14. The 
weights are based on input from state and local economic development professionals and the 
project team’s own judgment. The weights need not be considered definitive. Future use of this 
approach should consider alternatives. For example, the research literature suggests that 
credible consideration of multiple locations could have a much higher weight than that used 
here. The importance of foreign ownership has been considered either very important or not at 
all important; the low factor weight is therefore somewhat skewed.  
 
We sought to create a scoring approach that offered simple but comparable scores (scaled from 
0 to 1) for each factor. We determined that the scoring approach should reflect the uncertainty 
that all parties have, and that the approach should be adjusted over time to reflect continuous 
efforts to improve our understanding of how different factors affect industry or business location 
decisions. For example, the MBDP does not have completed projects where the incentive 
amount relative to projected investment exceed 0.5, but this may not always be the case, 
requiring the scoring approach to be adjusted. We judged incentives to be most influential for a 
company or project characteristic that received a score approaching 1. Additional details on how 
the factors, weights, and scores were developed are provided in Appendix B. 
 







Table 14   Weighting and Scoring of Factors Influencing the Importance of Incentives 
Factor Scoring Approach Factor Weight 
Considered multiple locations 
0=no; 0.5=yes, among its own 
operations; 1=yes, multiple locations 
not limited to its own operations 
0.25 
Described financing gap or 
disadvantage 
0=did not describe gap or MI 
disadvantage in application; 1=did 
describe specific gap or 
disadvantage 
0.25 
Incentive amount relative 
projected investment 
0=0.125=0.25; 0.126-0.25=0.5; 
0.26-0.375=0.75; 0.376-0.5=1 0.15 
Company has operations in 
multiple locations 0=no; 1=yes 0.15 
Cost sensitive or capital-
intensive industry 0=other; 1=NACIS 31, 32, 33, 56 0.10 
Expansion or new to Michigan 0=expansion; 1=new 0.05 
Foreign owned  0=US parent; 1=foreign owned company 0.05 
Total Factor Weight 
(combination of above factors)  1.00 
 
Each of the 25 completed projects and 16 of the terminated projects were then scored using this 
factor weighting system. The scoring also required project team judgment, and there are cases 
where different judges might have scored individual projects differently. For example, when 
asked in the application, companies described their financing gap or competitive disadvantage. 
It is notable that the project team considered statements about other states offering alternative 
incentives an adequate rationale only if the company were able to provide other competitive 
details that helped the analyst judge whether the gap or disadvantage existed.  
 
Data for the scoring came primarily from project applications, MBDP term sheets, MEDC 
briefing memos, and additional research on the companies as needed. Each project’s total 
score indicates that project’s “but for” percentage based on the characteristics described in 
Table 14. Recognizing the inherent uncertainty in creating a “but for” score, and to avoid 
conveying unwarranted precision, we translated each individual score into a rounded 
percentage6 representing the likelihood that the incentive influenced each firm’s decision. 
 
The scores for all completed projects and 16 terminated projects are provided in Appendix B. 
The calculated percentages range from 30% to 90%, with the “but for” percentage for most 
                                               
6 The Score translates to a “But For” percentage score in the following ways: Score= 0.05-2 translates to 
10% but for percentage; Score = .21-.4 translates to 30% but for percentage; .41-.6 translates to 50% but 
for percentage; .61-.8 translates to 70% but for percentage; and .81-.99 translates to 90% but for 
percentage. 







projects estimated at 50 or 70%, indicating that incentives would be responsible for 
approximately 50-70% of the choice to invest in Michigan. These findings suggest that the 
incentive likely played an important role in influencing most companies’ investment decisions.  
 
While these estimated “but for” percentages are lower than the typically assumed 100% level, 
they reflect the reality that no analyst (including those within the company) can be certain about 
whether the incentive tipped the investment in Michigan’s favor.  However, the evidence also 
suggests that there was a pretty large risk that without the incentive, the investment would have 
occurred outside the state. 
 
This approach results in substantially higher “but for” percentages than the Upjohn cost 
sensitivity approach. The cost sensitivity approach does not examine specific project 
characteristics but looks at the relative value of the incentive when compared to the industry-
wide value-added and makes a judgment about whether the project would have gone forward 
without the incentive. Beyond this fundamental difference, there are several reasons that the 
CREC firm choice approach results in a relatively higher “but for” estimate than does the cost 
sensitivity approach.  
 
In short, the two approaches examine different aspects of the company’s decision-making 
process. In developing the custom firm choice ‘but for’ estimates, CREC relies on the 
company’s application for the incentive. These data may overstate the company’s case but 
reflects the fact that the firm is at a particular point in the site selection process in which the 
company has specified several feasible options in which small differences – such as the 
incentive – are much more likely to affect the final decision.  
 
Other states use this sole point (whether companies credibly considered other locations) to 
determine whether companies meet their “but for” standard. The high percentage of firms with 
operations in multiple locations and in cost-sensitive industries also suggest that an incentive is 
likely to influence their investment decisions. The cost sensitivity model examines the need for 
the incentive at a more abstract level, focusing on its importance when compared with broad tax 
and business climate issues. This approach is particularly relevant in determining the full array 
of public investments that influence a company’s willingness to consider locating in a location. 
 
Examining an individual project in greater depth can help demonstrate the dynamics behind the 
CREC firm choice “but-for” probability estimation approach. In 2012, AGS Automotive, 
headquartered in Toronto, was deciding whether to produce new parts at one of its existing 
locations in Ontario or to purchase and retrofit a building in Sterling Heights near one of its 
current facilities. AGS had operations in multiple locations and was choosing among a set of 
viable facilities for its new production. The company identified a Michigan-specific disadvantage 
based on the additional costs for the building purchase and retrofit. The firm is in a cost-
sensitive industry that tends to value incentives. For these reasons, the customized firm choice 
approach estimates a relatively high – but not 100% -- “but for” level for this project of 70%. 







However, the cost sensitivity “but for” estimation approach based on the value of the incentive 
relative to industry value-added estimates a “but for” level of 4%. The Upjohn cost sensitivity 
approach demonstrates that other factors may have determined the company’s decision to 
make an investment while the CREC customized firm choice approach indicates that the 
incentive offer was an important factor in the company selecting Michigan over a very viable 
alternative option.  
Interview findings 
To validate our understanding of the importance of incentives, we reached out to 21 local 
partners (representing 23 of the completed projects) who were familiar with the completed 
projects to gain their perspectives. The MBDP requires a local partner contribution (typically a 
property tax abatement), and the local partner perspective is important to understanding the 
MBDP’s effectiveness to securing the deal and achieving outcomes. The local partner is directly 
involved in a supporting role to the state during the investment decision process. Since the 
property tax abatement has a 12-year timeframe, the local incentive also remains active for 
most of the completed projects. Furthermore, the local partner often has current knowledge of 
the investment’s status and latest developments.  
 
When asked to compare factors influencing the business’s decision to locate or expand in 
Michigan, describing each factor on a five-category scale (from unimportant to very important), 
most interviewees agreed that ability to serve markets and customers and the availability of 
incentives were “very important”. Many interviewees also ranked overall cost of operations and 
availability of sites and buildings as very important. Access to skilled workers and availability of 
infrastructure and utilities ranked slightly less important among the top responses. (Table 15) 
 








Ability to serve 
markets/customers 
15 3    
Access to skilled workers 6 11 1   
Availability of 
infrastructure/utilities 
7 5 4  2 
Availability of site/building 11 6 1  1 
Overall cost of operations 11 7 1   
State and local incentives 12 6 3   
Other(s) 2 2 1   
 
CREC also asked local stakeholders to rate the incentive’s importance with the following 
question: 
 







In the absence of grant assistance, in your opinion, would the project have (choose one 
option only) 7:  
(a) Gone ahead as now unchanged (that is, same scale, time and location) 
(b) Gone ahead at a different location outside of Michigan (but otherwise unchanged)  
(c) Gone ahead in Michigan at a later date but otherwise unchanged (delayed but 
otherwise unchanged)  
(d) Gone ahead in Michigan on a reduced scale (but otherwise unchanged) 
(e) Project would have been abandoned  
 
In response to this query, 14 of 25 interviewees stated that they believe the project would have 
gone ahead outside of Michigan if the incentive had not been provided. An additional six 
expected the project would have proceeded in Michigan but would have been either delayed or 
reduced without the incentive. Two believed the project would have been abandoned. One 
respondent thought that the project would have gone ahead unchanged without the incentive. 
(Figure 6) 
 




                                               
7 Adapted from Lenihan 2004 







These perceptions suggest that the scoring system described in the previous section provides a 
reasonable proxy in support of a “but for” analysis. In most cases the estimated “but for” 
percentage aligned with the local partner perspective that the incentive was important or very 
important in motivating the firm’s decision. In three cases, local partners considered the 
incentive very important while the scoring indicated a “but for” level of 50%. In three cases the 
scoring indicated a higher “but for” level of 70% while the local partners considered the incentive 
“somewhat important.”   
Comparison to terminated projects 
As a final point of understanding, we examined the characteristics of terminated projects with 
the expectation that, by definition, the incentive would have been less meaningful to the 
investment since the project did not fully proceed despite receiving the incentive. The average 
firm choice “but for” percentage for the 16 terminated projects that met at least one milestone 
was 54% compared to 66% for the 25 completed projects.  
 
The study team also compared the features of 55 total terminated projects, including those that 
completed no milestones, to see how they varied from the completed projects. Relevant findings 
on factors likely to influence the importance of the incentive are:  
 
• 33 of the terminated projects were manufacturing operations; while 22 were services-
based.  
• MEDC defined 43 as retention/expansion projects and 12 as attraction projects. Eleven 
of the total are not recorded as having other Michigan locations and so were likely new 
to the state.  
• 53 of the 55 projects considered multiple locations, both among their own operations and 
other locations, and described them in their applications. 
• 47 of the terminated projects occurred in non-border counties.  
• 14 of the 55 projects involved a foreign-owned firm or a foreign-owned parent company, 
based on application data. 
• 28 projects were located in an “eligible distressed area,” as defined by the Michigan 
State Housing Development Authority in May 2018.  
• The incentive offer averaged 24% of the projected investment across completed 
projects, with a range of 0.6% to 250%. The projects with high incentive-to-investment 
ratios were in service operations proposing job creation without substantial investment.  
Figure 7 shows the distribution of completed and terminated projects by industry. Most of 
MEDC’s completed projects were manufacturing operations with few services industries. The 







terminated projects were still heavily manufacturing-oriented but with more services operations 
in more industries. 84% of completed projects were in manufacturing compared to 60% of 
terminated projects.  
 
Figure 7   Completed and Terminated Projects by Industry Category 
 
 
Overall, MBDP funded projects were more likely to be concentrated in distressed communities 
than in non-distressed locations. 64% of completed projects and 51% of terminated projects 
occurred in distressed communities. (Figure 8)  
 







Figure 8   Completed and Terminated Projects by Distressed Location 
 
 
The proportion of attraction and expansion projects were nearly the same for both completed 
and terminated projects. Approximately 80% of both sets of projects were considered 
expansions. (Figure 9)  
 
Figure 9  Completed and Terminated Projects by Attraction/Expansion 
 








The project team assessed the business reasons cited for requesting the incentive as described 
in the applications to MBDP.  An analysis suggests that terminated projects were more likely to 
request the incentive to address capital access or operational expense needs, while completed 
projects were more likely to cite workforce development issues, the presence of competing 
incentives, or tax burden. However, the dominant business need driving the request for 
incentives among both completed and terminated projects was facility/site location. (Figure 10) 
 
Figure 10  Completed and Terminated Projects by Stated Business Need for the Incentive 
 
 
Break-even “But For” Levels For the MBDP Program and How Break-evens 
and ROIs Vary with Project Opportunity Costs 
In contrast to the assertion that MBDP induced every funded project to move forward when they 
would not have otherwise done so, both the Upjohn cost sensitivity and CREC firm choice 
approaches reduces the estimated net benefits of the MBDP program. But even the most 
conservative adjustment (made with the lower Upjohn cost sensitivity but-for estimates) still 
generate the positive program ROI of nearly 4:1. Using higher but-for estimations result in a 
higher ROI. Given the difficulties and controversy with estimating the “but for” percentage for 
diverse projects, one alternative is to focus on assessing what “but for” probability would be 
sufficient for MBDP to achieve a net positive ROI. This proportion may vary with how MBDP is 
financed. Up to now, it is assumed that the MBDP program is implicitly financed by having 
overall business taxes be a bit higher than they otherwise would be (baseline). However, MBDP 







could also be financed with a balanced state budget by increasing other taxes or by reducing 
various types of public spending. 
Break-even “but for” percentages under baseline financing mechanism 
As shown in Table 16, the break-even “but for” levels for the MBDP program are quite small. For 
all 239 projects, the break-even “but for” is 0.8 percent. That is, if the MBDP program tipped 
more than 8 out of 1,000 projects, it would have a would yield a positive ROI.  
 
Table 16  Break-Even “But For” Percentages, with Baseline Financing 
 Break even but for Upjohn but for CREC but for 
Completed/terminated projects 0.7% 6.8% 56.1% 
All projects 0.8% 9.7%  
NOTE: The break-even “but for” is defined here as the minimum “but for” percentage, assigned uniformly to all 
projects in a group, that yields a positive overall ROI for that group of projects. All calculations in this table use the 
baseline assumption that the MBDP program is financed by business taxes being slightly higher than they otherwise 
would be.  
 
This break-even “but for” is far below the “but for” estimated by the Upjohn cost-sensitivity 
model or the CREC firm choice approach. For example, for all 239 projects, the Upjohn cost-
sensitivity model estimates the “but for” is almost 10 percent, or 9.7 percent, equivalent to 
tipping 97 out of every 1,000 projects. This is over 10 times the “break-even” but for.  
 
This break-even “but for” probability estimate as well as all MBDP ROIs estimated so far in this 
study, assume that the MBDP program is financed by having Michigan business tax rates be a 
bit higher than the rates would be if MBDP did not exist. However, if MBDP were financed with a 
balanced state budget that increased other taxes or reduced various types of public spending, 
then ROI estimates and the break-even estimate would be lower. 
 
Implications of financing the MBDP program by other tax increases or by 
spending cuts 
We also considered different financing mechanisms for the MBDP program and how they affect 
the MBDP program’s ROI for different groups of projects. Table 17 reports results for four 
different financing mechanisms: business tax financing (the already-reported baseline results); 
financing by increases in non-business taxes; financing by cutting K-12 spending; and financing 
by reducing other state and local government spending.  
 







Table 17  How MBDP’s ROI Differs with Different Types of Financing for the Program 
Type of project 
Baseline (financing 










3.51 3.41 -0.86 3.32 
In process projects 3.94 3.86 0.51 3.83 
Total projects 3.86 3.78 0.25 3.73 
 
As Table 17 shows, the only dramatic change in ROI comes when the financing of the program 
is achieved by reducing K-12 spending. In the study’s model, K-12 spending is highly 
productive, with a 10 percent reduction in K-12 spending reducing future wages by about 8 
percent. As a result, the program ROI drops to only 0.25 for all 239 projects and turns negative 
at −0.86 for the completed/terminated projects. In other words, based on the returns from for the 
completed/terminated projects, the ROI to the state from K-12 spending is higher than the ROI 
achieved from the MBDP program. Cutting K-12 spending to pay for MBDP would result in net 
reductions in state residents’ per capita income levels.  Essentially, the model is saying is that if 
one is targeting “economic development,” defined broadly as higher per capita incomes for state 
residents, then it doesn’t make sense to expand one program that increases state residents’ per 
capita incomes while cutting another such program.  
 
The case of K-12 cuts indicates the potential importance of a long-term perspective in 
calculating program impacts. As shown in Table 18, most of the negative consequences of 
cutting K-12 spending occur after 10 years. These negative consequences occur as the lower 
quality of K-12 education has negative effects on wages when the students impacted by less 
education investment enter their prime earnings years some 30 or more years after the 
education cuts were made.  
 
Table 18  How ROI Differs with Different Time Horizons, Baseline Financing vs. Education Cut 
Financing 
 Baseline (business tax financing) Education cut financings 
ROI over 80 years 3.86 0.25 
ROI over 10 years 3.60 3.23 
 
Table 19 shows how the break-even “but for” varies with project financing. Consistent with the 
earlier discussion, the break-even “but for” only changes dramatically when we consider 
financing by K-12 spending cuts. In the K-12 financing scenario, the break-even “but for” 
increases significantly to 3.4 percent for the completed/terminated projects, and 4.3 percent for 
the all 239 projects.8 
                                               
8 It might seem odd that the break-even “but for” for the 41 completed and terminated projects, at 3.4 
percent, is less than the Upjohn “but for” for these projects which averages 6.8 percent, yet the overall 

































0.7% 0.8% 3.4% 0.9% 6.8% 61% 
All projects 0.8% 1.0% 4.3% 1.1% 9.7%  
 
V. Findings from Comparison Programs 
 
In this section we discuss how different states calculate and use ROI and “but for” analyses in 
incentive programs similar to MBDP. The goal is to help MEDC further improve its processes for 
allocating limited resources and investing in projects that demonstrate the greatest net benefit to 
the state. This assessment is timely as state economic development leaders across the country 
have embraced the need to report program outcomes of publicly used dollars to document the 
impact of their efforts in ways that demonstrate results and can be readily verified.  
 
The analysis below compares information on Minnesota’s Job Creation Fund, North Carolina’s 
Job Development Investment Grant, the JobsOhio Economic Development Grant, and the 
Texas Enterprise Fund to illuminate how different states evaluate projects to determine an 
incentive award (“pre-award analysis”) and how states monitor and evaluate the impact of 
projects that have received incentive support (“post-award program management”).  
Pre-Award Analysis 
States may consider many elements before investing in a project. Our first line of inquiry to 
other states was to assess what each does to calculate return on investment. If they do 
something formally, how do they calculate the ROI and with whom does the state share that 
information. Another consideration we explored was to what extent do others take “but-for” 
statements into account. The following section describes what we learned in asking four key 
questions. 
 
                                               
ROI for those 41 projects (Table 16) is −0.86. This occurs because among the 41 projects, there are large 
differences in “but for,” which leads to some quite negative returns for some projects with education 
financing. The break-even but for imposes a uniform but for across all projects, which is a different sort of 
calculation.  







• How do states calculate the return on investment prior to making an award? 
• What is the role of ROI calculations in incentive decision-making? 
• Are ROI calculations reported to lawmakers or other external audiences?  
• Is there a process to account for “but-for” in the decision to award incentives?  
How do states calculate the return on investment prior to making an award? 
All four states studied in this comparative analysis calculate a project’s return-on-investment 
prior to awarding incentive support. While the purpose of most incentive programs is to improve 
economic benefits to a state, the states studied also consider fiscal benefits in making their 
incentive investments. Of the four states, three consider a project’s ability to provide state 
revenue in excess of incentive support in its return-on-investment (ROI) calculations addressing 
primarily fiscal impact, while one primarily considers a project’s ability to provide economic 
benefits.  
 
To calculate a project’s return on investment, two states utilize modified commercial economic 
modeling software, one utilizes a proprietary economic model, and one utilizes a proprietary 
formula. The use of a commercial model can ultimately be less expensive than creating one’s 
own model, but it has limitations in terms of flexibility and adaptiveness to a state’s unique 
program. Different models of calculating an ROI will lead to different numbers, so it is extremely 
difficult to compare outcomes from one model to another. 
 
All four states’ return-on-investment calculations consider a project’s direct, indirect, and 
induced benefits. Two of the incentive programs consider a payback period greater than ten 
years in their ROI calculations, while the other two consider a period less than seven.  
 
In North Carolina, the state uses a proprietary economic model to calculate the fiscal ROI of 
each potential Job Development Investment Grant (JDIG) awardee. North Carolina calculates a 
project’s ROI according to the project’s ability to provide fiscal benefits to the state in the form of 
tax revenue in excess of the incentive provided by the state over the given period of support. 
Typically, North Carolina calculates a project’s ROI over a 12-year period, the standard period 
during which JDIG provides incentive support. North Carolina may also calculate a project’s ROI 
for up to 25 years in the case that it is deemed ‘transformative’ and eligible to receive additional 
support.  
 
The JDIG program calculates project ROI using a model developed by Michael L. Walden 
(William Neal Reynolds Distinguished Professor and Extension Economist at North Carolina 
State University), which utilizes industry data, economic impact modeling techniques, and JDIG 
application information to estimate the project’s direct, indirect, and induced employment effects 
and impact on state expenditures and revenues over the given period of incentive support. 







Factors considered in the state’s ROI calculations include the number of newly created jobs; the 
duration of newly created jobs; total project investment; project industry; company sales output; 
project location in a development zone or similar distressed county; and the amount and 
duration of total state and local incentive support received by the project, including from the 
JDIG. By estimating the complete impact of a potential JDIG recipient project on North 
Carolina’s expenditures and revenue, the state can identify projects with a positive ROI that 
generate more public revenue than they receive in public incentive expenditures.  
 
In Texas, the state uses an adapted version of the Beacon Hill Institute’s STAMP model to 
calculate the fiscal ROI of each potential Texas Enterprise Fund (TEF) awardee. The Texas 
dynamic revenue analysis model, entitled T-STAMP, calculates a project’s ROI according to the 
project’s ability to provide fiscal benefits to the state, primarily in the form of sales tax revenue, 
in excess of the incentives provided by the state and municipalities in support of the project. In 
addition to considering the cost to Texas, in the form of state general revenue fund support, 
Texas also considers municipal incentive support provided to a project in its calculation of 
project ROI.  
 
In its calculation of project ROI, Texas considers the project’s 20-year Net Present Value (NPV) 
benefit to state, county, and city tax revenue against the 20-year NPV cost of TEF and other 
general revenue fund expenditures by the state in support of the project. The primary sources of 
variance among projects are the number of jobs created, the expected timeframe for hiring, and 
the average salaries. Factors considered in the state’s ROI calculations include the estimated 
direct annual payroll; total construction payroll; capital investment in construction and operating 
equipment; and the indirect and induced effects of all inputs. The state estimates sales tax 
revenue of $0.015 per every $1 of payroll. By calculating a project’s discounted benefit to the 
state, less any discounted costs, Texas can identify projects with a positive ROI that generates 
public revenue in excess of public costs, in consideration of the period during which the state 
will receive this benefit. Texas also requires applicants to submit an independent economic 
impact analysis describing capital investment and employment plus the economic and fiscal 
impacts of construction and 10 years of annual operations.  
 
In Ohio, the state uses a proprietary formula to calculate the fiscal ROI of each potential 
recipient of a JobsOhio incentives package, including the Economic Development Grant. Ohio’s 
formula calculates a project’s ROI according to the project’s ability to provide fiscal benefits to 
the state in excess of the incentives provided by the state in support of the project over the 
typical three-year period of incentive support. This period of support and ROI payback period 
are modified to seven years in the case of research and development projects. JobsOhio’s 
formula considers a project’s ROI, along with the payback period – projects without a positive 
ROI over the three-year period of incentive support will not be selected. Because JobsOhio 
often makes its economic development grants available in association with other state 
incentives, the aggregate cost of these incentives is considered. JobsOhio selects projects with 
a rapid payback period, and over 60% of selected projects break even in their first year. By only 







selecting projects with a positive 3-year ROI, JobsOhio can ensure its self-sufficiency and only 
select projects with a positive fiscal impact on the state.  
 
In Minnesota, the state uses the REMI model to calculate the economic ROI of each potential 
recipient of the Job Creation Fund (JCF) award. Minnesota calculates a project’s ROI according 
to its ability to provide direct, indirect, and induced economic benefits to the state in the form of 
impact on employment, earnings, and investment in the state. In its calculation of ROI, 
Minnesota considers a project’s complete economic impacts over a five-year period if located in 
the Twin Cities region and over a seven-year period if located in Greater Minnesota. Factors 
considered in the state’s ROI calculations include the project’s location, projected job creation 
and earnings, projected investment, and projected other expenditures, less any public 
expenditures in support of the project. By calculating a project’s overall benefit to the state, 
Minnesota can identify projects with large multiplier effects to the economy to support with its 
Job Creation Fund. 
 
In Minnesota, applicants for JCF incentive support typically have an economic return on 
investment of 25 to 1. This means that for every dollar of incentive support provided to a project 
in the JCF program, there is $25 worth of economic benefits accrued by the state. Officials 
interviewed as part of this process indicated that many projects have a ROI well above this 
amount. 
What is the role of ROI calculations in incentive decision-making? 
The ROI should not be the only factor that states consider in making an investment decision; it 
is but one of several. Other factors might relate to the state’s economic development goals, 
including the equitable distribution of program investments, a mixed portfolio of the types of 
projects (different industries have different ROIs), the importance of economic benefits over 
fiscal benefits, etc. Of the four states studied, three utilize the ROI in addition to other project 
factors. Two states use the ROI calculation to determine the amount of incentive support to 
provide a project.  
 
North Carolina uses a combination of project factors and ROI in its decision to award a project. 
JDIG administrators decide to award a project by weighing several factors, including the location 
of the project, the county tier designation, projected job creation and wages, projected 
investment, and project industry. Prior to deciding to award a project, JDIG administrators utilize 
the Walden Model to conduct a cost-benefit analysis evaluating each project’s impact on North 
Carolina’s tax revenue according to the project ROI. Only projects with a ROI indicating North 
Carolina will fully recoup the incentive award provided to the project over the award period in tax 
revenue are eligible to receive JDIG support. The typical award period is up to 12 years.  
 
While Texas does not consider project ROI in its decision to award a project, the state does 
utilize project ROI in its determination of the amount to award a project. When determining the 
amount to award a project, TEF administrators consider a project’s ROI in the form of the 20-







year NPV of the state sales and local tax revenue generated by the project, against the 20-year 
NPV of the incentive award provided to the project. Since Texas considers the 20-year NPV of 
the project generated revenue, projects with a shorter payback period will receive more TEF 
funding, because the future revenue provided by the project will be discounted less. The 
decision to award a project is based on several economic factors, primarily the projected job 
creation and wages, hiring timeframe, and projected capital investment. These are all also 
inputs into the ROI model.  
 
Ohio considers a project’s ROI in the form of fiscal benefits to the state, among other project 
factors in its decision to award a project. JobsOhio administrators will only award projects with 
an ROI that ensures the state will recoup the full value of the incentive awarded to a project over 
the three-year period (seven for R&D) of incentive support. In addition to ROI, JobsOhio 
administrators also consider a project’s projected job creation and wages, industry, projected 
investment, and location in their decision to provide an incentive. The threshold for these values 
varies across projects, although the Economic Development Grant program is typically open to 
companies with annual revenue in excess of $3 million. 
 
In Minnesota, the state utilizes a project’s ROI in addition to seven other economic factors in its 
decision to award a project incentive support. Other factors considered include local business 
conditions in the project’s respective industry, project location, projected job creation and 
wages, project readiness (i.e. funding availability), hiring timeframe, and hiring of targeted 
populations, including Greater Minnesota residents, minorities, women, veterans or persons 
with disabilities. The combined eight factors are considered in scoring the amount a project is 
eligible to receive in JCF support. Projects that score below a certain threshold are not eligible 
to receive support. The JCF job creation requirement helps to ensure that applicants meet the 
threshold. Currently, Minnesota does not use ROI to competitively score projects as part of a 
selection process. Instead, ROI is used with other factors to determine the size of incentive 
support.  
Are ROI calculations reported to lawmakers or other external audiences?  
North Carolina and Texas require incentive administrators to provide reports to non-
administrators; however, legislation does not call for explicit reporting specifically on ROI 
calculations. Minnesota and Ohio do not require the administrators to report any ROI figures to 
external parties. 
 
In North Carolina, state statute Article 10 § 143B-437.55 requires the North Carolina 
Department of Commerce, the administrator of the JDIG program, to provide an annual report to 
the House of Representatives Finance Committee, the Senate Finance Committee, the House 
of Representatives Appropriations Subcommittee on Natural and Economic Resources, the 
Senate Appropriations Committee on Natural and Economic Resources, and the Fiscal 
Research Division. Included in this report are a “listing of each grant awarded during the 
preceding calendar year, including the name of the business, [and] the cost/benefit analysis 







conducted by the Committee during the application process.” The fiscal ROI calculation 
performed for each potential JDIG satisfies the General Assembly’s cost/benefit analysis 
requirement.  
 
In Texas, state statute Title IV § 481.078 requires the Texas Office of the Governor and the TEF 
program administrator to provide the Lieutenant Governor, Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, and other legislators with a report detailing each Fund recipient’s direct 
economic and fiscal impact on the state prior to the start of each regular session of the 
legislature (biannually). Included in this report are projected job creation and earnings, and the 
“additional amount of ad valorem taxes, sales and use taxes, and fee revenues projected to be 
generated” by the recipient of the incentive award, against the “total amount of tax credits” 
received by the recipient. Thus, while not explicitly required to supply the ROI for each project, 
the TEF administrator must supply the legislature with the two pieces of information ultimately 
used to calculate ROI.  
What process, if any, does the state use in accounting for “but-for” in the 
incentive award decision process?  
Across the United States, states are increasingly challenged to consider whether an incentive 
investment is required to influence the company considering an investment in their state. As 
described in this study, the concept is challenging in theory and extremely difficult to implement 
in practice. For many states, the “but-for” determination is largely done on an ad hoc basis with 
no standardized methodology. 
 
One of the most important factors used to determine ‘but-for’ is the perception of whether the 
project would have taken place in the state without the incentive, usually implying outside 
competition from other states. Two of the programs, Minnesota and Texas, require that 
applicants must be considering locations outside of the state.  
 
In Ohio, “but-for” is a qualitative analysis based on an application question, where JobsOhio 
requests information on project competitors and a mix of capital expenditures and jobs 
depending on the industry. However, there does not seem to be a pre-set requirement.  
 
Minnesota and North Carolina have more structured criteria.  Minnesota considers other sites 
outside of the state, financial strength, and whether the project operates in a basic industry. 
Through these qualitative measures, companies provide specific reasons why this project would 
not move forward “but for” the assistance of the program. In North Carolina, a statute addresses 
“but-for” through the grant applications, requesting information on “the competitive nature of the 
project” including other locations being considered and the benefits of those locations. Although 
this information is required by statute, it does not determine a project’s overall eligibility. 
 
In Texas “but for” assessments focus on whether there is a viable option for the project in 
another state because only such projects are eligible to be funded.  This means that a company 







cannot have previously signed a lease, purchased land, or hired employees in Texas before 
receiving their grant approval. Those actions, if completed before the grant approval, suggest 
the company has already made their location decision and does not need the state’s help to 
move forward. The application also requires information on the primary competition for the 
project including city, state and incentive type.  
Post-Award Program Management  
Once an incentive has been awarded, it is important for states to monitor the performance of 
recipient companies in reaching the agreed upon incentive goals.  As performance is monitored, 
there is the difficult task of determining how to verify a company’s performance report and what 
to do if the defined commitments are not met. Our analysis examined how other states 
managed incentive awards after they were made by focusing on the following three questions: 
 
• How do states monitor and report on the progress of projects that have received 
incentives?  
• How is the data submitted by companies verified?  
• What actions can a state take when commitments are not met? 
How do states monitor and report on the progress of projects that have received 
incentives?  
As part of the program monitoring process, all the states require project reporting. Some are 
more customer-oriented and continuous in their relationship with the company while others are 
more hands off – waiting for periodic reports from companies required under their performance 
agreement. Two states provide support to companies that look like they may not be able to fulfill 
their obligations to help them address compliance issues and to work out arrangements either to 
improve performance and identify alternative programs that may represent better fits for their 
needs. 
  
In Minnesota, businesses are required to submit annual reports through the local government to 
the Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic Development (DEED) documenting 
job creation and investment performance. Required documentation includes payroll reports or 
human resources headcounts for jobs, invoices, and sworn construction statements, among 
other documents for investment. 
 
In North Carolina, companies are required to submit an annual payroll report to the Economic 
Investment Committee showing withholdings and identifying eligible positions as a condition of 
continuation in the grant program. State and federal tax returns or an audit may also be 
requested. Annual reports submitted to the Committee must include social security numbers of 
individual employees identified in the reports to determine eligible positions that have been 







created during the base period that remain filled at the end of each year of the grant. These 
data are used to validate employment claims independently against unemployment insurance 
wage record filings. 
 
In Texas, the process requires recipients to submit annual compliance verification reports to the 
Office of the Governor. With job creation being the focus of their program, the state requires 
information that includes employee identifiers, job functions or titles, hire dates, annual 
compensation, and transfer information.  
 
In Ohio, recipients are obligated to submit an annual report each year throughout their metric 
evaluation period to the JobsOhio Project Performance Team. The JobsOhio Project 
Performance Team also meets with grantees multiple times per year to discuss compliance to 
ensure they are on target to meet their milestones. If not, JobsOhio works with underperformers 
and has demonstrated a willingness to amend performance agreements to reflect changing 
economic or financial circumstances. Additionally, JobsOhio conducts periodic audits of 
businesses receiving investments.  
 
Jobs are reported to the public in multiple ways. For example, JobsOhio releases Annual 
Metrics Reports, and monthly reports are available on its website. A separate Independent 
Performance Assessment of JobsOhio in 2018 provided the numbers of “committed” new and 
retained jobs compared to “actual” reported jobs. Texas prepares an annual Legislative Report 
that includes Funded Project Statistics that describes projects that were active or completed at 
the time of publication and includes both the number of jobs “committed” and jobs “created to 
date.” The Office of the Governor also provides a listing of TEF projects by year in PDF format 
on its website. Minnesota provides data only on ongoing projects on its website, with an 
emphasis on projected outcomes; data on completed projects and actual outcomes was 
provided upon request. North Carolina publishes JDIG Annual Reports that include grantee 
terms for active and completed projects and has certified jobs data associated with payments 
for that calendar year. A separate Economic Development Grant Report provides additional 
information on “certified” job creation compared to projected job creation over the life of the 
program.  
 
Michigan also has two primary reports, the MEDC Annual Report and the MSF-MEDC Annual 
Report to the Legislature. The legislative report provides valuable information on actions taken 
during the fiscal year plus a running list of active projects, including “new jobs committed” and 
“actual new jobs created” by project. The MEDC Annual Report includes a summary graphic 
tracking “original contractual jobs,” “revised contractual jobs,” and “actual jobs created” over the 
life of the MBDP. In the other states, it can be difficult to obtain this information because it is 
scattered among different reports or put in tabular form that is hard to interpret. MEDC’s chart 
clearly summarizes the number of original or announced jobs, the number of jobs that are 
currently contractually obligated, and the number of jobs that have been created by firms 
receiving an incentive.  







How do states verify the data submitted by companies?  
Verification of company reports is done differently in the four states. Some states require the 
companies to attest to their report’s accuracy, some require the company to submit 
documentation from their payroll or tax records, and others use third-party data sources (such 
as corporate or UI tax filings). However, problems can arise when relying on third-party sources 
because the data from those administrative records may not be aligned with the reporting 
requirements.   
 
In Minnesota, the JCF requires businesses to work with local governments where the project is 
located. Minnesota will use data provided by the local government and business to verify job 
performance and investment data and may ask for additional information prior to payment 
authorization. Minnesota may also conduct on-site monitoring and examine documents relevant 
to the project.  
 
To assess actual versus projected jobs, Minnesota utilizes unemployment insurance (UI) 
records to compare data from the annual reports submitted by local government and business. 
However, unemployment data does not always provide the exact data required for performance 
monitoring, so it is not effective enough to be the sole verification procedure. This has pushed 
Minnesota to rely on business payroll reports to verify job creation and retention activities.  
 
In Ohio, companies self-report to JobsOhio. Those reports are provided monthly and are 
summarized in monthly and yearly metrics reports that describe the companies who received 
monetary assistance. In some cases, JobsOhio may request a third-party audit to supplement 
performance reports. 
 
North Carolina utilizes the Department of Revenue to certify the company’s reported 
withholdings and the absence of overdue tax debts. North Carolina also utilizes unemployment 
insurance data to compare actual versus projected jobs. 
 
Texas utilizes annual company-produced compliance verification reports for information on 
recipients’ job creation. In these reports, companies attest to their compliance with other 
requirements in their award agreements. Information may be verified with the Texas Workforce 
Commission in certain cases, and the state may conduct site visits as part of this process. 
What actions can a state take when commitments are not met? 
Most of the programs that we reviewed are similar in that they are performance-based 
incentives. That means that the company must meet its performance targets before receiving 
incentive funds. Minnesota has the strictest rules, in that a company must demonstrate that 
incentive-induced jobs must continue to exist at least a year before funds are disbursed. Two of 
the states actively work with the company client in cases where they may not meet performance 
metrics. Both Minnesota and Ohio work with the client before removing them from a program, to 







either redefine the performance metrics or determine whether another program may suit the 
company’s end goals and needs.   
 
In cases where the company clearly defaults on its commitment to create jobs or make local 
investments, all of the programs have procedures in place to terminate the agreement and in 
some fashion recapture disbursed funds. Since Texas is the only state that makes payments in 
advance of performance, it is the only state to heavily emphasize clawback terms.  
 
In North Carolina, if the business receiving a grant fails to meet a commitment, the Committee, 
in consultation with the Attorney General can reduce the amount of the grant or the term of the 
agreement, may terminate the agreement, or both. If the company fails to maintain employment 
or fails to comply with the agreement for two consecutive years, North Carolina can withhold 
payment or terminate the agreement. If there is evidence of manipulation, the committee can 
immediately terminate the agreement and recapture grant funds. Furthermore, the state can 
recapture funds if a grantee fails to maintain operations at the project location for at least 150% 
of the grant term. 
 
In Minnesota, if a business does not make progress on the project within six months (i.e. 
building permits, construction contracts, etc.), meet the one-year capital investment goals or the 
two-year job creation goals, it will be removed from the program but may apply for future 
designation. Minnesota allows one opportunity to amend a contract and adjust the award level if 
the project over-projected its performance; if that milestone is not reached it then can be 
removed from the program. To limit nonperformance and clawbacks, Minnesota disburses 
payment only after jobs have existed for one year.  
 
Like Minnesota, Ohio strives to limit nonperformance and may reassign the company to other 
programs if it is not performing.  
 
In Texas, performance agreements stipulate terms for repayment in the case of non-
performance. If the grantee fails to maintain its employment figures or meet other contract 
terms, money is returned in one of three ways. First is the clawback, in which the penalty for 
nonperformance is calculated for each job for each year by multiplying the job shortage for the 
year by the penalty that is specified in the agreement. Another method is termination 
repayments, which differ from clawbacks, where repayment is based on adjusting funds already 
disbursed by a specified interest rate. Lastly, funds not disbursed due to termination, but that 
had been obligated, can be recovered for the program.  
Summary of State Comparison Findings 
High quality project assessment, monitoring and evaluation efforts help economic development 
programs increase economic impact over time. Based on our research on select issues in the 







use of ROI and “but for” statements before awards are made, and how states then monitor 
companies for compliance post award, we can summarize our findings as follows:   
 
1. ROI is typically one of several factors used to determine whether to grant incentives 
and to calibrate the amount of the incentive. Initial ROI estimates on project return 
are best used as one element among other strategic criteria when evaluating 
opportunities.  
2. “But for” is frequently required but seldom well defined. Most programs do not have a 
statutory requirement to establish that the project would not have occurred “but for” 
the incentive. That said, most states ask applicants to provide some project-specific 
information that would indicate either the level of competition for the project or a 
rationale for requesting the incentive.  
3. Annual company reporting, including payroll documentation, ability to conduct audits, 
site visits, and ability to verify company inputs with state unemployment insurance 
and revenue offices are common compliance procedures.  
4. States are improving their reporting on outcome metrics, including actual jobs 
created compared to projected or announced jobs. Each state’s process and method 
of reporting is slightly different.  
5. Performance agreements ensure that companies know what to expect in terms of 
their performance requirements. Among the comparison programs, incentives are 
typically paid after performance is achieved, often with intermediate milestones and 
payments. Where clawbacks are necessary, terms are clearly defined and enforced.  
6. The review of management practices indicated that high quality project assessment, 
monitoring and evaluation efforts help economic development programs increase 
economic impact over time. 
Lessons from the states suggest that MBDP might consider the following changes to current 
MEDC practice. First, MEDC may choose to improve its return on investment/cost-benefit 
practices by extending its pre-award analysis to include economic impacts and incorporate a 
“but for” range in its analyses. Second, MEDC could enhance its up-front project analysis by 
including the effects of all incentives, including local government incentives, recognizing the 
important role that local partners play in making these investments successful. Third, it could 
strive to modify program management procedures to strengthen the data verification process by 
using administrative records from the Michigan Departments of Technology Management and 
Budget as well as Michigan Treasury in ways that could improve data quality for reporting 
purposes while reducing the burden on companies. In addition, MEDC could enhance the 
reporting process by examining the process to identify ways to make compliance more 
customer-friendly while ensuring data accuracy.     








Applying This Study’s ROI Model to Comparison State Programs  
The study’s ROI model was also used to consider comparison state programs. Because of the 
lack of detailed project-specific data on the four comparison states, the original version of the 
model was used (described in Bartik, 2018a). The model was tweaked so that the ROI matched 
the overall ROI of Michigan’s completed and terminated projects. (The original model assumes 
that all projects are the same, so the original model will not match the average ROI from using 
the rich set of project-specific data used in the full analysis.) This tweaked model was then 
applied to a stylized version of the incentive structure in each of the four comparison states.  
 
Table 20 depicts the results. The first row shows the ROI in Michigan and the four comparison 
states if each state’s average project matched Michigan’s average multiplier of 3.69. The 
resulting ROIs would be very similar in Ohio and Texas to Michigan. This is because all three 
states use relatively up-front incentives. In contrast, Minnesota and North Carolina have 
significantly lower ROIs. These lower ROIs occur because Minnesota and North Carolina 
provide multi-year incentives rather than up-front incentives. Multi-year incentives have lesser 
effects than up-front incentives, per social present value dollar of incentive costs. The “but for” is 
swayed less with more protracted incentives, as business decision makers heavily discount the 
future. 
 
Table 20. Average Multiplier Effects 
 MI OH TX MN NC 
Assuming all states have average MI multiplier of 
3.69 
3.51 3.54 3.51 2.93 2.17 
Assuming all state assist same industry mix as MI 
(OH multiplier = 3.78, TX = 3.20, MN = 2.84, NC = 
3.17) 
 3.64 2.97 2.13 1.79 
Assuming OH and TX have multipliers suggested by 
their industry mix (OH = 3.16, TX = 2.78) 
 2.95 2.51   
 
Row 2 in Table 20 considers the implications of switching the other states from using Michigan’s 
multipliers to using the multipliers that would occur if each state provided incentives to the same 
industry mix as Michigan does with the MBDP program. The multipliers from all five of the states 
are obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and differ for the same industry 
by state. These cross-state differences are largely due to the strength of state supplier 
networks. BEA essentially assumes that if a state has more extensive activity in different 
supplier industries, then the multiplier will be higher because new export-base industries will use 
more in-state suppliers.  
 







Michigan and Ohio tend to have higher multipliers than the other three states due to more 
extensive manufacturing supplier networks. As a result, substituting the lower state multipliers 
for Texas, Minnesota, and North Carolina tends to reduce the ROI for their incentive programs.  
 
Finally, Row 3 uses some data on the industry mix awarded incentives by Ohio and Texas. (No 
such data were obtainable for Minnesota and North Carolina.) Ohio and Texas incentives tend 
be less targeted to high multiplier industries. As a result, the realized ROI in Ohio and Texas is 
estimated to be significantly lower than it would be if they targeted a high-multiplier industry mix 
similar to Michigan. 
VI. Options for Consideration 
 
The primary goal of this study is to assess the effectiveness of the MBDP. One reason for doing 
so is to identify ways to enhance the program’s economic impact for Michiganders. This section 
provides options for improving ROI practices and up-front analyses to make good incentive 
choices that create the expected benefits for Michigan’s residents. Options for changes to 
program design and administration to increase effectiveness are also offered. 
Reorient the ROI analysis to emphasize economic impact 
MEDC’s mission is to “market Michigan’s opportunity and provide the tools to assist job creation 
and investment,” which serves the larger vision of becoming “a top 10 state for low 
unemployment, GDP growth, per capita income and talent retention and growth.” The Michigan 
Business Development Program (MBDP) supports the mission and vision by providing “grants, 
loans, or other economic assistance to businesses for highly competitive projects in Michigan 
that create jobs and/or provide investment.” To date, job creation has been the program’s 
primary measure of merit.  
 
While the expected program outcomes are economic benefits primarily related to job creation, 
the MBDP’s internal measure of “return on investment” (ROI) is currently limited to fiscal gains 
to state government. MEDC’s current ROI formula compares cash flow to the state from new 
personal income generated by projects to the cost of the incentive over the period of the 
incentive agreement. By relying on this narrow definition of ROI, the state misses the 
opportunity to address whether incentivized projects are making a positive impact on the state 
economy in a manner consistent with MEDC’s mission and vision.  
 
Reorienting ROI from its focus on short-term state-level fiscal returns to longer-range economic 
costs and benefits for the state’s residents would require extending the timeframe for analysis. 
ROI estimates based on returns achieved over three years, as is current practice, would not 
adequately capture the net value of new job creation to the state economy. The original impact 
simulation model that was adapted for this study assumes an 80-year time horizon to 







understand the long-term economic implications associated with different policy and budget 
scenarios, such as reductions on K-12 education spending where the effects only become 
apparent after decades. As presented in this study, a 10-year timeframe is sufficient to see 
economic effects take hold without requiring heroic assumptions about the underlying business 
activity driving the change.  
 
MEDC may consider adapting its current REMI-based impact modeling approach to include 
economic as well as fiscal impacts. In doing so, the timeframe for ROI analysis should be 10 
years in order to capture a more complete set of expected benefits and costs. Another option 
would be to adopt a version of the Upjohn economic simulation model used for this analysis for 
future ROI estimations.  
Address Costs More Explicitly in ROI Estimations 
Economic impact estimates will be viewed with skepticism if they overstate the benefits and 
ignore costs. If an incentive program’s ROI will be based on economic impact, it must consider 
several cost categories, including the cost of the incentive itself, public service costs associated 
with new jobs and accompanying population growth that must be paid for with state and local 
taxes, and higher prices for local businesses.  
 
ROI for economic development 
The term ROI can be misleading when public sector funds are used for economic 
development. Governments typically seek a combination of economic and fiscal benefits 
from incentive spending, rather than a straight financial return as is the case in the private 
sector. Further, there is no established consensus on how to determine ROI for an 
economic development incentive program. Different programs across states use a variety of 
approaches, including a multiple fiscal and economic outcome measures to try to quantify 
their “return.” 
 
A useful definition of ROI should consider a broad range of both benefits and costs to state 
residents. The estimation of benefits depends on the nature of the incentive program but 
typically includes how new jobs and their multiplier effects alter state residents’ per capita 
earnings by increasing local employment-to-population ratios and workers’ wage rates. 
Additional state and local taxes generated and increased property values are other benefits 
that can be estimated. The fiscal impact of the program should include the effects of state 
population growth on the needs for expanded state and local public spending to maintain 
the quality of public services. 
 







Less visible costs should also be incorporated into the estimates. 
 
• If incentivized businesses primarily serve the local population (e.g., retail), it may 
negatively affect existing businesses and their accompanying jobs, wages and taxes. 
• Providing incentives to firms also represents an opportunity cost for taxpayer dollars that 
might otherwise be devoted to increasing spending on government services or returned 
to taxpayers through tax cuts. The modeling challenge is that the economic magnitude of 
these effects can be widely disputed. However, it is untenable to assume that increased 
taxes or reduced public spending has zero economic impact. 
The MEDC specifically asked that this effectiveness study take into consideration several of 
these cost factors. Going forward, the ROI estimation procedures should be adapted to reflect 
additional costs as well as economic benefits. We believe this effort would establish MEDC as a 
national leader in deploying rigorous and accurate ROI analyses that more fully capture the net 
benefits to taxpayers of the state’s economic development work. 
Account for the Incentive’s Level of Influence on Investment Decisions 
One way that ROI measures can overstate benefits is by assuming that the incentive is 
responsible for all positive outcomes. As in most states, MEDC’s current ROI methodology 
implicitly assumes that 100% of the estimated benefits can be attributed to the incentive. This 
study has demonstrated that, whether considered through an economic lens or from a site 
seeker’s perspective, this assumption is flawed. 
 
This does not mean that incentives were “wasted” if it can’t be definitively proven that the 
incentive drove the investment decision. In fact, we know that we can never definitively 
determine what would have happened without the incentive. Incentive policy conversations are 
often stymied by the impossible charge to prove the unknowable: what would have occurred in 
the absence of the incentive? What we do know is that many location-specific factors – 
including incentives but also talent, sites and buildings, and infrastructure – interact with each 
other and together influence each company’s investment choices.  
 
Since incentives are considered in combination with other factors, they rarely – if ever – are 
100% responsible for an investment. Similarly, they rarely – if ever – have zero impact. Applying 
for and complying with discretionary incentive program rules involves costs that the business 
would not bother to incur if there were no value to be gained from the incentive. In short, there is 
no “right” answer, but the level of influence (or “but for” percentage) should be between 0 and 
100%. Estimated benefits should be reduced to reflect this uncertainty.  
 
MEDC can most easily operationalize the need to adjust for the incentive’s impact by 
discounting estimated net benefits by percentages representing various levels of incentive 







influence. For example, project analyses could consider how a given incentive amount 
compares to 10%9, 50%10, 70%11 and 100% of estimated net benefits to calculate adjusted 
ROIs. This approach can be applied regardless of the specific ROI model MEDC chooses to 
use. This simple method would also allow MEDC to identify the break-even point for projects 
and, with experience, establish either target levels or minimum levels for project approvals.  
 
Alternatively, MEDC could choose to use either of the two methods developed for the 
effectiveness study to adjust the estimated ROI during the project award phase. The cost 
sensitivity approach would compare the value of the incentive (estimated by MEDC) to the 
value-added per full-time employee by industry sector (obtainable from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis). The ratio of these two numbers would be used to estimate the “but-for”, or level of 
influence, of the incentive on the investment.  
 
The other approach would be to adapt the firm choice approach provided in this study to allow 
MEDC to estimate the incentive’s level of influence for each prospect based on project 
competition, specified financing gaps or competitive disadvantages, the ratio of the proposed 
incentive to the proposed project investment, whether the company is a new to the state, cost-
sensitivity of the industry, and other factors MEDC deems relevant.   
 
The project team recognizes that neither approach will generate the “right” answer because 
there is no right answer, only estimates that fall between 0 and 100 percent. In fact, the two 
approaches used in this study – the Upjohn cost sensitivity and the CREC firm choice – 
generate very different results. Any effort to incorporate a “but-for” estimate into the ROI 
analysis should recognize the inherent uncertainty. Therefore generating a range of estimates 
and/or assessing the incentive against a series of returns calculated using a set of “but-for” 
ranges is preferable to a single point estimate. Either approach specified in this study could be 
combined with the continued use of the REMI model or other economic impact models.  
The ROI Model Can Help Direct Incentives toward Projects with the 
Greatest economic Impact . . .  
The model used to estimate ROI is designed to highlight a series of costs and benefits that are 
affected when incentives are offered to companies. This analysis identified some of the most 
                                               
9 Average estimated “but-for” level for past MBDP projects based on research on company sensitivity to 
tax costs.  
10 Average estimated “but-for” level for completed and terminated MBDP projects hypothesizing the likely 
level of influence based on company- and project-specific factors affecting the propensity to value 
incentives in decision-making. 
11 Average estimated “but-for” level for completed MBDP projects hypothesizing the likely level of 
influence based on company- and project-specific factors affecting the propensity to value incentives in 
decision-making. 







important factors that boost modeled ROI. Prioritizing projects with these characteristics should 
generate greater impacts for the Michigan economy. For example: 
 
• Prioritize projects in high unemployment areas. The economy benefits most from new 
investments when new jobs go to local residents. Local residents are more likely to 
benefit from new jobs when local unemployment rates are high. In other words, the 
state’s ROI is greater when investments are targeted to locations with high 
unemployment. MEDC could incorporate the local unemployment rate into its upfront 
analysis to flag these opportunities.  
• Continue to favor projects with high multipliers. Projects in industries with high multipliers 
generate higher benefits. In practice, this tends to mean emphasizing projects in 
manufacturing industries with extensive networks in the state. 
• Recognize the potential for housing price pressures to dampen positive effects from job 
and population growth. If housing supply is not able to keep up with growth in demand 
(and housing prices increase), ROI will be diminished.  
. . . But ROI Should be Used in Concert with Other Project Review Criteria 
to Drive Decisions that Reflect Economic Objectives 
Calculating the ROI helps quantify benefits and enables comparisons among otherwise diverse 
projects. A downside is the inability of a single ROI measure to capture all the relevant project 
details that determine its contribution to state and local economies.  
 
For example, manufacturing firms, especially in the automotive sector, usually have high 
multipliers, while service industries have lower multipliers.  A decision to focus only on 
manufacturing will keep the ROI high, but it could lead the state to over-specialize and miss out 
on high-income job generating opportunities in other faster-growing sectors. While 
manufacturing is relatively healthy now, most new jobs are being created in service sectors. An 
incentive program designed to support job creation would miss most job opportunities if it 
ignored the service sectors because of low multipliers. In addition, manufacturing-heavy 
communities often wish to diversify their economies to be less susceptible during economic 
downturns, and incentives can be one way to help attract new types of businesses to 
communities that might not be competitive without them.   
 
On the other hand, within the model, some of these same high multiplier sectors tend to have a 
low “but-for” or incentive level of influence that diminishes the estimated ROI. It would be unwise 
to dismiss these high value-added manufacturing sectors because that very characteristic (high 
value-added) lowers the calculated return relative to other sectors.   
 







To take another example, the model indicates that projects in the Detroit metropolitan area 
would have a lower ROI because of higher costs, including those associated with absorbing the 
additional population that would come with new jobs. The implication is not that incentives 
should not be used for projects in southeast Michigan in favor of projects elsewhere. In fact, the 
higher costs of doing business may suggest a greater need for incentives. It does not make 
strategic sense to avoid projects in the state’s largest metropolitan area that are likely 
supporting the Michigan’s most important economic sectors, redeveloping properties, and 
generating local taxes simply to bump up the average modeled ROI. 
 
In short, the MEDC’s project review, including the ROI estimate, should be used to support the 
state’s economic development strategy, not the other way around. The strategy should be about 
more than generating a high ROI. ROI is appropriate as one element of project decision-making 
criteria but should not be relied upon exclusively to determine incentive awards. MEDC should 
be willing to accept lower ROIs when projects help achieve important economic objectives not 
captured in the ROI calculation. We heard several examples of these benefits throughout the 
course of our interviews, including building improvements, bringing abandoned or underutilized 
properties back into productive use, training and hiring programs for populations with barriers to 
employment, and positioning Michigan-based operations for future growth.  
 
One way to think about the tradeoffs is from a portfolio perspective. Investment portfolios should 
be diversified to mitigate risk and should not concentrate all assets in the highest-yield 
investments. Incentivizing projects that generate a certain ROI will tend to concentrate funds in 
narrow categories of investments that may actually increase long-term economic risk. A diverse 
portfolio supports a broader set of industries and mitigates the potential impact should 
downturns affect specific industries and their supply chain networks.  
Revisit MBDP’s Purpose and Eligibility Rules to Assess Match with Current 
State Needs  
The project review, assessment of internal procedures, and local partner interviews surfaced 
several options to improve MBDP’s utility. At the same time, the economic, political and 
incentive environments have changed since MBDP was created, prompting reconsideration of 
how and why MBDP operates the way it does.  
 
MEDC may wish to consider MBDP’s role and potential adaptations that could improve its 
effectiveness in today’s economic development setting. 
 
• When MBDP was established in the post-recession period, job creation was the primary 
economic development concern. Today, finding enough talented workers to fill job 
openings is the dominant economic development challenge facing communities. At the 
same time, MBDP has historically funded a high proportion of manufacturing operations, 







where the trend is toward greater automation requiring fewer people with higher skills. 
For both reasons, is it sensible to continue to emphasize job creation metrics? 
• MBDP was created during a time of very negative political perceptions about tax 
incentives, led by a Governor who famously described them at the time as the “heroin 
drip of state government.” It was intended to focus on short-term investments and to be 
tightly controlled. Today, the new Governor is a more enthusiastic proponent of 
incentives for economic development. Does the MBDP remain the right approach given 
political expectations? 
• MBDP has been joined by the Good Jobs for Michigan Program in MEDC’s incentive 
program portfolio. Good Jobs for Michigan also strives to serve new businesses creating 
jobs in Michigan and, as MBDP was intended, to help the state become more 
competitive in attracting desirable investment. Businesses that create a minimum of 250 
new jobs with an average wage of 125% of the regional average are eligible. Should the 
MBDP consider revising its own eligibility criteria to focus on smaller, Michigan-based 
enterprises?   
One option for consideration is linking MBDP to worker training programs among the 
incentivized companies. Grants and support for customized job training is an increasingly 
common state-level incentive that should generate a high return by increasing the employment 
levels and expected wages of the state’s residents. There is good evidence that customized job 
training may often have a higher dollar value to assisted companies, and hence higher effects, 
than cash incentives, particularly for smaller companies. Evaluating a training option either 
within MBDP or within MEDC is sensible in terms of both ROI to the state and meeting business 
needs, as articulated by incentivized firms that have trouble achieving their hiring goals and 
local economic development partners working with these companies.   
Continue Efforts to Use UI Data to Verify Company-provided Data on Job 
Creation  
States are increasingly verifying jobs and payroll data provided by incentive recipients with 
information that companies submit to state unemployment insurance (UI) agencies. While these 
records can provide a useful check on the data that incentivized firms submit for compliance 
purposes, the structure, timing and coverage of the data can mean they are not a foolproof 
method of verification for the incentive program.   
 
In Michigan, the UI Agency generally does not collect site-specific data for employers paying 
into the system: “Unless the firm asked the Unemployment Insurance Agency to create 
“chargeable locations” for their firm, all wage records would be aggregated to the firm’s total 
employment for the state.” This is the case for the majority of Michigan firms. This means that UI 
data would not allow wage and employment verification for MBDP-funded project unless the 







project is either with a single-site company or happens to be one of the few firms to have 
created records by “chargeable location.”  
 
One option to consider would be to request or require businesses applying for an MBDP grant 
to create “chargeable locations” for their firm in order to allow milestone compliance verification. 
It is unclear what burden this might place on firms in the state although many other states 
require firms to report these data at an establishment level.  We suggest that MEDC and the 
Bureau of Labor Market Information and Strategic Initiatives (within the Department of 
Technology, Management and Budget) seriously examine the viability of this option. A 
complementary option for businesses that do not wish to provide location-specific data to the UI 
Commission could be to specify an alternative verification procedure that would involve more 
robust periodic site visits to verify reported employment data.  
 
A more holistic solution would be to advocate for legislative authority to require enhanced wage 
records that include start date, job title, hours worked, and employment site location. State law 
should allow for sharing this data between MEDC and the UI system for evaluation and 
statistical purposes. Other states are taking this approach. For example, Nebraska allows for 
data sharing between agencies on a voluntary basis for firm establishments that receive 
incentive awards. Other states, including Alaska, Washington, Oregon, and Louisiana, provide 
authority to their UI system to collect these data for all employers receiving incentives, and the 
data can be shared with the economic development agency for use in verifying reports provided 
by incentive recipients.  
Strengthen Cooperation with Local Partners  
The MBDP could be improved by strengthening cooperation with local economic development 
partners. Local partners often have valuable knowledge about opportunities proposed for their 
communities, especially for expansion projects, that could enhance MEDC’s up-front analyses. 
They are also well-placed to facilitate compliance reporting and to engage with the company on 
an ongoing basis, thereby providing an early warning system if problems (or opportunities) 
emerge. Closing communication gaps in real time would be helpful to both MEDC and local staff 
to facilitate better evaluation, but also to capture critical insights about the impact and efficacy of 
the incentives. 
 
In general, local partners sought greater collaboration with MEDC during MBDP project 
development. Specifically, during the decision-making phases, local partners expressed a 
desire for greater transparency into project opportunities earlier in the process so they could 
prepare and respond appropriately and quickly, especially regarding the local incentive match. 
At the same time, many felt they could contribute valuable intelligence about the nature of the 
project that would be useful during the assessment phase.  
 







Multiple local partners expressed frustration that they were not privy to updates on project 
progress, especially related to MBDP milestone achievements in their communities. The 
knowledge itself would be welcome, but partners could also bring to the table resources to help 
local firms meet their milestones, such as local workforce identification and training programs. If 
kept informed, they would also be in a better position to make sure their local companies stay in 
compliance.  
 
Options going forward include providing local partners greater transparency on local projects, 
sharing updates on milestones from companies in their communities, and collaborating to work 
with companies to make it easier administratively and operationally to achieve their milestone 
commitments. Closer local engagement could ameliorate the challenges MEDC faces in 
managing compliance reporting from the company. If it chooses, MEDC could engage local 
partners to answer critical questions about the impact of the project even after formal project 
completion.  
  







Appendix A. Detailed ROI Methodology 
 
This study’s methodology is based on a version of the model described in Bartik (2018a). This 
model is adapted to Michigan, and to the MBDP program, using Michigan data and MBDP data, 
as will be described in a later section. 
 
The study follows MBDP in defining ROI to be the net benefits of a project (or the program 
overall), divided by the MBDP incentive costs. However, the study defines net benefits quite 
differently from MEDC’s current approach. MEDC currently defines net benefits as being the 
expected increased state revenue over the term of the MBDP incentive, either two or three 
years, adjusted downwards by some local incentive costs.  
 
In contrast, this study defines net benefits of MBDP as being the present value of the gains in 
real income per capita for various Michigan residents. These gains in real income per capita are 
of the following types: 
 
• Increases in real earnings per capita due to increases in the employment to population 
ratio. 
• Increases in real earnings per capita due to increases in Michigan real wages. 
• Capital gains for Michigan residents who own Michigan property due to increases in 
property values.  
• Fiscal benefits for Michigan taxpayers due to increased state and local tax revenue from 
an expanded economy, minus the increased public service needs due to an expanded 
population.  
• Reductions in profits of businesses owned by Michigan residents that face increased 
costs due to higher wages and property costs.  
• To avoid double-counting, the increases in real earnings, increased property values, and 
reductions in profits are converted to after-tax versions using Michigan tax rates.  
• MBDP’s incentive costs are subtracted out from these various benefit numbers to yield 
net benefits. But MBDP’s costs are first adjusted to account for the reality that some 
incentive costs may be directly “exported” to non-state residents, specifically out-of-state 
owners of businesses that may pay increased taxes to finance the incentives.  
This methodology contrasts with MEDC’s current methodology in being much more 
comprehensive in considering both additional benefits, as well as possible offsets to benefits. 
This study’s methodology captures the idea that economic development incentives such as 







MBDP are primarily aimed at giving a state’s residents better economic opportunities due to 
increased access to good jobs. The model’s inclusion of gains in real earnings per capita due to 
higher employment to population ratios and higher real wages captures the value of such better 
opportunities. But this study’s methodology also captures various offsets; for example, new jobs, 
while they may increase a state’s tax revenue, also increase the state’s population, which 
requires additional state and local public spending to maintain the same quality of public 
services. 
 
The study does not count the overall increase in state output or state income as a gain, unless it 
is associated with higher per capita output or income. Much of the gain in state output and 
income is due to population increase. The model’s philosophy is that simply increasing a state’s 
population, with no increase in state income per capita, is not really a real income gain for any 
one, and certainly not for state residents.12 
 
This study’s present value of net benefits is calculated over an 80-year period. This does make 
a difference compared to MEDC’s current approach of only looking at the 2 to 3-year term of the 
MBDP incentive. However, as will be shown later, in most model simulations, this present value 
doesn’t change much if only the first 10 years are considered. Most of the net benefits of new 
jobs for a state’s residents occur in the first 10 years after the jobs are created. 
 
We now turn to more detail on how these real income gains are estimated. We first consider 
how the real income effects are estimated conditional on a given net change in Michigan jobs 
due to the MBDP incentives. We then consider how the net change in Michigan jobs is 
estimated based on the “but for” number of jobs induced by the MBDP incentive. A separate 
section considers the important topic of how the study’s model estimates the “but for” 
percentage of MBDP jobs induced by these incentives. Finally, we consider how this model 
adjusts for the reality that some of the MBDP’s incentive costs can be directly exported to non-
state residents, whose income gains and losses are not counted in this Michigan-centric model.  
Real Income Gains Due to Job Growth in Michigan 
The model is based on estimates of how the Michigan labor market and housing market 
respond to the state’s job growth, and how the state’s economy affects state and local tax 
revenue and government spending needs. Each of these will be discussed in turn. This 
discussion assumes a given level of job growth in Michigan. How that job growth is determined 
will be discussed later.  
                                               
12 As has been argued before (Bartik 1991), it is probably not a gain even for in-migrants, who otherwise 
could have moved to some other state with quite similar income prospects.  







Labor market effects 
A shock that increases the number of jobs in Michigan by some amount is assumed to have 
both short-run and long-run effects in increasing labor force participation rates, reducing 
unemployment rates, and increasing real wage rates. The source for these estimates is the 
empirical literature on local labor markets, and the specific sources are referenced in Bartik 
(2017). As one would expect, the short-run effects of an increase in the Michigan job level on 
these various labor market outcomes are greater than the long-run effects. As migration 
increases over time, some of the initial labor market effects are offset. However, some effects, 
for example effects on labor force participation rates, are relatively persistent, lasting for many 
years, and certainly well beyond a 2- or 3-year time horizon. 
  
Based on the empirical literature, the magnitude of the effects of a job shock on labor market 
outcomes is assumed to vary with the local unemployment rate. With higher local 
unemployment, a given increase in local jobs is estimated to lead to greater reductions in 
unemployment, and greater increases in labor force participation. Therefore, labor market 
benefits of higher Michigan job growth are significantly greater for projects located in Michigan 
counties with high unemployment, or for projects undertaken at times when Michigan’s overall 
unemployment rate was higher.  
 
Job growth’s estimated effects on local unemployment and local labor force participation imply 
effects on overall population and hence on in-migration. Mathematically, a state’s jobs must be 
exactly equal to its employment to population ratio times its population. Therefore, any jobs that 
do not increase the employment to population ratio, either by reducing unemployment or 
increasing labor force participation, must increase population. These population increases play 
an important role later in the model in helping to determine state and local public spending 
needs to maintain public service quality. Such population increases are important. Empirical 
estimates suggest that in the long-run, after 10 years or so, a 1 percent increase to a state’s 
number of jobs leads to an increase in the state’s population by 0.7 to 0.8 percent, on average.  
 
All local earnings effects are adjusted to after-tax versions using Michigan tax rates. All taxes 
are included, not just income taxes.  
Housing market effects 
Job growth and its associated population growth also lead to higher property values. Property 
value increases are estimated based on the empirical research literature on how changes in 
local employment and population affect housing values. Only the increases in property owned 
by Michigan residents are counted.  
 
The increases in property values result in a one-time capital gain for some Michigan residents. 
The model also subtracts out the subsequent increases in property taxes, based on estimated 
Michigan property tax rates.  








The model uses a straightforward fiscal impact model to measure the fiscal benefits of job 
growth and its resulting population growth. Personal income in the state is assumed to grow by 
the same percentage as state jobs. This is then combined with estimates from the empirical 
literature on how elastic different types of state and local taxes are with respect to state 
personal income. State and local spending needs are assumed to grow by the same percentage 
as population growth.  
 
Because population growth in the model in the long-run is 70 to 80 percent or more of job 
growth, there is some tendency for spending needs to grow by an appreciable percentage of the 
growth in state and local tax revenue. This is exacerbated by the estimates from the literature 
that Michigan’s state and local tax revenue, as in most states, tends to be slightly inelastic with 
respect to personal income, that is state and local tax revenue in percentage terms tends to 
grow somewhat slower than state personal income.  
 
A more complete, complex, and difficult-to-estimate fiscal impact model might be able to 
improve upon these estimates. On the one side, the model may under-estimate the public 
infrastructure costs of growth. Existing public infrastructure in many cases was paid for in the 
past with federal grants and purchased at a time when land costs were much lower, and there 
was less existing infrastructure to be demolished. New public infrastructure may have to be 
financed without as much federal aid and may require more expensive costs for retrofitting 
existing infrastructure or demolishing it and buying more expensive land. In other words, 
increased congestion costs of new infrastructure, and diminished federal aid, may mean that a 
given percentage increase in jobs and population may cause a much larger percentage 
increase in infrastructure costs.  
 
On the other hand, job growth, by increasing employment to population ratios and wage rates, 
may imply that state welfare spending, including the state portion of Medicaid spending, may 
grow by a lesser percentage than state population growth. Overall, it is unclear whether a more 
complex fiscal impact model would increase or decrease the net fiscal benefits of state job 
growth. The state of Michigan should consider constructing a more complete state and local 
fiscal impact model, which would have a variety of uses for all kinds of government policies, not 
just economic development incentives.  
Reductions in profits of Michigan-owned businesses  
The increased wages and land prices due to growth will increase business costs. This will 
decrease business profits unless the cost increases can be passed on to consumers. The 
model assumes that for “non-export-based” goods and services, that is those goods and 
services sold to Michigan buyers, that these higher Michigan costs are fully passed on to 
buyers. (The resulting increase in prices is already accounted for in the model, as the model’s 
estimated effects on wages adjust for local price changes due to growth.)  
 







On the other hand, for export-based businesses, which sell their goods and services outside of 
Michigan, there is little if any ability for Michigan-based businesses to pass on their costs to 
buyers, as the prices of these goods and services is determined in a national market. Among 
these Michigan-based export-base businesses, the resulting loss in profits is only counted as a 
loss in the model if the loss is for businesses owned by Michigan residents. The model is 
consistent throughout in taking a Michigan-centric perspective: only real income gains and 
losses for Michigan residents are counted, and effects on non-state residents are ignored. 
 
Based on various empirical data, detailed in Bartik (2018a), the model assumes that 26 percent 
of businesses in the Michigan economy are owned by local residents, and that only 22 percent 
of such Michigan-owned businesses sell their goods and services outside their local economy. 
Therefore, of the increase in local costs estimated in the model, only about 6 percent (26 
percent times 22 percent) are borne by Michigan businesses owned by Michigan residents.  
 
All these changes in real income per capita of Michigan residents are conditional on a given 
change in the number of jobs in Michigan. The next section turns to considering how the 
number of jobs created in Michigan is determined, conditional on a given but-for effect of MBDP 
on jobs in the incented firm. After the next section, we consider how the but-for effect on jobs is 
determined. 
Net Job Growth Effects of a Given Increase in Incented Jobs 
For a given increase in jobs in firms receiving incentives, there will be some net increase in jobs 
in Michigan. Some economic forces augment the jobs created in firms receiving incentives; 
other economic forces reduce other jobs in the state economy. On the positive side are input-
output multipliers and agglomeration economies. On the negative side are crowding out and 
congestion costs, and the opportunity costs of government paying for the incentives. Each will 
be discussed in turn. 
Multiplier effects  
The jobs created in incented firms will affect other jobs in the state economy via “input-output” 
effects. The jobs and output of the incented firm requires some supplies of goods and services 
as inputs, and some of these inputs will be obtained locally, increasing jobs in local supplier 
firms. Both the incented firm and its local suppliers will use as inputs some local workers, who in 
turn purchase as “inputs” to their life style some locally produced goods and services.  
 
The magnitude of these input-output multipliers depends partly on whether the technology and 
organization of the industry has led to particularly complex tiers of suppliers – the more complex 
and extensive the supplier networks, the larger the multiplier. These supplier network multipliers 
also depend upon how the extent of development of the local supplier network, so holding 
industry constant, these supplier network multipliers will tend to be higher in states that have a 
greater history of being concentrated in a particular industry. Thus, for example, autos tend to 







have higher multipliers than other industries, and autos in Michigan tends to have higher 
multipliers than other states.  
 
The magnitude of these input-output multipliers may also depend upon the range of local goods 
and services of high quality and low price that are readily available. Workers have a choice of 
whether to purchase locally, and these local purchases may vary in different local economies.  
 
Input-output multipliers are available from several sources, including from the U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, IMPLAN, and REMI. For this study, we used the “RIMS II multipliers” for 
different industries available from BEA. 
Agglomeration economy effects  
The size of a local economy, or greater concentrations of local industries in a cluster, may 
increase productivity of at least some industries. These “agglomeration economy” effects are 
believed by regional economists to exist due to either local “thick market externalities”—a larger 
local market for a particular good or service will result in greater availability of more specialized 
suppliers—or due to local information spillovers, in which firms and workers steal ideas from 
other local firms and workers.   
 
Although it is widely believed that agglomeration economies exist—otherwise, how could Silicon 
Valley exist with its high costs? —such agglomeration economies only increase multipliers if the 
job increase in the incented firm increases these agglomeration economies. If the incented 
firm’s expansion allows the local economy or cluster to reach a scale where certain specialized 
goods and services can be economically produced locally or allows a local economy or cluster 
to have better synergies of information “sharing/stealing,” then the multiplier may be higher. The 
resulting greater local productivity will attract local job growth in other local firms, such as 
specialized suppliers or even competing firms.  
 
There is no real consensus on whether agglomeration economies lead to higher multipliers in 
practice, and if so, in which types of local economies such higher agglomeration multipliers will 
occur. Therefore, the model used in the study assumes that increases in jobs in incented firms 
do not have any special extra multipliers due to agglomeration effects.  
Crowding Out and Congestion Costs 
The jobs in incented firms, and any input-output or agglomeration economy multiplier effects, 
will lead to shortages in some local inputs. Local land is in fixed supply—they’re not making any 
more of it—so local land prices will go up, which will in turn push up local wages even if real 
wages are unchanged. Higher land prices and wages will lead to higher prices of other locally 
produced goods, and even of locally distributed goods due to higher local distribution costs.  
 
In the current study, the effects of increases in land prices and other local prices and nominal 
wages are derived from studies of how local jobs respond to increases in business taxes, under 







the assumption that an increase in local costs by some given dollar amount has the same effect 
no matter what the source. The effects of higher local real wages on local jobs seem to be 
smaller in the empirical literature than would be predicted based on business tax effects, and 
these observed smaller effects for local real wages are assumed in the model. Real wage 
increases may have smaller effects on business job creation because higher real wages may 
increase worker productivity in various ways, for example by reducing turnover and hiring costs, 
and inducing greater worker effort.   
 
The offsets from higher local costs are considerable. Higher local costs in this study’s model 
reduce net job creation by over one-quarter. Thus, if the job multiplier was originally 4, these 
higher local costs would reduce the net multiplier to 3.  
 
These offsets are not impervious to policy intervention. For example, if a state or local economy 
makes efforts to make land easier to develop for new housing or new business, this will reduce 
the property value effects of local job growth. This in turn will reduce overall cost effects, thereby 
reducing the offset due to increased costs. Based on some empirical estimates, the model 
assumes that in the Detroit metropolitan area, compared to the rest of the state of Michigan, 
housing price elasticities are higher, which will reduce net job creation from incentives in this 
portion of the state. This presumably reflects some scarcity of land in the Detroit suburbs, which 
is in part affected by public policy.  
Opportunity costs of government financing the incentives 
Under the plausible assumption that the fiscal benefits of incentives are lower in present value 
than the direct incentive costs, and assuming further that state and local governments must 
balance their budgets, the net costs of incentives, after fiscal benefits, must be paid for by some 
combination of state and local tax increases and spending cuts. These tax increases and 
spending cuts will affect the state economy in two ways: demand-side effects; supply-side 
effects.  
 
On the demand side, either state and local tax increases, or spending cuts, will reduce the 
purchasing power of some state residents. As explained in Bartik (2017), the model uses some 
of the most recent evidence of such demand-side effects, which may be larger than previously 
supposed.  
 
On the supply-side, either tax increases or spending cuts could potentially have some effects on 
the quantity or quality of various business inputs, potentially affecting output or jobs in a state. 
This study’s model focuses on the supply-side effects with the greatest evidence: business tax 
increases; cuts in K-12 spending.  
 
Other tax increases and spending cuts may also have supply-side effects, but there is less 
reliable evidence, so such supply-side effects are not incorporated into the model. One could 
imagine that infrastructure spending cuts might have considerable supply side effects in 







retarding the growth of the state economy. However, such effects are likely to vary enormously 
with the particular infrastructure spending that is cut, so it would be speculative to include any 
such effects in the model.  
 
For business tax increases, this study uses a large literature that estimates the negative effects 
of business tax increases, holding public services constant. This research suggests that a 10 
percent increase in overall state and local business taxes, holding public services constant, will 
reduce the long-run number of jobs in a state by about 5 percent. Based on prior research, the 
state economy gradually converges to this long-run equilibrium at a rate of about 9 percent per 
year.  
 
It might be wondered if such business tax increases would completely offset the effects on 
business of business tax incentives. In general, the model’s answer is No, for two reasons. First, 
business tax incentives, unlike general business taxes, are targeted on a state economy’s 
“export-base” sector, that is on businesses that sell their goods and services outside the state. 
We expect the export-base sector to be far more sensitive to changes in taxes and incentives 
and business costs in general than is true for the non-export base sector, as the non-export 
base sector can largely pass on changes in their costs to local consumers; the export-base 
sector cannot do so because the output prices of the goods and services this sector produces 
are determined in national and international markets. Second, business tax incentives are, 
mostly, targeted at new investment decisions, and hence have more immediate effects than 
business taxes on business decisions about overall capital stock and jobs. To put it another 
way, changes in overall business taxes, unlike incentives, affect many businesses that are not 
contemplating any significant change in their scale of operations, and these businesses are 
unlikely to be substantially affected in the short-run by business tax changes. 
 
In addition, it might be assumed that because business tax increases have a negative effect 
upon job creation, that financing tax incentives by increased business taxes is a bad idea. Not 
necessarily. As will be explored more below, there is a countervailing factor: a substantial 
portion of increased business taxes fall on businesses owned by out-of-state owners, such as 
stockholders living in some other state. To the extent to which incentives are financed by 
business costs, a portion of these costs are not paid by state residents. In turn, the reduced job 
creation due to business tax increases have some negative effects on state wages and property 
values, which shifts some of these costs back to state residents, but not all.  
 
For K-12 spending cuts, the model uses estimates from a recent paper by Jackson, Johnson, 
and PepsiCo (2016), that a 10 percent cut in public school spending, over all 13 years from K-
12, will reduce future wages by about 8 percent. The model only counts such reduced wages as 
costs for K-12 students who stay in Michigan after graduation. As one might expect, the bulk of 
the costs of lower K-12 spending for Michigan’s economy occur only after a generation, as the 
cohort in school enters their prime earnings years. Therefore, if incentive costs are financed by 







K-12 spending cuts, an 80-year perspective is necessary to give a true picture of the policy’s 
benefits and costs. For this type of financing, a 10-year perspective misses a lot.  
 
The baseline model used in this study assumes that MBDP incentives are implicitly financed by 
business tax increases, compared to what business taxes would be otherwise. That is, the 
model assumes that if the MBDP program were to be abolished, the most likely political 
scenario is that the cost savings would be used to reduce the state’s overall business taxes. 
However, the model also considers alternative financing scenarios in which incentives are 
instead financed by: increases in non-business taxes; reductions in K-12 spending; reductions 
in non-K-12 spending. As we will show, the overall ROI only significantly changes if incentives 
are financed by K-12 spending, which significantly reduces the ROI. Financing economic 
development incentives by cuts in other policies that have large effects on economic 
development is a bad idea.  
Incentive Costs and Offsets to Such Costs 
As mentioned, the project includes incentive costs on both the numerator and denominator of 
the calculated “return on investment” or ROI. For each project, the present value of actual 
incentive costs is the denominator. The present value of incentive costs is also subtracted from 
other economic effects to calculate net benefits in the numerator of the ROI calculation. But in 
the numerator, the present value of investment costs must be adjusted to reflect that not all 
costs of financing incentives are paid by Michigan residents.  
 
The baseline model assumes that the net fiscal costs of incentives, after considering fiscal 
benefits, are financed by business taxes being higher than they otherwise would be. A portion of 
those business taxes will be paid by out-of-state business owners. The model ends up 
concluding that about 15 percent of gross incentive costs end up not being paid by state 
residents, and this “benefit” reduces the incentive subtraction by about 15 percent in the ROI 
numerator.  
Adapting the Model to Michigan 
A full description of the basic model is in Bartik (2018a). For this project, the model was tweaked 
in various ways to be applicable to Michigan. Following is a summary of the adaptations: 
 
• The original Upjohn economic simulation model considered an incented firm whose jobs 
did not change over time. To model each MBDP project, the model was modified to use 
the actual jobs created as reported in the MEDC database on this program. The actual 
incentive disbursements and repayments from the MEDC database were also used. 
• To calculate the but-for probability estimate, the model requires data on the present 
value of incentives paid and jobs created both now and in the future. For all projects, the 







model assumes that the last-reported cumulative number of jobs created will persist 
indefinitely in the future. This assumption essentially holds that agglomeration effects of 
more jobs will exactly counter-balance depreciation over time of the incented jobs.  
• For all projects, the model assumes no future incentive disbursements or incentive 
repayments will be made. The basic Bartik (2018a) model assumes that the incented 
jobs will at some point receive future incentive payments. This assumption was 
abandoned for this study because such an assumption implies that the MBDP program 
will necessarily lead to such payments for the incented jobs. Rather, future incentive 
payments for incented jobs will depend upon policy choices made by future state 
government personnel and should be analyzed separately.  
• The above assumptions about job creation and incentive payments do not seem 
problematic for the 41 completed and terminated projects in the database.13 However, 
for the 198 “First Milestone” projects, in many cases some future job creation (or 
destruction) will occur and some future incentive payments (or repayments) will occur. It 
seems likely that on net, these projects will have both some positive job creation and 
some additional incentive payments. The former will add to project benefits, the latter will 
add to incentive costs. The impact on the ROI is uncertain.  
• For all calculations that involve value added, Michigan specific figures on value-added 
per industry are used to assign value-added to different projects.  
• The analysis of each project uses information on the unemployment rate in the county in 
which the project is located.  
• All the fiscal calculations of budget effects on revenues and taxes use Michigan-specific 
information on different types of taxes and spending.  
• The estimated effects of state personal income on different types of taxes uses 
Michigan-specific estimates from Bruce, Fox, and Tuttle (2006), and Anderson and 
Shimul (2012), rather than the national average information used in Bartik (2018a). 
Based on Anderson and Shimul, separate urban and non-urban elasticities of property 
tax revenues are used.  
• The input-output multipliers used in the study are Michigan multipliers for each industry 
obtained from the RIMS II model of the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.  
                                               
13 Of those projects, 32 are formally and legally completed or terminated, whereas 9 are awaiting some 
final verification steps. Most of the analysis focuses on the 41 and 198 project groupings, but the model is 
also run for just the 32 formally terminated projects to see if results differ drastically.  







• The housing price elasticities are taken from Saiz (2010) and are Michigan-specific. The 
Detroit metro area elasticities are used for projects in the Detroit metro area, and 
projects in the rest of the state use the Grand Rapids metro elasticities. 
• Border counties use adjusted multipliers and “but for” percentages. The multipliers 
assume that for a border county, 25 percent of the multiplier occurs in the next state, and 
is lost to Michigan. (The rationale is that a border county is bordered on three sides by 
Michigan, and on one side by another state.). Thus, if the BEA says that the multiplier for 
this industry is 5, the adjusted multiplier would be 4 (= 1 + 0.75 * (5 − 1). Similarly, the 
“but for” percentage is adjusted to a weighted average of the average inter-state 
elasticity of 10 with respect to a 1 percent change in costs as a percent of value-added, 
and estimates from the literature that within a metropolitan area, the response to a 1 
percent change in costs in one part of a metro area is 40. The weighted average is 25 
percent on 40, and 75 percent on 10, which yields 17.5. The rationale is that in 
considering different sites for a location decision, 25 percent of the time the firm is 
choosing between different sites in the same local labor market. These adjustments are 
admittedly ad hoc, but serve in the absence of better evidence on border county effects.  
Technical Note: How This Study’s ROI Differs from the ROI Currently 
Produced by MEDC 
To explore further the differences between the MEDC ROI and the ROI results derived during 
this study, a specific project is considered: ‘Project Bob.’ Table A.1 shows how the ROI changes 
when the MEDC model is modified to this study’s models. The MEDC ROI for this project was 
9.8. When this project’s model is modified to match the MEDC model as closely as possible—
only counting state tax revenue for 3 years as a benefit—a project ROI of 7.47 is derived, which 
is a reasonably close match to MEDC’s calculation.  
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100.0% Fiscal ROIs 9.8 7.47 3.79 10.97 4.77 13.18 15.60 
100.0% Plus earnings effects     38.31 106.64 146.77 
100.0% Plus other effects     77.60 137.36 160.03 
2.7% Upjohn but for      2.77 3.34 
80.0% CREC but for       108.92 
 
The MEDC model is then modified by including the funding sources that typically pay for 
incentive expenditures.  States typically finance incentives through increased taxes or reduced 
spending, and these choices have a calculable negative consequence. In the baseline version 







of this study’s model, this financing is assumed to be from higher business taxes, which has 
negative effects both by reducing Michigan demand for goods and services, and by reducing job 
growth in some Michigan businesses. The ROI over 3 years, looking only at state revenue 
gains, is then cut in half, from 7.47 to 3.79. Financing effects for incentives are important.  
 
Next, the model is modified from just considering state revenue to also considering local 
revenue. The model is modified to be on a present-value basis, discounting future cash values 
at 3 percent annually. The ROI then increases from 3.79 to 10.97. Accounting for effects on 
Michigan local governments is important.  
 
The spending needs associated with the increased population attracted by the new jobs being 
created is then subtracted. Adjusting for spending needs reduces the ROI by more than half, 
from 10.97 to 4.77.  
 
The remainder of the table considers two different types of modifications to the model. In the 
columns to the right, the time horizon is modified from 3 years to 10 years to 80 years. For 
example, if calculating fiscal benefits ROI, the switch in time horizon from 3 to 10 years can 
result in a large difference, increasing the ROI from 4.77 to 13.18. However, going to an 80-year 
time horizon has a less significant effect on the fiscal benefits ROI, increasing it from 13.18 to 
15.60. An important issue to consider is whether the MEDC time horizon for incentives analysis 
should extend beyond 3 years to consider more medium-run benefits and costs within 10 years.  
 
Going to the second and third rows modifies the analysis by adding in additional benefits. Row 2 
adds in earnings effects and row 3 also adds in all other effects in the model. The different 
columns show how ROI with these additional benefits varies at a 3-year time horizon, a 10-year 
time horizon, and an 80-year time horizon.  These rows and columns show that earnings effects 
are the major effect over an 80-year or 10-year time horizon. Over a 3-year time horizon, being 
able to export some costs to out-of-state business taxpayers and property value gains are 
relatively more important. Most of these benefits are exhausted after 3 years, however, and the 
more persistent benefits of job creation, due to labor market benefits, loom as more important. 
  
All the analysis in these first three rows assumes a 100 percent “but for” probability.  Without the 
incentives provided to Project Bob, this project and any substitute job creation at this site would 
not have occurred at all. Under this assumption, the full 80-year ROI for this project is 160.03, 
over 16 times the 9.8 ROI estimated by MEDC. Including many more benefits dramatically 
increases project ROI, with the earnings benefits of the project being of particular importance.  
 
However, both the Upjohn cost-sensitivity model and the CREC firm choice “but for” model 
maintain that the “but for” probability for this project is less than 100 percent. The Upjohn cost-
sensitivity model yields a “but for” percentage of just 2.7 percent. The CREC firm choice model 
results in 70 percent. These adjustments reduce the project ROI to 3.34 using the Upjohn “but 
for” estimation approach and 108.92 using the CREC “but for” approach. These lower “but for” 







approaches are approximately, but not exactly, equal to the 160.03, “but for” multiplied by the 
lower “but for” percentages. (The approximation is because of various interaction effects in the 
model.) 
 
It might seem surprising that a project such as Project Bob can get a positive ROI even with a 
“but for” of 2.7 percent. When the earnings per capita benefits of more jobs in a local economy 
are included, the net present value of benefits per job becomes quite high. In the model, the 
average present value of the benefits from having one more job in Michigan’s economy 
calculated over an 80-year period is $433,647. This value may seem implausibly large, but it is 
only a fraction of the wages paid by that new job over 80 years. On a per-year basis, $433,647 
represents an average benefit for state residents of one new job of $13,009 per job year. One 
additional job maintained for 1 year will add $13,009 in increases in real per capita income to 
Michigan’s economy.  
 
Because of the high value of one more job in industries with high multiplier effects, incentives 
with modest costs can achieve sizable benefits relative to costs even if the “but for” is relatively 
low. This is why the MBDP program, which targets high-multiplier firms (in industries with an 
average multiplier of 3.69) and offers modest direct costs per job (at about $7,500), can achieve 
a positive ROI, even it were only able to demonstrate very low “but for” estimates.  
  







Appendix B. Detailed “But For” Methodology 
 
Background 
Michigan, like many other states, seeks to incentivize investments that require state involvement 
to go forward; that is, “but for” the incentives, the project would not happen in Michigan. MEDC’s 
current methodology for estimating the return on investment (ROI) from incentivized projects 
also implicitly assumes that 100% of the estimated benefits can be attributed to the incentive. 
The underlying assumption is not only that the incentive is required to ensure the business 
decides to invest in Michigan, but also that all of the impacts can be attributed to the incentive’s 
availability.  
 
Most economic development organizations and expert analysts also take this all or nothing 
approach: either the incentive made the difference or it did not. However, critics contend that 
this assumption can overstate the value of the incentive and the estimated ROI resulting from 
the investment. The point is well taken. An all-or-nothing (or “binary”) determination of “but for” 
suggests that incentives are the tipping factor and are therefore of utmost importance. This 
approach ignores the role that incentives play within the context of multiple elements that 
contribute to a competitive business environment. Using this binary approach to determining the 
“but for” inadvertently leads policy makers to overstate the importance of the incentive and 
downplay the significance of other factors that may be much more important – such as 
infrastructure and talent availability – to business investment decisions.  
Meanings and implications of the term “but for” 
Note that there are two different issues associated with the “but for” concept: 1) Was the 
incentive “needed” to drive the decision; and 2) How much of the benefit (if any) should be 
attributed to the incentive? In Michigan, the issues are connected because the ROI calculations 
used to help determine whether to offer an incentive are also used to estimate the amount of 
incentive to be offered and the benefits likely to accrue to the state.   
 
This two-pronged approach to considering the importance of incentives is well-grounded in the 
research literature on economic development program evaluation. Program evaluation studies 
have emphasized the following concepts (Storey, 1990; Foley, 1992; Persky et al. 1997; 
Abravenel et al., 2010): 
 
• Substitution, deadweight costs, and redundancy of capital: In other words, did the 
incentive simply replace money that would have been spent anyway? And was the 
substitution complete, or was it partial?  
• Additionality: How much of the beneficial outcome did the incentive itself actually cause, 
or how much can be reasonably be attributed to the incentive? 
 







These concepts first emerged from efforts to evaluate the federal Urban Development Action 
Grant program in the 1980s because policy makers were concerned that public funds should not 
substitute for private capital (Abravenel et al., 2010). The term “but for” developed in this 
context. One academic study suggests that the term itself was embedded in state urban 
renewal statutes and supported by advocates for tax increment finance (TIF) programs because 
it helped establish a “public purpose” that created a “need” for public financing. The article 
implies that the term was intended to give developers more power to move projects forward by 
threatening not to invest, causing communities to fear decline and a loss of opportunity14 
(Weber et al., 2013).  
 
The term “but for” has since been stretched from its initial focus on gap financing needed to 
enable urban redevelopment projects and is now often applied to all types of business incentive 
programs, including those intended for business attraction. In this case, “but for” has come to 
mean that an incentive was the deciding factor in a firm’s location, expansion or retention 
decision.  
 
Studies have attempted to apply this definition of “but for” during incentive program evaluation 
research. However, Bartik (2018b) has found that, “Overall, the research literature on incentives’ 
“but for” effects is not as rigorous as one might hope.” Reasons include positive or negative bias 
and not considering incentive program design and award magnitude. In addition, many “but for” 
studies do not look directly at the effect of an incentive on individual company’s decisions, but 
instead use a variety of techniques to compare job growth or other economic outcomes at either 
the firm level or by geographic area after the fact in order to infer the incentive’s impact.  
 
The methods (empirical vs. survey and aggregate vs. micro) and outcomes examined in these 
studies also vary, as do the type of incentive programs being evaluated (grants, tax credits, 
payroll credits, discretionary, statutory, etc.). Several studies use various approaches to job 
growth to determine the “but for” level, including job growth among a set of comparison 
companies, total employment and/or job growth at the county level, industry-specific job change, 
total employment, ratio of jobs created to claimed jobs created, and economic growth by county 
(Bartik 2018b). A key point is that in these cases, “but for” refers to the effect on broader 
community-level economic outcomes, rather than the influence on a company’s investment 
decision.  
 
In short, the economic development field has adopted “but for” as a meaningful standard for 
assessing incentive effectiveness, but the term is not well-defined nor is it used consistently.  
                                               
14 “These statutes required that municipalities attest that the area in question would not develop to its 
“highest and best use” in the absence of public assistance. In other words, the options of not providing 
public assistance were stasis or continued decline (“let nature take its course” noted Homer Hoyt and 
Leonard Smith, 1943; quoted in Fogelson, 2001). This difficult-to-demonstrate but easy-to-argue test 
harkens back to the notion that every area is a potential slum” (Weber et al., 2013, p. 197). 







Consequently, related findings about the value of “but for” assessments in the firm decision 
process do not rest on a strong research foundation. 
 
“But for” as an all or nothing proposition Is not appropriate  
What is often overlooked in the debate about economic development incentives is that grants 
and tax breaks are just one of many factors that firms consider in selecting a location or 
expanding in a location. Firms seek specific land and real estate, transportation access and 
infrastructure, different regulatory environments and key utilities, and workforce availability, 
including the expected ease of training or retraining the existing workforce to their specifications. 
They also consider the quality of the education system and quality of life for their employees 
and their families. These investments can be critical as a foundation for whether a location 
represents a viable option for the firm. 
  
Incentives are part of the mix, but they are typically considered in combination with these other 
public investments. Here incentive advocates and skeptics can find common ground because 
the social benefits from investments in a variety of policy domains such as education, 
transportation, infrastructure, health care systems, quality of life amenities, and so forth are 
highly valued by firms seeking a good place to do business as well as citizens seeking a well-
managed government.  The requirement for an incentive as well as the amount of incentive 
required to influence a business decision may be strongly influenced by public investments in 
these other policy domains. Considering the variety of public policy factors influencing company 
decisions, determining whether firm decisions are based on the provision of economic 
development incentives may be less relevant than determining to what degree incentives affect 
firm decisions within the context of an array of location factors (both within and outside the 
control of state government). 
 
Other incentive attributes also indicate that it is not appropriate to make a single, all-or-nothing 
determination of an incentive’s importance to business investment decisions: 
 
Incentives play different roles at various stages of the investment decision process.  For 
example, companies may research incentive program rules and availability early in the site 
selection process to help identify jurisdictions of interest. They may request incentive 
information or a general proposal once they’ve identified communities that meet their 
operational requirements. They will likely incorporate incentives into their cost model and 
decision matrix during the location evaluation phase. They may then participate in incentive 
negotiations to close any cost gaps, maximize their opportunities, and make a final decision. 
Incentives will have different levels of importance for each company at each stage. Companies 
likely apply to the MBDP for an incentive award after preliminary research in which companies 
have identified a set of Michigan (and other state) locations that meet their basic operational 
needs. At this stage of the process, companies are identifying best options among a smaller set 







of viable alternatives and reviewing incentives to close any financial or competitive gaps 
between locations.  
 
Incentive characteristics, including award size and program design, likely affect their level of 
influence. Larger incentives may have a greater effect on decision-making. Grants and loans 
may affect company decision-making differently than tax breaks. Discretionary incentive 
programs for which companies must be screened before receiving awards surely have a 
different impact on firm decisions than statutory tax breaks for which all eligible businesses 
automatically receive the benefit. The period of time over which incentives are available, the 
match with company needs (in the case of, say, R&D and workforce related incentives), and 
program administrative rules are also design factors that likely change the level of influence of 
the incentive.  
 
In practice, it is impossible to know whether the company would have made the investment 
without the incentive. Even if economic development professionals became mind readers, they 
would find that company representatives themselves have different perspectives on the value of 
incentives depending on their position within the firm. The problem gets even more challenging 
as time elapses from the original decision and both company and public sector staff change.  
 
In general, then, it is inappropriate for policymakers to regard an incentive as ever being 100 
percent responsible for the jobs incented. Given the inherent uncertainty about the determinants 
of business location and expansion decisions, it will forever be impossible to say with 100 
percent certainty that the location or expansion would not have occurred “but for” the incentive. 
Furthermore, even if the incentive did trigger this particular firm to choose this particular site, 
perhaps without the incentive some other firm would, within a relatively short time frame, have 
chosen the same site, and created a similar number of jobs.  
 
Therefore, incentives rarely – if ever – are 100% responsible for an investment. Similarly, they 
rarely – if ever – have zero impact. Applying for and complying with discretionary incentive 
program rules involves costs that the business would not bother to incur if it believed there were 
no value to be gained from the incentive. However, since determining the exact level of 
influence of any given incentive on any given investment is impossible, the study team 
developed a method that reflects this uncertainty. 
 
Study Method 
This study uses two approaches to determine a “but for” percentage for individual MBDP 
projects. The cost sensitivity approach was used for most of the ROI estimates and was applied 
to all 239 projects. It is based on the research literature addressing how location decisions in 
general are sensitive to tax costs and how incentives help firms reduce those costs. The firm 
choice approach draws on the research literature describing factors that affect “but for” and 







applies these factors to individual MBDP projects to create a score hypothesizing the likely level 
of influence of the MBDP incentive on each business decision. Since the MBDP is a 
discretionary grant program to which firms must apply and receive approval - as opposed to a 
statutory tax program available to all eligible companies - it is reasonable to assume the MBDP 
could have a different level of influence on individual firm decisions than would be assumed 
from the tax cost sensitivity literature. In other words, a discretionary grant offered during a 
competitive site selection process is likely to have a different impact than a general reduction in 
costs. 
 
Cost sensitivity – Upjohn approach 
The research literature suggests that a 10 percent reduction in state and local business taxes 
will, in the long-run, holding the quality of public services constant, increase a state’s level of 
business activity by about 5 percent. The “Upjohn approach” assumes that “a cost is a cost”, 
and that changes in business costs due to other factors, such as incentives, will have similar 
effects per dollar as business tax changes.  
 
To operationalize this, we re-express the tax effects by effects on overall business costs 
associated with a firm’s activity. There are a variety of ways to measure the magnitude of a 
business’s activity. One standard measure of a business’s scale is its “value-added”: the value 
of its output (gross sales) less the value of the material inputs it purchases. This represents the 
“value of output added” by the business’s labor and capital. For example, a steel producer’s 
value-added would be the revenue from the steel sold, minus the company’s costs to buy iron, 
coal, and other raw materials. A company’s value-added can also be calculated by looking at 
the sum of all worker compensation (including to managers), the payments to debt holders, and 
company’s profits. The sum of all value-added in the U.S. economy is gross domestic product 
(GDP).  
 
State and local business taxes have historically averaged around 5 percent of business value-
added (Bartik, 2017; Phillips, Sallee, and Peak, 2016). Therefore, if a 10 percent reduction in 
business taxes increased desired business activity by 5 percent, a 0.5 percent reduction in 
costs (as a percentage of value-added) will increase desired business activity by 5 percent. So, 
to be consistent with the effects of tax changes on business location and expansion decisions, a 
1 percent business cost reduction (as a percent of business value-added) provided by an 
incentive would increase the probability of the business making the desired location or 
expansion decision by 10 percentage points.  
 
In calculating incentive costs as a percentage of value-added, we must consider how firms 
weigh immediate investment costs with changes in profits next year, five years from now, and 
ten years from now. The available evidence indicates that businesses substantially discount 
future benefits in their new plant location or expansion decisions. For example, a study by 
Poterba and Summers (1995) suggests that the average discount rate used by corporate 







executives in evaluating future cash flows is 12 percent annually. This is the real discount rate 
after adjusting for inflation. This discount rate implies that even after adjusting future dollars for 
inflation, a real dollar provided 10 years from now is valued at $0.32 today. This means that 
upfront incentives have a substantially greater impact than incentives offered many years from 
now.  
 
Whether it makes sense for policymakers to exploit this high discount rate of business decision 
makers depends upon whether policymakers should have a substantially lower discount rate 
than 12 percent annually. Research literature explores the optimal discount rate used for 
various public policies. As reviewed in Bartik (2011), much of that research literature implies that 
policymakers should use a real discount rate of 3 percent or less. For evaluating environmental 
regulations, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency analyzes benefits and costs using a 3 
percent discount rate, and, for comparison purposes, a 7 percent discount rate.  
 
For this study, we assume a social discount rate of 3 percent. Hence, the model analyzes the 
present value of changes in state residents’ incomes, and of incentives, from the perspective of 
policymakers, at a 3 percent discount rate. However, in estimating the effects of MBDP 
incentives on individual businesses, the model assumes that businesses are using a 12 percent 
discount rate in making their decisions.  
 
For the firm analysis, we estimate value added associated with a project over an infinite time 
horizon. However, only short- and medium-term impacts matter because the model estimates 
the implications for firm-level decisions using a real discount rate of 12 percent. The MBDP 
incentives are also discounted using a 12 percent discount rate. The ratio of the incentive to the 
estimated project value added is then taken. This percentage is then used to project the but-for 
percentage for that project.  
 
The model as operationalized also assumes that larger incentives have less of an impact (per 
public dollar invested) on the “but for” percentage than smaller incentives. The but-for 
percentage here is the percentage of incented firms whose location decision is due to the 
incentive. This is because the response of businesses to cost changes resulting from incentives 
is assumed to be logarithmic as described in appendix D of Bartik (2018a). As a result, the ratio 
of the “but for” percentage to the percentage the incentive is of value added, declines as the 
incentive percentage gets larger, but only slightly until we get to very large incentives. For 
example, an incentive of 0.1 percent of value added has a 1 percent but for percentage, 10 
times as great. An incentive of 1 percent of value added has a but for percent of 9.6 percent, or 
9.6 times as great, a very slight decline. In contrast, an incentive of 10 percent of value added 
would have a but for percentage of 65.1 percent, or 6.51 times as great. The result of this 
assumption is that increasing incentive magnitudes tends to reduce the ROI for incentives, but 
only modestly until we get to very large incentives, at the Amazon or Foxconn level.  
 







For MBDP, the average incentive has a present value of about $7,500 per job; that is the 
incentive is equivalent to giving each firm cash of $7,500 per job today. The average value-
added per job of the incented firms is $168,000 annually per job. The present value of this, 
evaluated at a 12 percent discount rate, is $1,568,000 per job. Therefore, the average MBDP 
incentive is about 0.5 percent of the present value of value-added for the firm. To put it another 
way, the average MBDP incentive is equivalent to lowering the state and local business taxes 
owed by the firm by 10 percent, because state and local business taxes are about 5 percent of 
value-added.  
 
Therefore, a naïve aggregate projection is that the “but for” for the MBDP program should 
average around 5 percent, based on the research literature that a 10 percent reduction in 
business taxes increases positive business location decisions by 5 percent. In practice, the 
estimated average “but for” ends up being higher, as we will see, at almost 10 percent. This 
slightly higher average is due to the variation across individual projects in incentive amounts 
and value added per job.    
 
There is some evidence that non-cash benefits in the form of in-kind services to small 
businesses function in the same way as “incentives” and that they may have higher effects per 
dollar of public investment. For example, there is research evidence that manufacturing 
extension services and customized job training have effects on business costs of at least five 
times the costs of providing these services. If so, in-kind services should affect location and 
expansion decisions five times as much as tax and other cash incentives. This greater cost-
effectiveness depends upon difficult-to-measure assessments of service quality, relevance (i.e., 
meeting information, cost, or financing gaps), and enhanced accessibility as perceived by 
targeted small businesses.    
Firm choice – CREC approach 
Researchers have used three techniques to estimate the “but for” levels for specific incentive 
programs: interviews/asking the company, comparing assisted companies to non-assisted 
companies, and regression analysis (Storey, 1990). Since our purpose is to understand the 
incentive’s effect on the set of companies that received MBDP incentives, the study team 
developed a variation on the first approach (asking the company) to assess each firm’s 
propensity to value incentives during the investment decision. In this case, the company’s actual 
application served as the primary input on the importance the company placed on the incentive, 
since it represents the company’s statement of interest during the investment decision process 
itself.   
 
We assumed that the best source of information would be that provided at the time of 
application with the signature of the company’s leadership attesting to its accuracy. We did not 
make this assumption naively.  Since the applicant is the only valid source that will know its own 
intentions, the statement of need for the incentive should be taken seriously if not at full face 
value. Even if the applicant company is being completely honest about the incentive’s 







importance, it is not going to be a perfect source. First, its self-interest may lead it to overstate 
the role of incentives. Second, company personnel do not all value decision factors in the same 
way, and the perceived importance of the incentive will vary among leaders within the company 
and can change over time.  
 
The MBDP requires companies seeking program assistance to provide additional supporting 
documentation when they apply for assistance.15 The application requests basic applicant 
details such as name and address, the parent company name and location, the firm’s current 
statewide Michigan employment, the location of each Michigan facility, a project description, 
proposed project location, alternative project configurations (other sites being considered), 
demonstration of why the incentive assistance is needed to ensure the project will happen in 
Michigan, and other data to be considered in evaluating the project for incentives. The study 
team opted to use the same information available to MBDP in its assessment of the importance 
of the incentive to securing the deal.  
 
The research literature suggests several firm and project characteristics affect the importance of 
incentives to business investment decisions. These include: 
 
• Geographic area. Efforts to measure incentive influence depend on the geographic 
frame of reference. For example, a company may have already decided to invest in the 
United States (so a national incentive would be assumed to have no influence on that 
choice) but has not chosen the specific state (so state-level incentives would be more 
likely to affect that decision) (Storey,1990).  
 
• Consideration of multiple locations. Companies that have credibly considered 
multiple locations that are able to meet their operational needs or have functions that are 
mobile (that is, they do not need to locate in a specific place in order to meet their 
operational needs) are more likely to value state and local incentives in their decision 
process (James, 2013; Jensen, 2016; Tavares-Lehmann et al., 2016). A special case 
occurs when the investment decision will be made among multiple locations where the 
company already has operations, and corporate leaders are evaluating which site will 
generate the highest return.   
 
                                               
15 Applicant firms must also provide a substantial amount of additional information to MEDC. Details on 
proposed employment, including timing of hires and average annual wages, benefits offered, whether 
new jobs will be direct employees, investment details, and project contacts are also requested.  
Supporting documentation that must accompany the application includes a detailed business entity 
organization chart, financial capacity documentation (three years of annual financial statements), 
disclosure of lawsuits and proceedings pending or resolved, listing of administrative agency proceedings, 
articles of organization or incorporation, and a Certificate of Good Standing from the state.  







• New or existing facility. Incentives are considered especially valuable to attract new 
businesses or encourage new investment (Hoover, 1975; Stimson, Stough, and Roberts, 
2002), but in practice, incentives are frequently offered to existing businesses for 
retention purposes to encourage investment that might not have otherwise occurred 
and/or to build goodwill with the firm to ensure that it does not consider alternative 
locations for its expansion.  
 
• Features of the incentive offer. The relative size of the incentive benefit affects its 
impact (James, 2013; Bartik, 2018a) as do the incentive type and structure, timing of the 
application, and whether a firm is a first-time or repeat incentive recipient (Foley, 1992; 
Lenihan et al., 2005).  
 
• Firm attributes. Cost-sensitive or efficiency-seeking operations (such as manufacturing, 
call centers, and distribution centers) and foreign investors have also been found to be 
more likely to influenced by the availability of incentives, as are companies for whom the 
incentive meets a specified need, such as project financing or support services 
(Tavares-Lehmann et al., 2016).  
 
To operationalize these concepts, we identified project- and firm-specific information available 
from the MBDP applications and MEDC briefing memos and term sheets for 25 completed 
projects and 16 terminated projects. As part of the review, we also examined company-provided 
answers to application queries on alternative project configurations and other sites being 
considered, why the incentive assistance was needed to ensure the project happened in 
Michigan, and the project description.  
 
We then selected ten primary factors affecting the importance of incentives (Table B.1), drawn 
from the research literature and team experience. We established weights for each factor by 
first assuming each factor carried an equal weight (10%) and then obtaining perspectives on 
how that baseline assumption should change by querying 23 state and local economic 
development leaders. This informal approach gave us confidence in the relative ranking of these 
factors (that is, which were most important and least important), but the weights themselves 
should not be viewed as definitive. Further research and additional perspectives would 
strengthen the findings and their utility for understanding the relative influence of different 
project- and company-specific factors on the importance of incentives. Future iterations would 
also more fully specify factor descriptions. For example, the factor “project was capital-intensive” 
was intended to represent cost-sensitive or efficiency-seeking operations, but the wording did 
not clearly convey those concepts. 
 












Adjusted weights from local 
partners and state economic 
development leaders 
Considered multiple locations 10% 26% 
Addressed a competitive disadvantage 10% 14% 
Filled a financing gap 10% 11% 
Investment to be made in an existing facility 10% 8% 
High incentive to proposed investment ratio 10% 7% 
Project was capital-intensive 10% 9% 
Project was in final decision stage 10% 7% 
Company had operations in multiple 
locations 10% 13% 
Company was foreign-owned 10% 4% 
Company was publicly held 10% 2% 
Other   
Q: Please weight the factors in the table by their influence on the importance of the incentive. It is not necessary to 
assign importance to each factor, but the total adjusted weights should total 100%. 
 
From this set of ten factors, we chose seven that were considered important and for which we 
had consistent data from MBDP applicants: whether the company credibly considered multiple 
locations, description of a financing gap or competitive disadvantage (specified need), the ratio 
of the incentive to the projected investment (incentive offer size), whether the company already 
had operations in multiple locations, whether the company already operated in Michigan or was 
new to the state, foreign or US parent company ownership, and cost-sensitive industry category. 
The rounded factor weights are provided in Table B.2.  
 
We then created a scoring system for each factor. Each factor received a score between 0 and 
1 as follows: 
 
• Considered multiple locations: 0 = no; 0.5 = yes, among its own existing operations; 
1 = yes, multiple locations not limited to its own existing operations 
• Described financing gap or disadvantage in the application: 0 = did not describe; 1 = 
did describe 
• Incentive value/projected investment value: 0.25= an incentive to investment ratio 
between 0 and .125; 0.5 = an incentive to investment ratio between .126 and .25; 
0.75 = an incentive to investment ratio between .26 and .375; 1.0 = an incentive to 
investment ratio between .376 and .5.  (No MBDP incentives exceeded 50% of the 
projected investment value.) 
• Company has operations in multiple locations: 0 = no; 1 = yes 
• Company already operates in Michigan: 0= yes; 1 = no 







• Company is foreign-owned: 0= no; 1 = yes 
• Cost sensitive industry: 0 = other; 1 = NAICS 31, 32, 33, 48, 56 
 
Table B.2  Weighting and scoring of factors influencing the importance of incentives 
Factor Scoring Approach Factor Weight 
Considered multiple locations 
0=no; 0.5=yes, among its own 
operations; 1=yes, multiple locations 
not limited to its own operations 
0.25 
Described financing gap or 
disadvantage 
0=did not describe gap or MI 
disadvantage in application; 1=did 
describe specific gap or disadvantage 
0.25 
Incentive amount relative projected 
investment 
0=0.125=0.25; 0.126-0.25=0.5; 0.26-
0.375=0.75; 0.376-0.5=1 0.15 
Company has operations in 
multiple locations 0=no; 1=yes 0.15 
Cost sensitive or capital-intensive 
industry 0=other; 1=NACIS 31, 32, 33, 56 0.10 
Expansion or new to Michigan 0=expansion; 1=new 0.05 
Foreign owned  0=US parent; 1=foreign owned company 0.05 
Total Factor Weight (combination 
of the above factors)  1.00 
 
Each of the 25 completed projects and 16 terminated projects were reviewed and scored by two 
study team members. The last step involved multiplying each factor score by the appropriate 
weight and adding the factor scores to determine a total project score that hypothesized the 
likely level of influence the incentive had on each company’s investment decision.  
 
The result was a score for each incentivized project between 0 and 1 that could be provided as 
an alternative input to the Upjohn model in lieu of Upjohn’s built-in “but for” assumption 
calculated based on cost sensitivity (as described in the previous section). However, we were 
mindful that presenting an overly precise figure might be construed as too deterministic, 
especially given the number of assumptions we have made in developing this approach and the 
inherent uncertainty associated with the entire “but for” issue. Therefore, we opted to group 
scores into five categories and assigned a “but for” percentage to each range based on the mid-
point of that range. For example, a project that scored 0.75 was given a probability score of 70% 
based on the score range of 0.61-0.80. The interpretation is that there is about a 70% chance 
this project was influenced by the incentive given project and company characteristics. 
 







Table B.3 ‘But For’ Probability Assignments based on Weighted Scores 
Score Range Assigned probability 





We assume the incentive’s influence can be neither 0 nor 100%.  
 
The scores and assigned probabilities for each project are summarized in Table B.4. Again, 
each total score indicates that project’s “but for” percentage based on the characteristics 
described in Table B.2. Our range of estimates suggests that the MBDP incentive would have 
typically have been responsible for 50-70% of company choices to invest in Michigan These 
findings suggest that the incentive played an important role in influencing the company’s 
investment decision. These rates are driven by the applicants’ descriptions of specific other 
viable locations under consideration, plus additional factors as listed in Table B.2. 
 




USED IN ROI 
ANALYSIS 
AGS 0.7125 70% 
Avon Protection  0.4625 50% 
Brose New Boston 2012  0.6125 30% 
Denso Manufacturing 2015 0.7125 70% 
Denso Manufacturing 2016 0.7125 70% 
Fairlife  0.8375 90% 
FIAMM 0.7125 70% 
HCL 0.5625 50% 
Huntington Foam 0.45 50% 
Integrated Manufacturing 0.575 50% 
JCIM 0.6625 70% 
Lacks Enterprises 0.7875 70% 
Magna Exteriors  0.5 70% 
Magna Seating 0.7875 70% 
MedDirect 0.7375 70% 
Muskegon Castings 0.6375 70% 
Ogihara 0.7125 70% 
Pinnacle 0.7875 70% 










USED IN ROI 
ANALYSIS 
Rassini Brakes  0.7125 70% 
Sakthi  0.4875 50% 
Summit Polymers 0.6625 70% 
Undercar Products 0.7125 70% 
Unique Instruments 0.6625 70% 
Ventra Grand Rapids 0.6625 70% 
Whirlpool 0.6 50% 
Baker Aerospace Tooling & Machining 0.6625 70% 
Cataphora 0.15 10% 
Challenge Manufacturing-  0.5125 50% 
Eberspacher North America 0.4625 50% 
Fullerton Tool Company  0.3875 30% 
Martin-Brower Company 0.4375 50% 
NEMO Capital Partners LLC  0.2 10% 
Nexthermal Corporation  0.425 50% 
Norplas Industries  0.7125 70% 
NOVO 1  0.8625 90% 
Penske Vehicle Services  0.6875 70% 
Quality Edge 0.5375 50% 
ROL USA 0.8375 90% 
Teijin Advanced Composites America  0.6375 70% 
Terryberry Company  0.4125 50% 
XanEdu Publishing 0.6375 70% 
 
This methodological approach to estimating the importance of the incentive was supplemented 
by interviews with local economic development partners in the communities where each project 
occurred.16 The MBDP process requires a local partner contribution, giving them some insight 
into the project. In most cases, the local contribution is a property tax abatement that is active 
for several years beyond the MBDP incentive period, so our working assumption was that the 
local partner would be familiar with the project both past and present. The local partner also 
often has current knowledge of the investment’s status and latest developments. For these 
reasons, the local partner perspective was valuable to understanding the MBDP’s effectiveness 
to securing the deal and achieving desired outcomes.  
                                               
16 Local partners were from MEDC’s regional partners (Economic Development Collaboratives), local 
government staff, or local economic development organizations, depending on the location and project. 







The project team prepared an interview questionnaire, identified local partners for each 
completed project, and completed 30- to 40-minute phone interviews with local partners for 23 
of the 25 completed projects between June and September 2018. Several of the questions were 
used as checks on our own analyses to make sure our findings did not vary widely from the 
local understanding. As summarized in the main body of the report, most interviewees agreed 
that incentives were “very important” or “important.” Further, only one interviewee thought that 
the project would have gone ahead unchanged without the incentive, while the remainder 
believed the project would have either gone to another state or would have been delayed or 
reduced without the incentive. 
 
Local Partner Interview Questions  
 
1. We’d like to start by reviewing our understanding of the project and asking a few 
questions about the project’s characteristics. 
2. A. Which factors motivated xx company’s decision to invest in your community?  









Ability to serve 
markets/customers 
     
Access to skilled 
workers 
     
Availability of 
infrastructure/utilities 
     
Availability of 
site/building 
     
Overall cost of 
operations 
     
State and local 
incentives 
     
Other(s) _______      
 
3. In the absence of grant assistance, would the project (investment) have (choose one 
option only):  
a) Gone ahead as now unchanged (that is, same scale, time and location) 
b) Gone ahead at a different location outside of Michigan (but otherwise unchanged)  
c) Gone ahead in Michigan at a later date but otherwise unchanged (delayed but otherwise 
unchanged)  
d) Gone ahead in Michigan on a reduced scale (but otherwise unchanged) 
e) Project would have been abandoned  
 
 







4. Do you think the firm would have hired fewer workers without the financial assistance?  
 
5. How credible was the company’s consideration of other locations, in your opinion?  
 
6. How could the MBDP be improved (in terms of program design or administration)?  
 
7. OPTIONAL: Please weight the factors in the table below by their influence on the 
importance of the incentive to decision-making. Your answers can apply to investments 
in general, not just the project we have been discussing.  
 
For example, in your experience, when a company “considers multiple locations” before making 
an investment, does a financial incentive become more or less important to the decision?  It is 
not necessary to assign importance to each factor, but the total adjusted weights should total 
100% 
 
Factors affecting importance of financial 
incentives to investment decisions Baseline Weights Adjusted Weights 
Considered multiple locations 10%  
Addressed a competitive disadvantage 10%  
Filled a financing gap 10%  
Investment to be made in an existing facility 10%  
High incentive to proposed investment ratio 10%  
Project was capital-intensive 10%  
Project was in final decision stage 10%  
Company had operations in multiple locations  10%  
Company was foreign-owned  10%  
Company was publicly held  10%  
Other:  ______   
TOTAL 100% 100% 
 
  







Appendix C. State Comparison Interview Protocol and Program 
Profiles 
Interview Protocol 
Call opening  
 
We are seeking to better understand the landscape of incentives, specifically how best-practice 
job creation incentive programs—like your own—are administered and monitored. We’d like to 
learn from you more about the process behind assessing companies/projects applying for 
incentives as well as the way your organization tracks and reports outcomes from incentivized 
investments. 
 
These interviews will be confidential in that we will not quote anyone involved in the 
conversation, but we will share the states and titles of the participants. When we have 
completed the interviews we will give you a summary of our findings. We envision this as a 
paper or memo organized by question that will be completed around the end of the year.  We 
hope this information will be useful to you.  
 
Questions 
• Do you consider a project’s return on investment (ROI) when making awards?  
o How do you calculate ROI? 
o Do you use a model to calculate ROI? Over what timeframe do you calculate ROI? 
o What role does it play in your decision-making or reporting?  
o What is the average projected and actual ROI for this program?  
• Which factors determine which companies/projects are awarded funds?  
o Specifically, prior to awarding funds to a company, do you have measures in-place to 
ensure the funds are essential for a project or that the funds are integral to a company 
investing where it otherwise would not have? In other words, do you account for the “but-
for”? And if so, how?  
• Do you keep track of companies that were not awarded incentives? 
• What is your process for monitoring projects that are awarded funds?  
o Are there project milestones, progress reports, legislative reports?  
o Would you be willing to share copies?  
o How do you verify data that is provided by the company?  
• How many jobs have been created by incentivized projects?  
o How do you track projected versus actual jobs created?   
o How have projected jobs (here we mean original projected jobs, not amended 
projections) compared to actual jobs created? 
• How do you manage clawbacks or projects that do not meet the terms of the 
agreement? 








Profiles of State Comparison Programs 
Minnesota Job Creation Fund:  Minnesota Department of Employment and 
Economic Development 
Overview  
The Job Creation Fund (JCF) provides financial incentives to new and expanding businesses 
that meet certain job creation and capital investment targets. Companies deemed eligible to 
participate may receive up to $1 million for creating or retaining high-paying jobs and for 
constructing or renovating facilities or making other property improvements. In some cases, 
companies may receive awards of up to $2 million.  
 
Eligibility  
The program is available to businesses engaged in manufacturing, warehousing, distribution, 
technology-related industries, finance, insurance; or professional or technical services. 
Companies must work with the local government (city, county or township) where a project is 
located to apply to DEED to receive designation as a Job Creation Fund business.  
 
At minimum, a business must: 
 
• Be engaged in an eligible business activity 
• Obtain local government support for their project via council resolution 
• Invest at least $500,000 ($250,000 for Targeted Populations*) in real property 
improvements within one year of becoming a designated Job Creation Fund business 
• Create at least 10 (5 for Targeted Populations*) new full-time permanent jobs within two 
years of becoming a Job Creation Fund business while maintaining existing employment 
numbers 







• Pay at least $13.01/hour in wages and benefits in 2018, adjusted annually based on 110 
percent of federal poverty guidelines. The level will change again on Jan. 1, 2019. 
• Have other location options outside of Minnesota 
• Cause no undue harm to Minnesota business competitors 
• Certify that the project would not occur without Job Creation Fund assistance 
Projects that start their activities prior to becoming designated by DEED are not eligible for the 
Job Creation Fund. 
 
Projects that receive $200,000 or more in Job Creation Fund assistance are subject to 
prevailing wage requirements. 
Program Provisions and Guidelines 
The Minnesota Job Creation Fund provides a maximum award of $1 million following 
performance achievement through two innovative capital investment and job creation incentive 
award components. Awards of up to $2 million are available to companies that hire targeted 
populations, in addition to meeting all other requirements. 
 
Companies that meet eligibility requirements must sign a business subsidy agreement with 
DEED to meet job retention, creation, wage, and capital investment requirements. The following 
benefits may be available once a business meets the conditions of its agreement and provides 
proof of performance: 
 
1. $1,000 ($2,000 for Targeted Populations*) per year per job created for jobs paying at 
least $26,837 in cash wages 
2. $2,000 ($3,000 for Targeted Populations*) per year per job created for jobs paying at 
least $36,126 in cash wages 
3. $3,000 ($,4000 for Targeted Populations*) per year per job created for jobs paying at 
least $46,448 in cash wages 
4. Up to a 5 percent rebate for real property improvements for businesses located in the 
Twin Cities Metro 




Applications for the Job Creation Fund are accepted year-round. Businesses must apply 
through the local government unit (city, county or township) where the project will be located. In 
consultation with DEED, the local government unit will determine whether the business meets 







minimum program requirements. Projects that meet the minimum requirements go through the 
following four-step process: 
 
Step One: With assistance from the local government, the business submits the Job Creation 
Fund Application Form and required supporting documents to DEED. 
 
Step Two: DEED evaluates the application and notifies the local government and business of 
approval or denial. If approved, DEED will formally designate the business as a Job Creation 
Fund business and determine an award amount. Awards in excess of $500,000 require DEED 
to hold a public hearing. 
 
Step Three: After a public hearing (if applicable), DEED drafts a business subsidy agreement 
specifying project goals and duration for the agreement and sends it to the business for 
signature. The business then returns the agreement to DEED for final signature by the DEED 
commissioner. 
 
Step Four: Through the duration of the business subsidy agreement, the local government will 
continue to provide assistance to the designated JCF business. This includes collecting required 
reporting information and submitting progress reports, annual reports, requests for payment, 
and providing updates to the business regarding updates to annually adjusted wages. 
 
Job Development Investment Grant: North Carolina Department of Commerce 
Overview  
The Job Development Investment Grant (JDIG) is a performance-based, discretionary incentive 
program that provides cash grants directly to new and expanding companies to help offset the 
cost of locating or expanding a facility in North Carolina. The grant amount is based on a 
percentage of the personal income tax withholdings associated with the new jobs. 
Eligibility  
The JDIG program is available to eligible businesses that create qualified new jobs and 
investments in North Carolina. Qualified new jobs must meet the county average wage 
requirement and the business must provide health insurance and pay at least 50% of the 







premiums for participating employees to be eligible. JDIG cannot be used to incentivize job 
retention. 
Program Provisions and Guidelines 
The JDIG program provides support in the form of annual grant disbursements for a period of up 
to 12 years to new and expanding businesses based on a percentage of withholding taxes paid 
by new employees during each calendar year of a grant.  
 
For high-yield projects that invest $500+ million and create 1,750+ jobs, JDIG can provide a 
grant worth up to 100% of personal income tax withholdings for up to 20 years. For 
transformative projects that invest $4 billion+ and create 5,000+ jobs, JDIG can provide a grant 
worth up to 100% of personal income tax withholdings for up to 25 years.  
 
When deciding whether to award a grant and the appropriate amount and term of a grant, the 
Economic Investment Committee considers both economic and fiscal impacts. The amount of a 
JDIG award is calculated by weighing several factors to determine its potential value, including: 
 
• Location of the project 
• Project county tier designation 
• Number of projected net new jobs 
• Projected Wages of the added jobs compared to the county average wage 
• Level of projected investment 
• Whether the industry is one of the state’s targeted industry sectors 
Fees 
Grant applicants are required to pay a $10,000 nonrefundable fee with the submission of a 
completed application (application fees were raised from $5,000 in 2013). Grant recipients are 
also required to pay an annual fee with the submission of each annual report, when filed with 
the NC Department of Commerce. The annual fee amount is the greater of $2,500 or .03% of 
the grant amount awarded to the company. The amount of a grant associated with any specific 
position may not exceed $16,000 in any year. 
Process 
A five-member Economic Investment Committee (EIC) evaluates projects and determines the 
disbursement amount of JDIG awards. The North Carolina Department of Commerce 
administers the program on behalf of the EIC. North Carolina statute requires that the company 
maintain operations at the project location, or at another approved site in North Carolina, for at 
least 150% of the term of the grant.  







Project application materials and the results of staff analysis are provided to the EIC and 
considered in one or more closed sessions. The EIC then considers the appropriate terms for a 
given project, and a term sheet is provided to the company that outlines the structure and 
proposed terms of the grant and the conditions necessary to fulfill the grant requirements. If the 
company accepts the terms in writing and commits to locate the project in North Carolina, 
subject to the award of the grant, an open meeting is held by the EIC to award the grant, and a 
Community Economic Development Agreement (“CEDA”) is executed. Grantees are required to 
submit performance reports by March 1st of each year following the end of a calendar year 
during the grant term. These reports allow Commerce and the EIC to assess grant performance 
and eligibility to receive scheduled disbursements. The actual disbursement amount for which 
the company is eligible is determined from Commerce’s analysis of the annual performance 
reports. The Department of Revenue certifies the company’s reported withholdings and the 
absence of overdue tax debts. All disbursements must be approved by the EIC before actual 
payment. 
 
JobsOhio Economic Development Grant:  JobsOhio 
Overview  
The JobsOhio Economic Development Grant (“The Grant”) is a performance-based, 
discretionary incentive program that provides cash grants directly for projects in Ohio engaged 
in targeted industries. Grant decisions are based on several project factors, including but not 
limited to job creation, additional payroll, fixed-asset investment commitment, project return on 
investment, and project location. 
Eligibility  
The Grant is available to companies engaged in Ohio’s targeted industries or business functions 
seeking to locate a project in the state. Ineligible projects include but are not limited to retail and 
other population driven businesses. Companies must operate in one of the following industries 
to be eligible for the grant: 
• Aerospace & Aviation 
• Automotive Manufacturing 
• Financial Services 
• BioHealth 
• Advanced Manufacturing 
• Energy 
• Food Processing 
• Information Technology and 
Services  
• Polymers and Chemicals 
• Headquarters and Consulting 
• Back Office 
• Logistics 
• Research and Development 
 
Eligible costs must focus on fixed asset and infrastructure investment, including land, 
construction and renovation, machinery and equipment, relocation, infrastructure, site 
development, and software development. The Grant cannot be used to finance any debt or 
bond obligations, repay any fines or penalties, or rental payments. Grant applicants are required 







to create a specified number of jobs within a set period as determined by JobsOhio, typically 
within 3 years. Projects that retain jobs may also be considered. JobsOhio will set a wage floor 
based on multiple wage considerations for each project.  
Program Provisions and Guidelines 
The Grant provides support in the form of a reimbursement-based cash grant for meeting 
specified job and investment targets. Claims of job creation and retention, and investment, 
require supporting documentation to receive disbursements.  
 
When deciding whether to award a grant and the appropriate amount for a grant, JobsOhio 
considers several factors influencing the economic impact and fiscal effects of a project 
including: 
 
• Average Wage of New Employees 
• Number of Jobs to be created 
• Number of Jobs to be retained  
• Fixed-Asset Investment Commitment 
• Project Return on Investment 
• Project Location 
• Project Industry 
 
JobsOhio may also consider providing assistance for eligible projects that improve operational 
efficiencies or production expansion at a facility.  
Fees 
For information on the grant application and any fees, applicants must contact JobsOhio.  
Process 
JobsOhio reviews all applications and administers the program. Companies are required to 
submit commitments for job creation and the associated payroll, job retainment, and fixed asset 
investment in their application. Applicants for The Grant are also eligible to receive additional 
program support in the form of grants or loans from JobsOhio as a result of their application. 
Grantees must provide supporting documentation of their attainment of specified targets to 
receive grant disbursements.  
 
Number of Establishments 230
Avg. Incentive Investment Amount 422,768.33$                                                                                       
Avg. Number of New Jobs Committed 142
Avg. Number of Jobs Retained 261
Avg. Median Wage of Commited New Jobs 46,058.60$                                                                                          
Avg. Projected Private Investment 30,596,441.27$                                                                                 
Avg. Incentive Investment Amount per Commited New Job 2,973.51$                                                                                            
Avg. Incentive Investment Amount per Commited New and Retained Job 1,047.62$                                                                                            
JobsOhio Economic Development Grant Program Summary (2015-2018)







Texas Enterprise Fund:  Office of the Governor, Economic Development and 
Tourism Division  
Overview  
The Texas Enterprise Fund (TEF) is a performance-based, discretionary incentive program that 
provides cash grants directly to new and expanding companies where a single Texas site is 
competing with another viable out-of-state option. The grant amount is determined by an 
analytical model of the state’s estimated increase in sales tax revenue attributable to the project. 
Eligibility  
The TEF is available to companies planning a new project, with significant projected job creation 
and capital investment, where a single site in Texas is actively competing with at least one 
viable out-of-state option. The company must not have conducted actions that signify a location 
decision, such as signing a lease, purchasing land, or hiring employees, to receive the grant.  
Eligible companies must operate in an advanced industry that could potentially locate elsewhere 
including:  
• Advanced Technologies and Manufacturing 
• Aerospace, Aviation, and Defense 
• Biotechnology and Life Sciences 
• Information and Computer Technology 
• Petroleum Refining and Chemical Products 
• Energy 
 
The TEF considers significant job creation to be at least 75 full time employees (FTE) in urban 
areas or 25 FTE in rural areas. The total average wage for new jobs must remain above the 
average county wage of the project location throughout the full term of the agreement. Projects 
must demonstrate significant levels of planned capital investment and a significant return on 
public investment, as determined by the Governor’s Office.  
 
Only applications by companies that demonstrate financial stability will be considered. 
Additionally, the project must have community involvement in the form of local economic 
incentive offers from the city, county, and/or local school district in which the project is located.  
Program Provisions and Guidelines 
The TEF provides support in the form of grant disbursements awarded for meeting contractually 
agreed upon job and wage targets for a given individual period, typically set annually.  
 
When deciding whether to award a grant and the appropriate amount and term of a grant, the 
Governor’s Office ultimately considers the fiscal impacts of a project. The amount of a TEF 
award is calculated according to an economic model (STAMP), that ensures the state will see a 
full return on investment within the period of a project contract in the form of estimated sales tax 
revenues. The ROI and the associated grant amount is determined by several factors, including: 








• Average Wage of New Employees 
• Number of Jobs to be Created 
• Timeframe for Hiring 
• Average Wages to be Paid 
• Total Proposed Capital Investment 
 
Grantees must maintain the contractually agreed upon job and wage figures throughout the full 
term of the contract. Grant funds are disbursed according to a company’s ability to meet the 
target dates for qualified job creation and investment, prorated to any partial attainment of these 
targets. If a grantee fails to maintain these figures or fails to meet other terms of the contract, 
the Governor’s Office may demand repayment of previously disbursed funds in the form of 
clawbacks.  
Fees 
Grant applicants are required to pay a $1,000 nonrefundable fee with the submission of a 
completed application to be considered for the TEF.  
Process 
The Governor, Lieutenant Governor, and Speaker of the House review all applications and must 
unanimously agree to support the use of TEF for each project. The Texas Office of the 
Governor, Economic Development and Tourism Division administers the program. 
 
Companies must submit a completed application package to the Office of the Governor to be 
considered for the award. Applications are accepted on a rolling basis. After applying, the 
company will be subject to an 11-step due diligence process including a review of corporate 
activity, financial standing, tax status, legal issues, and credit ratings. The Office of the 
Governor will also consider the project’s estimated economic impact, and the business climate 
of competing locations in reviewing an application. If a project is approved for a TEF award, a 
performance-based grant contract will be executed, which will include provisions to ensure that 
Texas taxpayer funds are spent effectively and efficiently. This includes the grantee agreeing to 
submit an annual progress report to the Office of the Governor containing information regarding 
the attainment of each set performance target. If TEF offers a grant of $1,000,000 or more to an 
applicant, the company must additionally submit a “Disclosure of Interested Parties Form” to the 
Governor’s Office. After signing the contract, each TEF grantee will also participate in a press 
release with the Governor’s Office announcing the project and the TEF award amount.  
 







Appendix D. ROI and But-For Calculations by Project 
 
































Project 1 0066000000JWHgU AGS Automotive 
Systems - 2012 E 
2013 3361-3363 4.15 $255,644 E C 1.101 90 Macomb 9.5 4.4 2.22 
Project 2 0066000000Sq4G5 Avon Protection 
Systems - E - Fire 
Service Industry 
Mfg.- 2014 E 
2015 339 2.76 $116,400 E C 0.117 29 Wexford 6.7 11.6 5.19 
Project 3 0066000000KsWQo Brose New Boston, 
Inc.-Project Fire 
2012 3361-3363 4.15 $250,392 NF C 4.433 350 Wayne 11.7 6.1 2.61 
Project 4 00660000016lndB Denso 
Manufacturing 
Michigan -Inc. 
Project Bob - E - 
FY2015 Battle Creek 
2015 3361-3363 4.15 $244,875 E C 0.748 100 Calhoun 5.1 9.8 3.34 
Project 5 0063200001l0SZq Denso 
Manufacturing 
Michigan, Inc.- E - 
FY2016 
2016 3361-3363 4.15 $238,380 E C 0.733 341 Calhoun 4.8 2.5 3.61 
Project 6 0066000000KvAC2 Fairlife, LLC - 
Coopersville E 
Project 2012 
2013 311-312 3.65 $131,717 E C 1.086 130 Ottawa 6.1 4 5.14 
Project 7 0066000000HTHuK FIAMM 
Technologies, 
Incorporated - New 
Electronic Horn 
2013 3361-3363 4.15 $255,644 E C 0.620 35 Wexford 11.1 3.8 3.27 
Project 8 0066000000Iqcgi HCL America Inc.-MI 
Office 
2013 518-519 2.81 $94,464 NF C 0.847 100 Jackson 8.3 9.8 5.90 
Project 9 0066000000KuiCP Huntington Foam 
Corporation-
Huntington Foam E 
and Retention 2012 
2012 325 3.70 $212,306 E C 0.436 30 Montcal
m 
10.2 5.8 3.25 











































2014 3361-3363 4.15 $239,128 E C 4.011 620 Wayne 9.7 14.1 2.86 
Project 
11 
0066000000RBzsI JCIM US, LLC-2013-
E 
2014 3361-3363 3.36 $239,128 E C 0.944 219 Monroe 6.1 11.7 3.90 
Project 
12 
0066000000Itdvr Lacks Enterprises, 
Inc.- Lacks E 2011 
2013 332 2.86 $96,725 E C 0.395 124 Kent 6.2 21.5 5.31 
Project 
13 
0066000000uLpVt Magna Exteriors and 
Interiors USA, Inc.-E 
(Phase 2) - FY2014 
2014 3361-3363 4.15 $239,128 E C 0.999 445 St Clair 9.6 32.4 2.69 
Project 
14 
0066000000KLEKP Magna Seating of 
America Inc.- 
Highland Park E 
2012 
2012 3361-3363 4.15 $250,392 E C 0.904 263 Wayne 11.7 13.3 2.67 
Project 
15 
0066000000KtzIB MedDirect, Inc.- 
MedDirect E 2012 
2012 54 2.36 $91,510 E C 0.316 100 Kent 6.8 7.8 4.31 
Project 
16 
0066000000IR6f6 Muskegon Castings 
Corp - new facility 
2012 
2012 331 3.37 $182,786 NF C 0.671 148 Muskego
n 
10 6.1 3.97 
Project 
17 
0066000000LR3cl Ogihara America 
Corporation-Howell 
2014 3361-3363 4.15 $239,128 E C 0.364 78 Livingsto
n 
6.4 15.8 2.18 
Project 
18 
0066000000HROYN Pinnacle Foods 
Corporation/Vlasic 
Brands-SQF E 
2013 311-312 3.65 $131,717 E C 1.011 46 Lapeer 11.4 1.8 4.24 
Project 
19 
0066000000P1YFe Rassini Frenos S A 
de C V - Rassini 
Brakes 
2013 3361-3363 4.15 $255,644 NF C 0.607 61 Genesee 9.7 2.6 3.26 
Project 
20 





2013 3361-3363 4.15 $255,644 NF C 2.572 172 Wayne 11.5 19.6 2.71 
Project 
21 
0066000000M4YQG Summit Polymers, 
Inc.- Three Site E 
2013 326 3.22 $98,565 E C 0.468 77 Kalamaz
oo 
6.9 7.6 6.11 
Project 
22 
0066000000MZdp4 Undercar Products 
Group-Undercar E 
2012 
2013 326 3.22 $98,565 E C 0.580 151 Kent 6.2 19.5 6.36 
Project 
23 
0063200001lpXKt Unique Instruments, 
Inc.- FY2016 - 
manufacturing 
relocation 
2017 339 2.76 $112,917 R C 0.112 34 Saginaw 5.5 5.8 5.60 







































0066000000TopJ8 Ventra Grand 
Rapids 5, LLC-
Sassy E 2013 






2013 54 2.02 $91,567 R C 2.893 180 Berrien 8.7 3.3 5.76 
Project 
26 
0066000000ODjwU Baker Aerospace 
Tooling & 
Machining, Inc.- E 





2013 51 2.72 $171,355 E T 0.190 1 Washten
aw 





Challenge E 2013 
2015 3361-3363 4.15 $244,875 E T 1.150 153 Allegan 4.1 9 2.77 
Project 
29 
0066000000NEKip Eberspacher North 
America, Inc.-E-
2014 
2016 3361-3363 4.15 $238,380 E T 1.279 142 Livingsto
n 
4.1 7.6 2.24 
Project 
30 
0066000000xJ4aG Fullerton Tool 
Company - E - 2014 





Acquisition & E 2012 






Partners LLC - E - 
2015 




Corporation - E - 
2014 
2015 335 3.34 $178,122 E T 0.026 6 Calhoun 5.1 7.3 3.57 
Project 
34 
0066000000Ng2vi Norplas Industries - 
Michigan Assembly 
2014 3361-3363 4.15 $239,128 NF T 0.765 393 Wayne 9.7 16.2 2.82 
Project 
35 
0066000000X22zv NOVO 1 - New 
Michigan Center 
2014 
2014 56 1.50 $44,086 NF T 0.000 0 Kent 4.9 9  
Project 
36 






2012 54 2.36 $91,510 E T 0.463 6 Oakland 8.2 25.6 2.21 
Project 
37 
0066000000LSu0l Quality Edge, Inc. - 
QE 2012 
2013 331 3.37 $165,283 E T 0.029 27 Kent 6.2 6.6 3.19 







































0063200001l0KFc ROL USA, Inc.- 
Project Lithuania E - 
FY2016 
2016 337 2.87 $114,098 E T 0.000 30 Allegan 3.9 2.7  
Project 
39 
0066000000Itdy7 Teijin Advanced 
Composites America 
Inc.-Tech Center 
2013 54 2.36 $91,567 NF T 0.385 22 Oakland 7.8 4.5 3.06 
Project 
40 
0066000001ihXAc Terryberry Company 
- E - FY2015 
2015 339 2.76 $116,400 E T 0.157 30 Kent 3.8 6.9 4.46 
Project 
41 
0066000000X1Lbt XanEdu Publishing, 
Inc.-E 2014 
2016 42 2.49 $166,595 E T 0.084 16 Washten
aw 






2015 3361-3363 4.15 $244,875 E P 0.234 78 Wayne 6.9 8.4 2.65 
Project 
43 
0066000001OBIkH Agape Plastics, Inc. 
- E - FY2015 
2016 326 3.22 $105,588 E P 0.320 58 Ottawa 3.4 4.5 6.37 
Project 
44 
0066000001dOs7H AGC America, Inc - 
Project R - FY2016 
2017 327 3.19 $143,124 R P 0.076 10 Oakland 3.4 6.3 3.43 
Project 
45 
0066000000S9W1K Aisin Technical 
Center-Northville 
relocation E 2013 
2015 54 2.36 $94,297 E P 0.895 103 Wayne 6.9 5.6 4.14 
Project 
46 
0066000000xHdHh American Axle & 
Manufacturing - E 
(Detroit Technical 
Center) - 2014 
2015 3361-3363 4.15 $244,875 E P 0.607 44 Wayne 6.9 1.4 2.62 
Project 
47 
0066000000ld8p6 Anchor Coupling, 
Inc.- E (Project 
Topaz) - 2014 
2015 333 2.46 $118,937 E P 0.873 57 Menomin
ee 
5.4 2.4 5.69 
Project 
48 
0060d00001qSrBl Antolin Shelby, Inc.- 
E - FY2018 
2017 3361-3363 4.15 $233,804 E P 3.755 110 Macomb 4.3 7.5 2.61 
Project 
49 
0063200001mi0Mf ArcelorMittal - E - 
FY2017 (Project 
Ace) 
2017 332 2.86 $96,220 E P 1.968 83 Wayne 5.4 3.2 4.99 
Project 
50 
0066000000LST6O ArcticAx US Ltd-
ArcticAX 2012 New 
Site in Grand Rapids 
2012 54 2.36 $91,510 NS P 0.156 9 Kent 6.8 7.6 4.03 
Project 
51 
0066000001dND9F Atomic Object, LLC - 
E - FY2015 
2016 54 2.36 $94,509 E P 0.090 8 Kent 3.5 4.2 4.56 
Project 
52 
0063200001oZ0X7 Attwood Corporation 
- Project MotorGuide 
- E FY2017 
2018 332 2.86 $94,468 E P 0.305 16 Kent 3.6 4 6.08 







































0063200001mRpiI Automotive Lighting 





2017 3361-3363 4.15 $233,804 E P 1.669 167 Oakland 3.4 7.8 2.60 
Project 
54 
0066000000dwlc4 AvaSure - E - 2014 2016 339 2.76 $115,127 E P 0.403 75 Kent 3.5 9 4.79 
Project 
55 
0063200001oD644 Baker Industries, 
Inc. - E - FY2017 
2017 333 2.95 $108,560 E P 0.153 40 Macomb 4.3 3.7 4.70 
Project 
56 
0066000000MblEd Black & Veatch 
Corporation- New 
Market E 
2014 54 2.36 $92,415 NS P 0.314 51 Washten
aw 
4.9 9.2 4.31 
Project 
57 
0066000000MZeM9 Bleistahl North 
America LP-Project 
Heavy Metal 





Company-2013 MI - 
IN Consolidation 
2014 333 2.46 $115,448 R P 0.152 39 Lenawee 6.4 5.7 6.02 
Project 
59 
0066000000Qf5Kp BorgWarner Inc. - 
R&D Center E - 
FY2014 
2015 3361-3363 4.15 $244,875 E P 3.740 180 Oakland 4.7 4.7 2.14 
Project 
60 
0063200001mBac0 BorgWarner, Inc. - 
R&D E - FY2016 
2017 3361-3363 4.15 $233,804 E P 0.764 76 Oakland 3.4 0.8 2.70 
Project 
61 
0066000000xIuE6 Brose North America 
-Project Huron 
2015 54 2.36 $94,297 E P 2.384 257 Wayne 6.9 3.9 4.17 
Project 
62 
0066000001ihuSt Byrne Electrical 
Specialists - E - 
FY2016 
2016 334 3.03 $110,289 E P 0.171 34 Montcal
m 
5.3 7.6 6.27 
Project 
63 
0066000000dtdSt Capital Welding, 
Inc.-2014 E 
2014 Rest of 
336 
3.54 $111,948 E P 0.488 73 Wayne 9.7 6.1 5.86 
Project 
64 
0066000000lczGf Cargill Kitchen 
Solutions - E - 
FY2015 
2015 311-312 3.65 $134,184 E P 0.287 83 Ionia 4.6 6 5.64 
Project 
65 
0063200001jG6b7 Carhartt, Inc. - E - 
FY2015 
2016 315-316 1.90 $58,911 E P 0.326 51 Wayne 6.3 6.2 5.77 
Project 
66 
0066000000ldndX Cascade Die 
Casting Group - E - 
2014 
2015 331 3.37 $142,992 E P 0.317 54 Kent 3.8 7.5 4.40 












































2014 54 2.36 $92,415 NS P 1.799 150 Wayne 9.7 4.3 4.02 
Project 
68 
0066000000leJXU CDK Global, LLC - E 
- 2014 







2016 3361-3363 4.15 $238,380 NS P 1.525 250 Oakland 4.2 8.6 2.43 
Project 
70 




2012 311-312 3.65 $133,250 NS P 3.306 59 Grand 
Traverse 
8.3 2.9 4.12 
Project 
71 





2014 337 2.87 $113,617 NS P 0.231 63 Ottawa 4.8 6 5.03 
Project 
72 
0066000000Ph2na Circuit Controls 
Corporation-VW E 




Logistics - New 
Building Detroit - 
2013 




Facility Integration - 
E 2011 





- Project Apollo 
2015 3361-3363 4.15 $244,875 E P 0.963 250 Oakland 4.7 21.1 2.59 
Project 
76 
0066000000S7prc Cooper Standard 
Automotive-Ford 
Work 
2014 3361-3363 4.15 $239,128 E P 1.151 192 Oscoda 11.8 6.8 4.11 
Project 
77 
0066000000IrRGR Cooper Standard 
Automotive-Leonard 
E 
2013 3361-3363 4.15 $255,644 E P 0.162 30 Oakland 7.8 11.1 1.87 
Project 
78 
0063200001jmBw9 Coyote Logistice - 
Logistics Operations 
- FY16 
2016 48-49 1.91 $77,797 E P 0.187 78 Washten
aw 
3.7 4.5 4.94 







































0066000000P3Em5 Coyote Logistics, 
LLC-Michigan E-
2013 
2014 54 2.36 $92,415 E P 1.142 122 Washten
aw 
4.9 1.9 4.75 
Project 
80 
0063200001nZzpq Creative Foam 
Corporation - E - 
FY2017 
2017 326 3.22 $103,562 E P 0.134 37 Genesee 5.8 3.4 7.61 
Project 
81 
0066000000KKuwp Credit Acceptance 
Corporation- 2012 E 
2013 52 2.81 $96,102 E P 2.051 310 Oakland 7.8 7.2 4.77 
Project 
82 
0063200001mTUHY CUP Acquisition, 
LLC dba Custom 
Profile, Inc. - E - 
FY2017 
2017 326 3.22 $103,562 E P 0.227 57 Kent 3.5 1.8 6.53 
Project 
83 
0063200001kZvPy Daifuku - E 
(Engineering Center 
and HQ 'Project 
Kryptonite') - 
FY2016 
2016 55 3.08 $162,913 E P 0.417 68 Oakland 4.2 23.1 2.36 
Project 
84 
0066000000OkKce Dairy Farmers of 
America-Project 
Thumb 





2015 51 2.72 $173,462 E P 0.120 18 Wayne 6.9 10.4 2.24 
Project 
86 
0063200001nkRjy Denso International 
America, Inc.- E - 
FY2017 







2013 3361-3363 4.15 $255,644 E P 1.774 266 Calhoun 7.9 7.3 3.19 
Project 
88 
0066000000OCPzV Denso-2012 R&D E 2013 3361-3363 4.15 $255,644 E P 1.799 176 Oakland 7.8 5 2.18 
Project 
89 
00660000016jupO Detroit Diesel 
Corporation - E - 
FY2015 
2016 3361-3363 4.15 $238,380 E P 0.270 50 Wayne 6.3 19.6 2.83 
Project 
90 
0066000000Nftp4 Detroit Diesel-E 
2013 
2016 3361-3363 4.15 $238,380 E P 0.255 100 Wayne 6.3 11 2.85 
Project 
91 
0063200001nZw2y Detroit Engineered 
Products, Inc. - E - 
FY2017 
2017 54 2.36 $94,614 E P 0.178 26 Oakland 3.4 6.4 3.76 











































2013 3361-3363 4.15 $255,644 E P 0.931 329 Wayne 11.5 26.6 2.53 
Project 
93 
0066000000OFAsk Dieomatic, Inc.- 
Cosma Casting E 
2013 
2014 3361-3363 4.15 $239,128 E P 0.763 201 Calhoun 6.3 11.5 3.87 
Project 
94 
0066000000NEWj8 Dieomatic, Inc.- E 
2012 
2013 3361-3363 4.15 $255,644 E P 0.759 235 Oakland 7.8 28.6 2.36 
Project 
95 
0063200001l0uvS Disher- E - FY2016 2017 54 2.36 $94,614 E P 0.050 18 Washten
aw 
3.6 8.3 4.91 
Project 
96 
0063200001lqcbd Dorel Home 
Furnishings, Inc. - E 
- FY2017 
2017 337 2.40 $105,018 E P 0.107 36 Cass 4.7 3.8 7.09 
Project 
97 
0063200001l2Vp9 Dornerworks Ltd - E 
- FY2016 
2016 54 2.36 $94,509 E P 0.119 16 Kent 3.5 4.7 4.76 
Project 
98 
0063200001lomzf Duo Security - E - 
FY2016 
2017 51 2.72 $164,035 E P 0.641 75 Washten
aw 
3.6 8.7 2.86 
Project 
99 
0063200001l25ny Eagle Film Extruders 
- E - FY2016 
















Retention - FY2015 
2016 332 2.86 $98,103 E P 0.368 91 Macomb 5.2 12.7 5.09 
Project 
102 
0063200001mT62g Fairlife, LLC - 
Project Boundary 
Waters - FY2017 
2017 311-312 3.65 $136,220 E P 2.451 52 Ottawa 3.3 1.3 4.61 
Project 
103 
0066000000QdS39 Firstronic LLC-GR E 
2013 
2013 3361-3363 4.15 $255,644 E P 0.372 110 Kent 6.2 15.9 2.70 
Project 
104 
0066000000lezLp Flow-Rite Controls, 
Ltd. - E - 2014 
2014 332 2.86 $97,634 E P 0.128 70 Kent 4.9 9.8 6.13 
Project 
105 
0066000001OBe9T Fori Automation - E - 
FY2015 
2015 333 2.95 $118,937 E P 0.280 55 Macomb 5.8 11.8 4.30 
Project 
106 
0066000000xGmSG Founders Brewing 
Company - E - 2015 
2015 311-312 3.65 $134,184 E P 0.265 283 Kent 3.8 8.2 6.13 







































0066000000OkzE6 Fuyao Automotive 
North America Inc - 
Encapsulation Plant 
2015 327 3.19 $154,867 E P 0.865 84 Oakland 4.7 2.9 2.90 
Project 
108 
0066000000xGEPc Gentherm - E and 
Relocation - FY2015 
2015 54 2.36 $94,297 E P 0.539 103 Oakland 4.7 20.5 3.71 
Project 
109 
0066000000P1pgc GKN Driveline North 
America-Project 
EDGE 
2014 54 2.36 $92,415 E P 1.200 50 Oakland 6.5 0.7 3.17 
Project 
110 




2015 337 2.87 $114,098 R P 0.229 53 Kent 3.8 5.6 4.89 
Project 
111 
0066000001dNNOF Great Expressions 
Dental Center HQ- 
HQ Relocation (E) - 
FY2015 
2016 55 3.08 $162,913 R P 0.314 84 Oakland 4.2 9.6 2.68 
Project 
112 
0066000000uLMUe Hannigan Insurance 
- E - 2014 
2015 56 1.50 $45,128 E P 0.095 16 Washten
aw 
3.7 3.7 5.87 
Project 
113 
0063200001kPcbu Hanson Systems, 
LLC dba Eagle 
Technologies Group 
- E - FY2016 
2016 333 2.46 $110,685 E P 0.497 73 Berrien 5 8.3 7.09 
Project 
114 









Company, LLC - 
Relocation - FY2015 
2015 332 2.86 $97,697 NS P 0.069 11 Van 
Buren 
6.3 5.7 7.00 
Project 
116 
0066000000uLitS Harman - E 
(+Consolidation) - 
2014 
2016 334 3.03 $110,289 E P 0.427 72 Oakland 4.2 15.6 4.23 
Project 
117 
0063200001jXlpI Hearthside Food 
Solutions - E K2 - 
FY2015 
2016 311-312 3.65 $138,886 E P 0.328 80 Kent 3.5 5.9 5.08 
Project 
118 
0066000001dMjlC Hearthside Food 
Solutions, LLC -
Hickey and 
Associates - E - 
FY2015 Project 
Desert 
2015 311-312 3.65 $134,184 E P 0.505 149 Kent 3.8 4.5 5.11 









































2013 332 2.86 $96,725 E P 0.355 154 Oakland 7.8 15.3 4.49 
Project 
120 
0063200001jGHrL Herbruck Poultry 
Ranch Inc - E - 
FY15 
2015 11 (Farm) 1.52 $45,425 E P 0.834 110 Ionia 4.6 13.7 6.02 
Project 
121 




2014 11 (Farm) 1.52 $49,971 E P 0.607 53 Ionia 6.2 1.3 4.65 
Project 
122 
0066000000leE3e Hirotec America Inc. 
- Major E - 2014-
2015 
2015 333 2.95 $118,937 E P 1.117 110 Oakland 4.7 6.3 3.99 
Project 
123 
0066000000xHKd4 Howmet Corporation 
- E (Thermatech 
Coatings) - 2014 
2017 Rest of 
336 
3.54 $118,435 E P 0.174 15 Muskego
n 
5.4 5 6.91 
Project 
124 
0066000000TpN3u HTC Global 
Services, 
Incorporated-E 2013 
2015 54 2.36 $94,297 E P 1.869 252 Oakland 4.7 3.8 3.62 
Project 
125 
0066000000dxPRN InGlass- North 
American E 2014 
2015 331 3.37 $142,992 E P 0.238 50 Kent 3.8 11.2 4.59 
Project 
126 
0066000000TpZbW Intrepid Properties, 
Inc. - Attraction 
(Costco Distribution 
Center) - 2014 
2015 48-49 1.88 $77,852 E P 0.481 270 Wayne 6.9 10.9 4.25 
Project 
127 
00660000016ltWf Irwin Seating 
Company - E - 2015 
2015 55 3.08 $161,717 E P 0.321 119 Kent 3.8 8.6 3.70 
Project 
128 




2014 52 2.44 $109,084 E P 3.202 400 Ingham 6.2 6.3 4.78 
Project 
129 
0066000000KNIOH Jason Incorporated 
(dba Janesville 
Acoustics)- New 
Battle Creek Facility 
2012 




Technology, Inc - 
GE Aviation - 
Muskegon E - 
FY2016 
2017 Rest of 
336 
3.54 $118,435 E P 0.833 82 Muskego
n 
5.4 4.6 6.95 







































0063200001lpL2R JR Automation 
Technologies, LLC- 
Project River E - FY 
2016 
2017 333 2.95 $108,560 E P 2.262 256 Ottawa 3.3 3.5 5.47 
Project 
132 




2013 333 2.95 $113,838 E P 0.367 93 Ottawa 6.1 18.5 4.73 
Project 
133 
0066000000KuYi8 Kalitta Air-Oscoda E 
2014 
2014 48-49 1.91 $78,687 E P 2.314 220 Iosco 9.7 1.8 5.60 
Project 
134 
0066000000OFpIz Kay Automotive 
Graphics-new facility 





2014 332 2.40 $97,634 E P 0.409 83 Berrien 6.8 12.2 7.77 
Project 
136 
0063200001mRqLa Kerkstra Precast, 
Inc. - E New Facility 
(Project Mix) - 
FY2017 




Incorporated- E - 
FY2017 
2018 313-314 1.95 $80,689 E P 0.153 25 Allegan 3.96 4.9 5.06 
Project 
138 
0063200001l2rKG Kraft Heinz 
Company - Project 
Footprint E - FY 
2016 
2017 311-312 3.65 $136,220 E P 0.509 55 Ottawa 3.3 3.1 5.52 
Project 
139 
0066000001OBxgS KUKA Systems 
North America LLC - 
Retention - FY2015 
2015 333 2.95 $118,937 E P 0.539 119 Macomb 5.8 5.8 4.89 
Project 
140 
0066000000Tomyb Lauren Plastics- Iso-
Trude Acquisition 
2014 326 3.22 $100,055 R P 0.270 50 Ottawa 4.8 7.2 5.90 
Project 
141 
0066000000OEEej Lenawee Stamping 
Corporation-2013 
2013 3361-3363 3.36 $255,644 NS P 6.025 475 Lenawee 7.8 1.8 3.95 
Project 
142 
0066000001OD14P LHP Software-E- 
2015 
2016 54 2.36 $94,509 E P 0.426 71 Oakland 4.2 6.3 3.81 
Project 
143 
0063200001oB52Q Lineage Logistics 
LLC - HQ Relocation 
- FY2017 
2017 48-49 1.88 $79,078 R P 0.320 40 Oakland 3.4 3.6 3.46 
Project 
144 
0066000000lcQhg Lippert Components 
Manufacturing Inc- 
IDS Acquisition & 
Growth 
2015 54 2.36 $94,297 E P 0.224 103 Macomb 5.8 12.8 3.95 







































0063200001pkdsu Litehouse, Inc. - E - 
FY2018 
2017 311-312 3.65 $136,220 E P 0.470 102 Kent 3.5 1.9 5.44 
Project 
146 
00660000016mZWs Loc Performance 
Products, Inc. - E 
(Defense) - 2014 
2015 Rest of 
336 
3.54 $124,331 E P 0.683 95 Wayne 6.9 7.1 5.27 
Project 
147 
0066000000OEEci Lyons Consulting 
Group-Ann Arbor E-
2012 
2014 518-519 2.81 $104,208 E P 0.353 30 Washten
aw 
4.9 5.1 5.07 
Project 
148 
00660000016jNnL Magna International 
of America, Mimco 
Inc.- E (Autosystems 
America Inc. DBA 
Magna Lighting) - 
FY2015 
2017 3361-3363 4.15 $233,804 E P 1.204 175 Wayne 5.4 11 2.98 
Project 
149 
0063200001l0NYu Magna Seating of 
America Inc.- E - 
FY2016 Highland 
Park 
2016 3361-3363 4.15 $238,380 E P 0.804 213 Wayne 6.3 11 2.89 
Project 
150 
0066000000QdcLJ Mahindra GenZe - 
EV Manufacturing 
2015 3361-3363 4.15 $244,875 NS P 0.328 36 Washten
aw 
3.7 2.3 3.28 
Project 
151 




Technical Center) - 
NA Technical Center 
- FY14 
2014 54 2.36 $92,415 NS P 0.581 127 Oakland 6.5 17.8 3.82 
Project 
152 
0063200001l1vil Majestic Industries, 
Inc. - Retention/E - 
FY2016 





2015 326 3.22 $108,099 E P 0.367 70 Kalamaz
oo 
4.3 12.3 6.44 
Project 
154 
0066000000dtwp6 Marada Industries 
Inc. dba Cosma 
Body Assembly 
Michigan - New 
Development - 
FY2015 




Automotive - E - 
FY2016 
2017 335 3.34 $175,003 E P 0.153 25 Oakland 3.4 3.3 2.89 











































2013 311-312 3.65 $131,717 NS P 3.791 65 Grand 
Traverse 
7.6 2.7 4.23 
Project 
157 





2013 3361-3363 4.15 $255,644 E P 0.248 50 Wayne 11.5 10 2.47 
Project 
158 
0066000000le2RN Medbio, Inc. - E - 
2014 





Inc- E project 2014 
2015 42 2.49 $167,083 E P 0.112 66 Wayne 6.9 13.2 2.21 
Project 
160 
0066000000P3rhG Merhow- Relocation 2013 3361-3363 3.36 $255,644 R P 0.240 49 St 
Joseph 
7.8 11 3.56 
Project 
161 
0066000001ihLBf Michigan Brand - E - 
FY2015 
2016 311-312 3.65 $138,886 E P 0.274 98 Saginaw 5.3 12.6 6.11 
Project 
162 
0066000001dMinD Mico Industries - E - 
FY2015 
2016 332 2.86 $98,103 E P 0.082 34 Kent 3.5 6.5 6.42 
Project 
163 
0066000000ldH4v Middleville Tool & 
Die Company, Inc. - 
E New Product Line 
- 2014 
2015 333 2.95 $118,937 NS P 0.392 36 Barry 4.3 4.2 5.14 
Project 
164 
0063200001oZBBM Milacron - DME 
Company LLC - E 
FY2017 
2017 333 2.95 $108,560 E P 0.178 40 Montcal
m 
5.1 6.3 6.23 
Project 
165 
0063200001kOm7v MMI Engineered 




2017 326 3.22 $103,562 E P 0.134 43 Washten
aw 
3.6 9 6.88 
Project 
166 
0066000000uLtOE Mobis North 
America - Plymouth 
2015 54 2.36 $94,297 R P 0.853 46 Wayne 6.9 5.7 3.75 
Project 
167 
0066000000SoJxc Molina Healthcare - 
Michigan Healthplan 
Operations E 2014 
2015 52 2.44 $124,192 E P 2.630 542 Oakland 4.7 5.4 2.78 
Project 
168 
0066000000M4Kef Mophie- Kalamazoo 
Relocation 
2014 54 2.36 $92,415 R P 0.280 52 Kalamaz
oo 
5.6 5.3 4.58 
Project 
169 
0066000000NgRpm Moran Iron Works, 
Inc.-Dock E 
2013 332 2.86 $96,725 E P 1.215 0 Presque 
Isle 
14.7 0.3 1.25 









































Company LLC - E 
FY2017 




Composites, LLC - E 
- FY2016 
2017 Rest of 
336 
3.54 $118,435 E P 0.096 25 Shiawas
see 
5.3 11.7 7.08 
Project 
172 
0066000000Pgnnw Navitas Advanced 
Solutions Group-Ann 
Arbor 
2013 335 3.34 $192,503 E P 0.596 40 Washten
aw 
5.8 4.1 2.85 
Project 
173 
0063200001jWbX0 Neapco Drivelines, 
LLC - E (Driveline 
Systems) - FY2015 
2016 3361-3363 4.15 $238,380 E P 0.561 58 Wayne 6.3 1 2.82 
Project 
174 
0066000000dveTq Neogen Corporation 
- E - 2014 





2014 54 2.36 $92,415 NS P 2.421 102 Kalamaz
oo 
5.6 1.8 4.26 
Project 
176 
00660000016kpDM NHK International 
Corporation- E - 
2015 
2016 54 2.36 $94,509 E P 0.168 26 Oakland 4.2 6.7 3.61 
Project 
177 
0066000000uMCjh Norma Group 
Americas - E & 
Consolidation - 
FY2015 
2016 332 2.86 $98,103 E P 0.187 97 Oakland 4.2 17.5 4.58 
Project 
178 
0063200001joEde Norplas Industries 
Inc (Magna Dexsys) 
Phase II (E) - FY 
2015 
2016 3361-3363 4.15 $238,380 E P 0.672 193 Eaton 4.1 19.4 3.52 
Project 
179 
0066000000Tqj51 Nyloncraft, Inc.-MI 
vs Sister Facilities & 
Mexico 2013 
2014 326 2.67 $100,055 R P 0.175 41 Hillsdale 7 6 7.83 
Project 
180 
0066000000xHqhZ Oakland Stamping - 
E Detroit - 2014 
2015 3361-3363 4.15 $244,875 E P 0.328 103 Wayne 6.9 22.9 2.79 
Project 
181 
0063200001lpvbS Oerlikon USA-New 
production facility 
2017 333 2.95 $108,560 NS P 0.417 50 Wayne 5.4 5.8 5.15 
Project 
182 
0066000001OEULq OMT VEYHL USA 
CORPORATION - E 
- FY2015 
2015 23 2.20 $79,840 E P 0.799 206 Ottawa 3.6 6.8 5.63 
Project 
183 
0066000000MdHrw OPS Solutions-HQ 
location 
2013 334 3.03 $118,635 E P 0.474 26 Oakland 7.8 1.6 4.28 
Project 
184 
00660000016kQ7E Paslin Company- E - 
2015 
2015 333 2.95 $118,937 E P 1.954 200 Macomb 5.8 6.9 4.00 








































Fabricating, LLC - 
New Development - 
FY2016 
2017 332 2.86 $96,220 NS P 0.160 56 Genesee 5.8 5.1 7.16 
Project 
186 
0066000000RCd2J Pillar Technology 
Group, LLC-Office E 
2014 54 2.36 $92,415 E P 0.391 52 Washten
aw 
4.9 4 5.11 
Project 
187 
0066000000X0THj Plasan Carbon 
Composites - E - 
2014 
2014 3361-3363 4.15 $239,128 E P 5.702 418 Kent 4.9 22.9 3.16 
Project 
188 
0066000001OCXxn Plasan North 
America Inc Project 
Shield - Relocation - 
FY2015 
2016 335 3.34 $178,428 E P 0.393 41 Kent 3.5 6.8 3.47 
Project 
189 
0066000001VDXdi Project Wildcat - 
Attraction (Hangar) - 
FY2015 







2015 332 2.86 $97,697 E P 0.088 20 Kent 3.8 5.6 5.66 
Project 
191 
0066000000P3dFW Rec Boat Holdings-
Jet Propulsion Boat 
E 
2014 Rest of 
336 
3.54 $111,948 E P 0.972 1 Wexford 8.6 4.6 0.66 
Project 
192 
0063200001jm5Ko Rivian Automotive - 
R&D Center - 2015 
2016 54 2.36 $94,509 NS P 0.729 68 Wayne 6.3 2.8 4.08 
Project 
193 
0066000000KwJWx RNFL Acquisition 
LLC- Biogenic 
Reagents 
2012 335 3.34 $181,446 NS P 2.528 27 Marquett
e 
8.1 12.3 3.32 
Project 
194 
0066000000X0LMs Roush Industries, 
Inc. - E - Allen Park 
2014 
2015 54 2.36 $94,297 E P 1.145 210 Wayne 6.9 5.6 4.27 
Project 
195 
0066000000ld5mP S&P Data LLC - 
New Operations 
Center - 2014 
2014 56 1.50 $44,086 NS P 0.713 100 Oakland 6.5 10.5 4.60 
Project 
196 
0066000000dvsEC Sakthi Auto Group 
USA - E - 2014 
2015 3361-3363 4.15 $244,875 E P 3.886 367 Wayne 6.9 7.6 2.93 
Project 
197 
0066000000PhXY7 Senderra RX 
Partners, LLC-E-
2013 
2014 44-45 1.49 $53,818 E P 0.243 72 Genesee 7.9 7 5.23 
Project 
198 
0066000001HGP9Q Sensient- E - 
(Harbor Beach) - 
2015 
2017 311-312 3.65 $136,220 E P 0.153 28 Huron 5.3 12.5 5.44 







































0066000001OExdb Shepherd Caster 
LLC Project Flock - 
E - FY2015 
2015 332 2.40 $97,697 E P 0.393 50 Berrien 5.2 4.6 7.05 
Project 
200 
0066000001HGnq1 Shift Digital - E HQ - 
FY2015 
2016 54 2.36 $94,509 E P 0.321 95 Oakland 4.2 7.7 3.74 
Project 
201 
0066000000lc9SH Shiloh Industries, 
Inc., Canton Mfg 
Division - E - 
FY2015 
2015 331 3.37 $142,992 E P 1.641 102 Wayne 6.9 26.6 4.14 
Project 
202 
0063200001kZvcU Shipston Aluminum 
Technologies - E - 
FY2016 





Sigma Machine - E - 
FY2017 
2017 331 3.37 $121,395 E P 0.122 20 Kalamaz
oo 
4.1 7.1 5.91 
Project 
204 
0066000000xFhws SL America - North 
America Engineering 
Center - 2014 
2015 54 2.36 $94,297 E P 0.603 55 Oakland 4.7 5.2 3.84 
Project 
205 
0066000000OCY6Y SMR Automotive 
Systems USA, Inc.-
Southern E 
2014 327 3.19 $135,084 E P 4.598 354 St Clair 9.6 4.1 3.88 
Project 
206 
0066000000lbvmd SolarBos - Attraction 
2014 
2015 335 3.34 $178,122 NS P 0.187 52 Kent 3.8 7.8 3.61 
Project 
207 
0063200001oZaYJ Sonoco Protective 
Solutions - E - 
FY2017 
2017 339 2.76 $112,917 E P 0.159 31 Shiawas
see 






2014 42 2.49 $167,340 E P 1.776 72 Kent 4.9 7.4 2.40 
Project 
209 
0063200001nhvfd Speedrack Products 
Group, Ltd. - E - 
FY2017 
2018 332 2.40 $94,468 E P 0.153 26 Hillsdale 4.95 4.6 8.13 
Project 
210 
0063200001lp117 Spiech Farms - E - 
FY2016 
2016 11 (Farm) 1.52 $38,868 E P 0.173 43 Van 
Buren 





2014 54 2.36 $92,415 E P 0.440 20 Wayne 9.7 0.5 4.17 
Project 
212 
0063200001kZcdS ST USA Holding 
Corp dba Sport 
Truck USA Inc. - E - 
FY2016 






2017 334 3.03 $108,172 NS P 0.071 17 Oakland 3.4 27.3 4.59 







































0063200001kZzlf Stoneridge, Inc. - 
E/Consolidation 
(Project Pebble) - 
FY2016 
2017 3361-3363 4.15 $233,804 R P 0.361 28 Oakland 3.4 5.5 2.58 
Project 
215 
00660000016lpqU Summit Polymers, 
Inc. Project SP - 
Multi-Site E - 2015 
2015 326 3.22 $108,099 E P 0.634 146 Kalamaz
oo 
4.3 7.6 6.31 
Project 
216 
00660000016li2S Superior Industries 
International Inc. - 
Relocation of HQ - 
FY15 
2015 3361-3363 4.15 $244,875 R P 0.905 67 Oakland 4.7 8.7 2.36 
Project 
217 
0066000000X2Mhe TD Ameritrade-New 
2014 
2015 52 1.59 $124,192 NS P 0.568 52 Washten
aw 
3.7 6.6 2.07 
Project 
218 
0063200001l38rO TecNiq - 
E/Relocation - 
FY2016 
2017 3361-3363 4.15 $233,804 E P 0.168 35 Kalamaz
oo 
4.1 14.1 3.57 
Project 
219 
00660000016jUir TG Fluid Systems 
USA Corporation - E 
- FY2015 
2015 3361-3363 4.15 $244,875 E P 0.167 39 Livingsto
n 
4.6 7 2.47 
Project 
220 
0063200001l1GWH ThinkTech, Inc - E 
(TDAmeritrade) - 
FY2016 
2017 54 2.36 $94,614 E P 0.176 50 Washten
aw 
3.6 8.3 4.89 
Project 
221 
00660000016jpBv TI Automotive LLC - 
HQ E - FY2015 
2016 3361-3363 4.15 $238,380 E P 0.195 26 Oakland 4.2 4.4 2.41 
Project 
222 
0066000000X0cxq Toyoda Gosei North 
America - E (HQ) - 
2014 




Automotive LLC - 
New Facility - 
FY2015 
2015 3361-3363 4.15 $244,875 NS P 0.605 82 Macomb 5.8 11.8 2.70 
Project 
224 
0066000000S7HEv Triumph Gear 
Systems-Project 
TG1-2013 





2014 3361-3363 4.15 $239,128 E P 0.840 153 Calhoun 6.3 10.7 3.38 
Project 
226 
0066000000NhavV Two Men And A 
Truck-Corporate HQ 
E-2012 
2013 55 3.08 $156,085 E P 0.426 76 Ingham 7.7 9.5 3.77 
Project 
227 
0063200001naD2y UACJ Automotive 
Whitehall Industries, 
Inc.- E - FY2017 
2017 331 3.37 $121,395 E P 0.255 50 Mason 5.8 7.5 6.57 







































0063200001k49qR Ultra Manufacturing 
(USA) Inc. dba 
Mitchell Plastics-
2016 Manufacturing 
2018 42 2.49 $165,962 NS P 0.178 69 Macomb 4.32 7.4 2.27 
Project 
229 
0066000000xGdE1 Unified Business 
Technologies, Inc. - 
E - 2014 
2015 334 3.03 $109,080 E P 0.351 25 Oakland 4.7 14.3 3.97 
Project 
230 
0066000000SSADq Urban Science 
Applications, Inc.- E 
- FY2014 
2016 51 2.72 $176,838 E P 0.477 63 Wayne 6.3 10.3 2.20 
Project 
231 
0063200001mi0hY Valeo North 
America, Inc. - E & 
Test Track (Project 
Leo) - FY2017 
2017 3361-3363 4.15 $233,804 E P 0.182 71 Oakland 3.4 2.8 2.65 
Project 
232 
0066000001OE0wH Valiant International 
E - FY2015 





2016 51 2.72 $176,838 NS P 0.274 63 Oakland 4.2 8.4 2.07 
Project 
234 
0066000000dtree Ventra Ionia Main, 
LLC - E 2014 Ventra 
Ionia Facility 
2015 3361-3363 4.15 $244,875 E P 0.569 406 Ionia 4.6 13.3 3.16 
Project 
235 
0063200001mhw8d Vickers Engineering, 
Inc. - E - FY2017 
2017 332 2.40 $96,220 E P 0.127 40 Berrien 5 6.1 7.96 
Project 
236 
0066000000dvevl Walbro Engine 
Management - E 
(Cass City) - 2015 
2015 326 3.22 $108,099 E P 0.184 30 Tuscola 6.7 9.6 6.82 
Project 
237 





2015 331 3.37 $142,992 NS P 0.265 0 Calhoun 5.1 17.9 0.31 
Project 
238 






2017 326 3.22 $103,562 E P 0.195 49 Wexford 5.7 6.2 7.55 
Project 
239 
0066000000P3nEK ZYNP International 
Corporation-
Romulus E 2013 
2014 54 2.36 $92,415 E P 0.213 26 Wayne 9.7 8.8 4.00 
a Abbreviations: E = Expansion; NF = New facility; R = Relocation; A = Acquisition; NS = New site. 
b Abbreviations:  C = Completed; T = Terminated; P = Pending. 
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